Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ACCRA164
2006-01-20 12:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Accra
Cable title:  

IAEA AND IRAN: GHANA'S VIEWS

Tags:  AORC GH KNNP PREL TRGY IAEA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 000164 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016
TAGS: AORC GH KNNP PREL TRGY IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA AND IRAN: GHANA'S VIEWS

REF: A) STATE 6236 B) UNVIE VIENNA 45

Classified By: Ambassador Pamela E. Bridgewater for reasons 1.5 d and e
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 000164

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016
TAGS: AORC GH KNNP PREL TRGY IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA AND IRAN: GHANA'S VIEWS

REF: A) STATE 6236 B) UNVIE VIENNA 45

Classified By: Ambassador Pamela E. Bridgewater for reasons 1.5 d and e
.


1. (C) On January 19, Ambassador raised ref A points on
Iran and the IAEA with Ghanaian Deputy Foreign Minister Awasi
Osei-Adjei (the Foreign Minister was out of the country.)
The Ambassador mentioned that she had raised the IAEA issue
on January 13 with Professor Bekowe, Chairman of the Council
of State and Ghana's representative to the IAEA, who promised
to forward our concerns to his colleagues in Geneva.


2. (C) Osei-Adjei said Ghana had been consistent as the
only sub-Saharan African country supporting a resolution
against Iran in the IAEA. He had delivered the same message
to British, French, German and Israeli Ambassadors who had
come to see him in the past week. Ghana wanted to play a
consistent, leading role in ensuring the safety of the world.
The GOG decided not to abstain on the previous IAEA vote on
Iran because this was an important matter of principle.


3. (C) The GOG delivered a similar "very emphatic" message
to an Iranian delegation which visited Ghana in
November/December 2005, Osei-Adjei said. The four-person
Iranian delegation included the Energy Committee chairman of
Iran's parliament and a nuclear expert. President Kufuor and
others in the GOG had told the Iranains that if they comply
with the IAEA resolution, Ghana might change its mind. But
if they did not comply, Ghana would maintain its consistency
in opposing Iran in the IAEA.


4. (C) The Deputy Foreign Minister said he was worried by
the Iranian visit to Ghana. The Government of Iran clearly
wants to build bilateral relations with Ghana and promised
hospital facilities and other projects here. Osei-Adjei said
the GOG refused the offers because they are worried about the
potential Iranian attempt to fuel Islamic fundamentalism in
Ghana. The Iranains were frustrated that a fellow member of
the Non-Aligned Movement would oppose them in the IAEA.
Osei-Adjei asked the Ambassador for USG help in countering
Iran's attempts to gain influence with Ghana's Muslim
community, such as speeding up approval of a Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) compact and security assistance.
The Ambassador expressed the USG's appreciation for Ghana's
support in the IAEA. She noted that the MCA compact was
moving unimpeded as quickly as possible.


5. (U) On January 20, in response to ref b, which we
received after the Ambassador's meeting with Osei-Adjei, the
Ambassador called Secretary to the President D.K. Osei to
urge the GOG to pay its arrears to the IAEA before the
February 2 Special BOG meeting on Iran. Also on January 20,
PolChief raised ref b points with Osei-Adjei and Econ Chief
raised the issue with Chairman of the Ghana Atomic Energy
Commission Bekoe. Osei-Adjei said he understood the urgency
and would call Geneva about it. Bekoe said he was already
working on the arrears issue and hoped to have payment by
January 23. We will follow up with all of them.


6. (C) Comment: In the meeting with Osei-Adjei, he told the
Ambassador about the Iranian visit after he asked his staff
to leave the room. His concerns mirror ours about Iran's
attempts to gain influence in Ghana. He was clearly trying
to leverage the GOG's IAEA support for more bilateral
assistance of some form. When asked if he knew of any
specific terrorism threats in Ghana, he said no, but said
that there were some radical elements who had support from
former President Rawlings and the opposition National
Democratic Congress (NDC) party, a "very dangerous"
development. We have no information to link the NDC or
Rawlings to radical Islamic elements but this is not the
first time senior GOG officials (including the President)
have made this argument with us. Osei-Adjei said the GOG
(especially the Vice President) was reaching out to Muslims
but could do better Public Relations work to communicate its
efforts. The GOG's firm stance on Iran in the IAEA seems
influenced not only by a desire to win favor in Washington
and Europe, but also to contain Iran's possible influence on
Ghana's Muslims. End comment.


BRIDGEWATER