Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA729
2006-04-03 10:53:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

DARFUR PEACE TALKS: PRONK WARNS UN TRANSITION

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0228
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUJA #0729/01 0931053
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031053Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5102
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 3727
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000729 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: PRONK WARNS UN TRANSITION
BEING UNDERMINED


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000729

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: PRONK WARNS UN TRANSITION
BEING UNDERMINED



1. (SBU) Summary: (SBU) UN Special Representative for
Sudan Jan Pronk expressed his concern that the African
Union's top leadership, including Alpha Omar Konare, does not
support the transition of an AU force to UN in Sudan on April
1 and 2. Pronk told USDEL and international partners that
Konare reportedly outlined for UNSG Kofi Annan the three
options being considered by the AU in Sudan: continuing with
AMIS, an augmented AMIS plus a "coalition of the willing",
and the least favored option of a UN transition. According
to Pronk, the AU executive is being manipulated by Khartoum
and Tripoli to prevent an AMIS-UN transition. The lack of
cooperation from Khartoum and the AU will affect the
transition assessment due to the UNSC on April 24, further
undermining efforts to attract troop contributors. Even more
alarming is the prospect that AMIS forces will be paid for by
the Government of Sudan and its Arab allies, an unacceptable
development on all fronts. AU President Denis Sasou-Nguesso
and Konare are expected in Abuja on April 8 for consultations
with Obasanjo and the AU mediation. End Summary.

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KONARE TO ANNAN: UN TRANSITION ONLY ONE OPTION
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2, (SBU) On April 1, UN Special Representative Jan Pronk
outlined to USDEL his concerns that the African Union (AU)
Executive may be working against the transition to a UN force
in Darfur. According to Pronk, AU Secretary General Alpha
Konare meet with UNSG Kofi Annan last week. Konare allegedly
reported that the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in
Addis supported the following options for Darfur: a
continuation of AMIS as it is, an AMIS plus a "coalition of
the willing" augmentation, and as a last resort, a transition
to a UN force.


3. (SBU) Pronk also pointed out since the Government of
Sudan began lobbying against a UN transition, the AMIS has
been less cooperative with UN requests. He speculated that
AU sector commanders may have been given instructions to
refer all matters to Force Headquarters. These instructions
are complicating and hampering ground operations, resulting

in a situation in which there are more cease-fire violations
occurring, but less AU monitoring. Pronk also noted that the
enlarged AU force is less proactive than its smaller
predecessor. Pronk was particularly critical of Konare for
not attending the March 10 AU Peace and Security Council
meeting and then allowing a range of interpretations of the
PSC decision. As further evidence of the AU's weak position
on transition, Pronk stated that the AU did not argue "very
strongly" in favor a UN transition at the Arab League Summit
in Khartoum.

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AU WEAKENING PROSPECTS FOR UN TRANSITION
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4. (SBU) Pronk reiterated these concerns to international
partners on April 2, but was even more direct in criticizing
Konare for falling for GOS manipulation and allowing the
possibility of GOS funding for AMIS. According to Pronk,
Konare has stated that the AU PSC meeting on March 10
emphasized giving AMIS a new mandate rather than a transition
to the UN. Pronk again stressed that, in his opinion, the AU
executive views the AMIS transition to a UN force as a least
favored option, which coincides with the GOS position.
According to Pronk, the international community is now facing
a situation in which AMIS will be funded by the GOS and Arab
countries, a situation that the movements will find
unacceptable. He said that the AU has decided that it will
finance AMIS for four months, the GOS will furnish two months
of funding, and the Arab League pledge would cover the force
after October 1.


5. (SBU) Pronk said that without the consent of Sudan a UN
mission in Darfur would be impossible. An overall peace
agreement in Abuja could help to secure this consent. Pronk
judged that President Bashir wants a full settlement, that
the wealth- and power-sharing documents could be settled
quickly, and that the security discussions were finally
moving forward. Without a full agreement Bashir will oppose
UN forces. He explained why further progress toward a full
settlement now required a comprehensive security agreement,
not an enhanced ceasefire. In turn, due to the limits of AU
capacity, the UN would be required to take over the
peace-keeping to meet the requirements of a full settlement.


6. (SBU) In response to questions, Pronk said that the UN

ABUJA 00000729 002 OF 002


had no evidence of direct GOS involvement in the recent
fighting with Chad, but Arab militias had been involved. He
warned that the rumored April 8 heads of state meeting in
Abuja could be "highly risky", because the participation was
both selective and arbitrary. At the end of the session he
told the international partners that peace required a full
package of texts, including a solution to disarming the
janjaweed and demobilizing other forces. He said it was
positive that all of the elements were finally on the table
for discussion.

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ENHANCED HUMANITARIAN CEASE-FIRE NOT ENOUGH
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7. (SBU) The AU Mediation's determined pursuit of an
Enhanced Humanitarian Cease-fire is not enough to allow for
the transition to a UN force for Darfur and could become a
"stumbling block" to the process, according to Pronk. He
explained that despite his misgivings, he had supported the
AU mediation's effort on EHCF if it did not lead to a
deterioration of the situation on the ground or stop the
negotiations on the comprehensive peace deal from moving
ahead. Now, Pronk said, it is clear that the EHCF is not
supported by any of the parties and does not provide for a UN
transition. Pronk also said that the AU's continued
postponement of key decisions prompted his approach to key
UNSC members to encourage Khartoum to accept the joint AU-UN
assessment mission.

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AU LEADERSHIP TO ABUJA
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8. (SBU) According to the AU Mediation, AU President Denis
Sasou-Nguesso and Konare will be visiting Abuja for
consultations with Obasanjo on April 8. Other heads of state
are rumored to be coming. The AU has called a Joint
Commission meeting in Addis Ababa from April 4-6 in advance
of an AU PSC meeting on April 6. Salim departed Abuja on
April 2 for Dar Es Salam and then for Addis for the PSC
meeting, to be back t Abuaj in time for the Sassou/Konare
et.al. visit.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


9. (SBU) In the absence of a full agreement, the government
of Sudan and the AU leadership are keeping ideas for a
continued AMIS mission in play, slowing down the UN
transition process as well as the peace talks. It is
important that the progress being made toward a full
agreement not be derailed at either the PSC meeting in Addis
or the April 8 meetings in Abuja. Pronk's visit helped to
alert other international partners to these risks, but some
European partners have a lingering attraction toward the idea
of priority for a cease-fire text rather than for the full
settlment needed for a UN transition.
CAMPBELL