Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA737
2006-04-05 10:35:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

DARFUR PEACE TALKS: CEASE-FIRE TEXT AS STEPPING

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUJA #0737/01 0951035
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051035Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5110
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 3733
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000737 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: CEASE-FIRE TEXT AS STEPPING
STONE OR STUMBLING BLOCK?

REF: ABUJA 792

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000737

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: CEASE-FIRE TEXT AS STEPPING
STONE OR STUMBLING BLOCK?

REF: ABUJA 792


1. (SBU) Summary: The African Union Mediation presented
the revised cease-fire document to international partners on
April 4, hoping it will become a stepping stone to the final
agreement. AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok stated that the
document could build momentum for the AU to table other
elements of the comprehensive peace agreement by mid-month.
He explained that the AU mediation was "deliberately not"
tabling the power and wealth-sharing documents until it could
assess how the parties consider the revised text. In what
could be a turning point in the talks, if agreed upon, the
GOS could use the text to prevent a UN transition from
occurring by arguing that the cease-fire and AMIS are
sufficient. If it is not agreed upon, the cease-fire
document could lead to a blockage in the talks. The AU wants
to use the April 8 mini-summit of heads of state to press the
parties to modify their positions on other issues. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) The AU Mediation Team met with the international
partners late evening April 4 to present the revised
cease-fire document. AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok explained
that the AU hoped that the cease-fire document would build
momentum for accomplishing the rest of the comprehensive
agreement by the end of April. According to Ibok, the AU
deliberately decided not to table the power and
wealth-sharing elements of the comprehensive agreement. He
explained that the AU security team resource persons felt the
movements still do not understand key elements of the
security arrangements, such as DDR and integration, and
advised the AU to move incrementally. As a result, he said
that the AU mediation decided not to confuse the situation by
having too many elements on the table at the same time.


3. (SBU) The AU believes it can get agreement on the
cease-fire and then, Ibok promised, however, that the
mediation is "increasingly coming to a position to table all
proposals soon". He said that the mediation will work with
the parties on the cease-fire for a week and that the AU
already has worked on text for the final security
arrangements, which include DDR and integration. Ibok said

that the mediation hoped to have the comprehensive package
(power, wealth, and security) on the table by mid-April.


4. (SBU) Alex de Waal, an AU resource person on the
security arrangements team, reviewed the document. Based on
meetings with the parties, he said that the GOS can accept
the document and it is "a good deal" for the movements.
Nonetheless, there are a number of issues over which there is
significant disagreement: the timing of verification of
positions, GOS insistence on reciprocal withdrawal of
movements to redeployment zones before it neutralizes the
janjaweed, the GOS insertion of provision which allows it to
suspend parts of the agreement to defend its borders,
policing of the IDP camps, a GOS-inserted provision for
recognition of historic nomadic routes, and increased
responsibilities for AMIS. The GOS also will likely object
to a provision giving the cease-fire agreement primacy over
the N'Djamena Accord.


5. (SBU) USDEL emphasized the importance of the cease-fire
document drawing the process forward. The parties must see a
common future and if the AU sees that the cease-fire document
as widening the gap between the parties, it needs to get the
other elements of the comprehensive deal on the table
immediately. The movements, for example, will be hesitant to
accept the document without knowing their future status,
particularly conditions for disarmament and integration. The
partners are fully supportive of the AU efforts, but cannot
place the maximum amount of pressure on the parties without
all the elements of the comprehensive deal in play.

- - - - - - - - - -
COMINGS AND GOINGS
- - - - - - - - - -


6. (SBU) AU Special Envoy Salim will brief members of the
AU Peace and Security Council this week and then return to
Abuja for the heads of state meeting. He will then proceed
to New York to brief members of the United Nations Security
Council. We are being told that Sudanese Vice President Ali
Osman Taha will be arriving in Abuja on/about April 6 for six
days. Ibok hoped the heads of state would give momentum to
the process by pressing the parties to modify some of their
positions.


ABUJA 00000737 002 OF 002


- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


7. (SBU) The mediation views the cease-fire document, which
it expects to put it to the parties on April 6, as a stepping
stone to tabling the other elements of the peace deal. The
risk of this approach, however, is significant, particularly
if the cease-fire is used by the Government of Sudan to keep
the UN out of Darfur and prevents agreement on a
comprehensive peace deal. Wrangling over the cease-fire text
without the full package in play could bog down the talks
altogether. The AU said it will see how the parties react to
the revised cease-fire over the next few days and then decide
whether to put the rest of the comprehensive deal on the
table. During today's session for international partners to
provide their comments, USDEL will fully support the AU's
efforts. We will press the mediation to move forward quickly
if the parties get bogged down or refuse to accept the
cease-fire without knowing the details of the final security,
power, and wealth-sharing arrangements.
CAMPBELL