REFUGEES IN GHANA: STRENGTHENING UNHCR AND GOG

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ACCRA 000248

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: GH LI PREF PREL TO
SUBJECT: REFUGEES IN GHANA: STRENGTHENING UNHCR AND GOG
COOPERATION

REF: A. A) 05 STATE 230023


B. B) 05 ACCRA 2585

C. C) 05 ACCRA 2548

D. D) 05 ACCRA 2311

E. E) 05 ACCRA 2287


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a January 23 meeting with Embassy
officers, UNHCR Representative Luc Stevens welcomed USG
support for his various refugee programs in 2006 and accepted
our encouragement to work more closely with the GOG. Beyond
money and staffing, his primary concern was the GOG wild
card: Stevens was unsure how much longer the GOG would
tolerate the presence of the Sudanese and Togolese (and other
refugees) at Krisan Camp or the Togolese who arrived last
year in the Volta Region. Stevens admitted that UNHCR had
made mistakes in the past at Krisan and he committed his
organization to engage in closer dialogue with the refugees
there and to hold monthly, tripartite meetings with Ref Coord
and the GOG. On January 26, the Ambassador hosted a
tripartite lunch with UNHCR and senior GOG officials in which
the Chief Director of the Ministry of Interior pledged
Ghana's continued support as a host for refugees. The GOG is
still investigating alleged police excesses at Krisan camp,
he said, while complaining that UNHCR had not responded to
GOG correspondence on Sudanese refugees. UNHCR and the GOG
officials agreed to begin regular meetings to improve overall
coordination and generate some sense of movement on Krisan
refugee issues. End Summary.

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Doing Less with Less
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2. (SBU) On January 23, Ref Coord, Polchief, and visiting
PRM Program Officer Jennifer Christenson met with Acting
UNHCR Representative Luc Stevens and Senior Protection
Officer Jane Muigai to review refugee goals for the coming
year. Stevens volunteered at the onset that he expected 2006
to be a difficult year because of the organization's
financial situation. It was possible that his budget would
only be 80% of last year's. Any increase in staffing was out
of the question, although it was possible Stevens might find
a UN volunteer to help with Krisan Camp.

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Krisan Camp: Durable Solutions
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3. (SBU) Emboffs asked about the situation in Krisan Camp,
where some refugees rioted in November and where police
repeatedly responded with excessive force. Stevens conceded
there were some police excesses at the camp but cautioned not
to "overreact" to the Krisan events, noting that it was not
in UNHCR's overall interest, given other concerns in Ghana,
to make public statements or directly criticize the GOG on
its handling of Krisan. There is a need for a holistic
approach to durable solutions for refugees at both Krisan and
Budumburam Camps, including possibly integrating the Togolese
at Krisan with the Togolese refugees in the Volta Region,
adjoining Togo. Some of the Krisan Togolese, who arrived in
Ghana during the 1990's, could eventually be referred for
resettlement, but the timing was not good now because it
would be seen as rewarding those who rioted and send
encouraging signals to the Volta Region Togolese that he was
not prepared to deal with at this time, especially given
their often very large, extended families. (In the past,
there had been cases of over 100 refugees linked to a single
Togolese family.) Stevens was concerned that the GOG was not
actively pursuing the 47 refugees supposedly wanted in
connection with the violence and border demonstrations in
November. Eleven refugees had already been taken to court,
but had been released on bail. He thus had no assurances
that the GOG would inflict any meaningful punishment on the
perpetrators.


4. (SBU) On the Sudanese refugees in Krisan, UNHCR in Geneva
is sending a letter to the Minister of the Interior
indicating that, while UNHCR is not opposed to their
resettlement, the timing for referral is not good so soon
after the violence in the camp. Stevens told us UNHCR would
not support resettling the Sudanese in a third country (such
as Chad) and he hoped to make the GOG understand that there
will inevitably be some Sudanese refugees here who will not
qualify for resettlement outside of Ghana.


5. (SBU) Stevens noted that 1,600 refugees had shown up for
the December food distribution, an indication that fewer camp
residents -- about 200 -- were still hiding in the
surrounding forests or elsewhere. He planned to meet with
refugees soon to discuss the possibility of another UNIDO
income generation project. Stevens added ruefully, "We now
realize we didn't know enough about our refugee population in
Krisan." Stevens planned to conduct a socio-economic survey
of the camp to better understand the camp dynamics and hoped
to hire a UNV to strengthen the UNHCR presence on the ground.
However, UNHCR did not have the funds to rebuild everything
it had before in the camp. In the end, Stevens acknowledged
that UNHCR's ultimate goal was to close the camp because it
is too remote and has a volatile mix of nationalities living
in close proximity to each other; however, closure would not
occur until 2007 or later.

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The Liberians
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6. (SBU) One of Stevens' top priorities was the repatriation
of 12,500 Liberians during CY 2006. A caucus of West African
UNHCR Representatives had asked the HC last week in Geneva to
approve the promotional phase of repatriation, during which
UNHCR would act more aggressively (including the use of
financial incentives) to encourage Liberian refugees to
return home. George Weah and some new Liberian ministers
reportedly have plans to travel within the region to promote
repatriation. Liberia's new Minister of Defense is a former
UNHCR staff member whom Stevens expects to be active on
refugee issues. Since Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's inauguration,
interest in repatriation had spiked among the 40,000 Liberian
refugees resident in Ghana. Already this year there had been
about 1,000 repatriations from Ghana by three charter
flights. Stevens believes more returns to Liberia would occur
if UNHCR chartered a boat, which would allow refugee families
to take more of their belongings with them.

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The Volta Region
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7. (SBU) Stevens was thankful that the 12,000 Togolese who
fled Togo for Ghana in April and May of last year were living
as part of Ghanaian communities, rather than corralled as
dependents into camps. Their number has decreased by 500
(about 4%),suggesting that a small proportion had decided to
return home to test the waters. Stevens believed it was
still too early to launch a tripartite repatriation agreement
with the current GOT, which had not yet convinced most
refugees it was safe for them to return. Stevens and Cotonou
UNHCR Representative Rafik Saidi have agreed to begin
periodic meetings to coordinate strategy, adding that ECOWAS
had offered to become involved in resolving the Togolese
situation, though he did not know whether that organization's
role would prove helpful. More worrisome to him was the
GOG's attitude toward refugees, which he thought reflected
increasing compassion fatigue.

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UNHCR Concerns about the GOG and Refugees
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8. (SBU) Stevens planned to meet with the GOG soon to
ascertain the latter's position on Krisan, fearing that the
recent violence and spate of refugee complaints broadcast to
the international media would turn the GOG away from its
traditional "open door" policy. Stevens believed the GOG, to
its disappointment, viewed the Krisan riot as a slap in the
face by the Togolese in return for Ghana's long-term
hospitality. He knew the Minister of the Interior had a
personal agenda in wanting refugees out of his home district,
precisely at a time when inflows (mostly by third country
nationals) at the Elubo border crossing with Cote d'Ivoire
were increasing. To the east, there was also mounting
evidence that the large refugee presence in the Volta Region
was becoming burdensome. The Volta Regional Minister was
vacillating between compassion and xenophobia, while some
local residents had asked the Togolese to leave their
properties and a few schoolmasters no longer wanted to admit
Togolese refugee children. Stevens also remarked that the
Ghana Refugee Board is "a virtual thing" with no office or
equipment.

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Building a Better Dialogue
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9. (SBU) On January 26, Ambassador hosted a tripartite lunch
including Stevens and Muigai of UNHCR, Ministry of Interior
Chief Director Edwin Barnes, Ghana Refugee Board Secretary
(and Acting Chairman) M.A. Bawumia, and Jennifer
Christianson. The Ambassador and Christianson thanked the
GOG for its willingness to serve as a safe-haven for over
60,000 refugees. Barnes said that the GOG was still
investigating reports of police excesses in Krisan camp and
remained willing to continue hosting 12,000 Togolese refugees
in the Volta Region. (He dismissed the Volta Regional
Minister's negative public statements as just political
posturing.) Barnes was clearly unhappy that UNHCR had not
responded to the GOG's written request that UNHCR resettle
the Sudanese in Krisan, saying that the lack of response left
the impression the GOG's concerns were not taken seriously.
He said the GOG has no problem with the presence in Krisan of
refugees from southern Sudan but saw the Darfurians as a
"security threat" (without going into details.) Barnes said
it was very important both to the GOG and to the refugees
that the UNHCR be perceived as "doing something" by having a
process of dialogue in place.


10. (SBU) Stevens replied that he would be conducting a
socio-economic survey at Krisan and formulating a holistic
plan that included durable solutions for refugees in Krisan
and Budumburam Camps. He wanted to avoid special treatment
for only one nationality in one location and appealed for
more time, adding that Krisan needed a cooling down period
and UNHCR urgently needed to come up with an "out of the box"
strategy for the old Togolese caseload there. He agreed that
UNHCR had taken too long to pursue the possibility of local
integration or resettlement of this group. Stevens
cautioned, though, that resettlement might not be the
appropriate durable solution for all of the Sudanese, and
that resettlement countries would probably not approve 100%
of the refugees referred to them. Stevens and Barnes agreed
to regular tripartite meetings involving the Embassy.

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Comment
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11. (SBU) Stevens has shifted from an attitude of defiance
on some refugee issues to a more collaborative approach. He
has clearly done some serious thinking and has come up with a
clearer vision for 2006. While the GOG is impatient for
resettlement to begin, it is understandable that UNHCR needs
more time to evaluate the refugees, particularly the Togolese
at Krisan, who have languished as refugees since the early
1990's. Barnes told PoChief after the meeting that he was
very pleased that this lunch opened a new atmosphere of
dialogue with UNHCR. UNHCR also appeared pleased with the
beginning of better communication and hoped that the GOG
gained a greater sense of realism about some of Ghana's and
UNHCR's refugee challenges. Liberian repatriation is clearly
a priority for both of them. We will continue to play an
active role in bridging communication between the GOG and
UNHCR.
BRIDGEWATER