Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA647
2006-03-22 16:30:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

MARCH 22 NIGERIA AVIAN FLU UPDATE

Tags:  TBIO KFLU EAID AMED EAGR NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0647/01 0811630
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221630Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4984
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RHFMISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHRO/USMISSION UN ROME 0070
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ASD-HD//
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000647 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

USDA FOR FAS/OA, FAS/DLP, FAS/ICD AND FAS/ITP
USDA ALSO FOR APHIS
USAID REGIONAL HUB OFFICE ACCRA
CHERYL FRENCH APHIS DAKAR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO KFLU EAID AMED EAGR NI
SUBJECT: MARCH 22 NIGERIA AVIAN FLU UPDATE

REF: ABUJA 576

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000647

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

USDA FOR FAS/OA, FAS/DLP, FAS/ICD AND FAS/ITP
USDA ALSO FOR APHIS
USAID REGIONAL HUB OFFICE ACCRA
CHERYL FRENCH APHIS DAKAR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO KFLU EAID AMED EAGR NI
SUBJECT: MARCH 22 NIGERIA AVIAN FLU UPDATE

REF: ABUJA 576


1. (SBU) Summary. As of March 15, reliable information,
including from testing, was not available on the extent of
AI in Nigeria. State veterinarians lacked vehicles and
equipment, and some lacked personal protective equipment.
There was no documentation on the location and numbers of
small flocks within Nigeria's urban areas. A high-level
official at the Vom laboratory said his superiors told him
to "hold off" on releasing information on confirmed cases of
AI in some southern states. In some cases, AI's spread is
facilitated by members of AI surveillance teams, as well as
by contaminated feed sacks. End summary.


2. (SBU) The following assessment of the avian influenza
(AI) in Nigeria is current as of March 15 and is based on
USAID officials' discussions with Nigerians who attended
four days of AI training funded by USAID/Nigeria. The 600-
plus participants included state veterinarians and their
staff from all Nigerian states; private veterinarians,
leaders of the Nigerian poultry industry, feed-mill
operators, and persons from poultry-related industries. The
first two days of training were held in Ibadan and the
second two in Minna, Niger State. A USAID official attended
the Ibadan training and provided his impressions to the
USAID official who attended the Minna training.

Reliable information from the states is not available
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) Based on firsthand information from state
veterinarians, it is not possible to evaluate accurately the
state of Nigeria's poultry industry. The clinical signs of
the extant Newcastle disease that normally infects and
causes high mortality in Nigeria's poultry flocks during the
harmattan (dusty) season are similar to lesions caused by
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Because of this,
the presence of HPAI cannot be confirmed without laboratory
testing -- which Nigeria is not carrying out consistently.
Extremely high flock mortality (greater than 50% in three

days),however, is a strong indicator used to determine
positive-flock HPAI status in the absence of laboratory
tests. There are no other poultry diseases with these
specific clinical signs that kill 50% or more of a flock in
less than a week.


4. (SBU) Owners of small flocks, which make up as much as
80% of Nigeria's poultry, do not report disease outbreaks
for reasons such as mistrust of state officials, and the
fear of losing one's business and one's personal reputation.
When small farmers' birds start to show clinical signs of
AI, their standard reaction is to immediately sell all the
birds for meat, rather than report the outbreak or suffer
losses.


5. (SBU) State veterinary officials lack vehicles, personal
protective equipment (PPEs),sampling equipment, and other
materials necessary to collect the information or samples
required for proper reporting. Samples must be delivered to
the Vom National Veterinary Research Institute within three
days to be of consistent value. Because in many cases it is
not possible to do so, state veterinarians very often do not
make the attempt.


6. (SBU) There is no documentation on the location and
numbers of small flocks within Nigeria's urban areas. State
veterinarians said even if they had the vehicles to permit
mobility, it would be impossible to fully survey the virus's
progress in denser urban areas such as Kano, the largest
poultry producer in the north. Kano's bird flocks are
spread both widely and densely throughout the residential
areas of this city of at least 4 million people. Bauchi
State officials reported being threatened by poultry owners
in some parts of the state and could not fully document AI's
spread there. The GON classified Jigawa State as free of
HPAI -- even though all of its neighbors, including Niger,

ABUJA 00000647 002 OF 003


are confirmed for HPAI. When a Jigawa official was asked at
the training why his state had not reported any AI outbreaks
on farms and had not sent in samples for testing, he said
all of the state's flocks already were dead.

GON officials suppress positive test results
--------------


7. (SBU) According to reports from private veterinarians
that cannot yet be confirmed, some farms in Nigeria's south
experienced the high flock mortality typical of HPAI as
early as Jan. 15, but there were no official reports of
this. Southern poultry farmers, however, were proactive and
responded by initiating a private vaccination program --
with efficacy as high as 95% -- not sanctioned by the
Government of Nigeria (GON). Commercial poultry farmers in
the north did not vaccinate their birds or conceal the early
outbreaks in their flocks.


8. (SBU) A high-level official from the Vom laboratory,
however, said he heard similar reports concerning
vaccinations in the south and was proceeding to Lagos to
conduct farm visits and a more complete follow-up to verify
these reports. The Vom laboratory can determine through
testing whether a particular flock has been vaccinated. The
Vom official said his motivation in following up was to
obtain information that would encourage the GON to authorize
a national bird-vaccination program. The same Vom official
said his superiors told him to "hold off" on releasing until
the "appropriate time" information concerning incidences of
AI, as confirmed by laboratory tests, in certain southern
states. (Note: AI has now been confirmed in several
southern states. The U.S. Mission has not received other
reports of GON officials being instructed to suppress
laboratory results confirming AI. End note.)

Illegal poultry imports seem certain
--------------


9. (SBU) Statistical analysis indicates and common sense
suggests that Nigeria imports large quantities of commercial
replacement birds despite the GON's ban on poultry imports.
Nigeria's poultry breeder/multiplier industry is not capable
of producing the required commercial stock. Attendees said
unofficial hatcheries in Kano import fertile eggs from Egypt
(which is now positive for AI) and possibly other places to
meet Nigeria's need for commercial flocks' replacement
birds. When the USAID officer visited Kano recently, he
sought information regarding the breeder and hatchery
industry and egg production to support hatcheries. But
neither state veterinary staffers nor the Poultry
Association of Nigeria could provide information about
these.

State veterinarians' complaints
--------------


10. (SBU) As of March 15, state veterinarians attending the
training in Minna still did not have PPEs or other equipment
or support. They were angered by press reports that Nigeria
recently gave some donated PPEs to the Government of Niger.
GON officials at the training announced that state
veterinarians could go to Abuja and pick up their PPEs and
equipment on their way home. According to these
veterinarians, the GON last year sold 1,000 government cars
and left state veterinarians without transportation. State
veterinarians have received reduced pay since October 2005
and say they have little incentive to respond to the AI
outbreak.

Comment
--------------


11. (SBU) Veterinary staff and surveillance teams do not
fully understand the mechanisms by which bird diseases are
spread, and Nigerian surveillance officers themselves likely
are major vectors in spreading AI. The majority of

ABUJA 00000647 003 OF 003


Nigeria's reported AI outbreaks have occurred in urban
areas. In these cases, the virus's spread probably is not
facilitated by migratory birds but rather by surveillance
teams.


12. (SBU) Nigeria's feed industry uses and reuses feed sacks
and does not have a sanitary means to deliver disease-free
feed to poultry farms. If this feed distribution system is
not corrected immediately, AI will continue to spread
rapidly to most of Nigeria's commercial flocks. In this
case, only backyard noncommercial, free-range birds would be
spared this particular method of AI's spread. Backyard
flocks likely will avoid much of the AI afflicting Nigeria
because they are not associated with what appear to be the
most common vectors: surveillance teams and recycled feed
sacks and egg trays. If AI is being spread in Nigeria by
wild birds, backyard flocks are the most susceptible
domestic poultry and will succumb rapidly to AI -- despite
GON officials' assertions that Nigerian free-range chickens
are more resistant.


13. (SBU) Nigeria's southern and southwestern commercial
poultry industry already responded to the AI outbreak
independent of the GON through a private-practice
vaccination program. As a result, the country's southern
and southwestern poultry industry likely will save itself
and recover. Northern Nigeria needs international
organizations and the USG to closely monitor its backyard
poultry industry, because a GON monitoring system does not
exist.
CAMPBELL