DARFUR NEGOTIATIONS: MAIN ISSUES IN SECURITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000677

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, D, DRL, INR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PROV PREL NI SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR NEGOTIATIONS: MAIN ISSUES IN SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS TEXT

REF: ABUJA 676


1. (SBU) Summary: Many hours of discussion with the
mediation team and with the parties have identified five key
issues that will have to be resolved: how the ceasefire
commission will make decisions; how different geographic
areas will be defined and managed; provisions for the
exercise of the policing function; the regime for control of
the international border; and, provisions for arms control,
demobilization, and integration of forces. The mediation
team has prepared a revised 25 page text for presentation to
the parties. USDEL has urged the AU mediators to present
this text and a revised text on power-sharing as soon as
possible. SEPTEL reports on other activity. End Summary.

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CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION DECISION-MAKING
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2. (SBU) How the ceasefire commission will make
decisions: The current "ceasefire" is frequently violated by
all parties, with no significant action taken by the
ceasefire commission. The parties agree that the commission
can act on the basis of consensus; they reject the idea that
in the absence of consensus the commission chairman (AU
force commander) can take a decision. The mediation is
considering a proposal that, in the absence of consensus, a
troika (AU, EU and U.S.) could take a decision. No
discussion has taken place whether the commission might
operate differently after the transition from AU to UN
forces in Darfur.

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GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITIONS
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3. How different geographic areas will be defined and
managed: The present text has provisions that refer to:
zones of de facto control (where a specified party now has a
military position); exclusion zones (where, after regrouping
and consolidation of forces, one of the parties is
recognized as being in control and the other parties
excluded); IDP camps (where a humanitarian agency is the
camp manager); buffer zones from which the parties are
excluded (areas surrounding IDP camps and areas to separate
the parties' zones of control/exclusion zones); and,
humanitarian routes (to a limited number of IDP camps).
Gradually the parties are seeing that the present
definitions are unworkable, and the mediation plans to use
the map work to generate usable definitions and plans. A
key issue is deciding who is responsible for security in
buffer zones and along humanitarian routes; another is
recognizing the obligation, under international humanitarian
law, for safe access for all humanitarian activities (not
just those along humanitarian routes) to be respected.

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POLICING FUNCTIONS
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4. Provisions for exercise of the policing function: The
present draft states that AMIS police monitors will patrol
all IDP camps (about 100) and provide for their perimeter
security in the buffer zones, plus perform the police
function in other buffer zones. To perform these tasks
adequately 24/7 at all locations would require a large
police force. AMIS does not have sufficient police to
perform these tasks, and the government will probably object
to AMIS police having arrest powers (as opposed to
monitoring arrests by government police). Another issue is
the movements' assertion that they have their own "police";
the government has rejected this assertion.

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BORDER CONTROL
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5. Regime for control of the international border: Both
sides regularly violate international law by taking arms and
supplies across the Chad-Sudanese border and by allowing
various rebel groups to enjoy safe-havens on the opposite
side of the border. The recently signed Tripoli Agreement
promises an end to this activity, but it lacks any practical
implementation mechanism (only ten observation posts to
cover the border from Libya to Central African Republic).
The current draft text repeats the absolute obligation of
the parties not to allow arms, materiel, and fighters to
cross the border, but both sides privately admit that they
expect such activity to continue. Current UN thinking is to

ABUJA 00000677 002 OF 002


use two 500 troop battalions to control the border, a task
that could only be performed with the assistance of aerial
surveillance. In addition the parties and mediators have
not yet come to grips with the challenge of zones of de
facto control and zones of exclusion controlled by the
movements that abut the international border (as will most
likely be the case for the northern part of the border with
Chad and the border with Libya).

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ARMS CONTROL, DEMOBILIZATION, INTEGRATION
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6. (SBU) Arms Control, demobilization, and integration of
forces: These issues are located in the "bridging section"
of the current draft for an "Enhanced Humanitarian
Ceasefire." The government has stated that it wants a
"permanent ceasefire" that addresses these issues; and, some
movement spokesmen have said they want these issues resolved
before they sign a new ceasefire text. Work on the mapping
of forces has moved the parties in this direction. During
the course of this week USDEL will work with the mediation
to open discussion of these issues, especially the need to
make provision for disarmament of janjaweed and tribal
militias.

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COMMENT
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7. (SBU) For the first time the parties are entering into
serious discussion of all security issues. The mediation,
depleted by departure of several of its military experts,
needs constant encouragement to take advantage of this
opportunity. End comment.
CAMPBELL