Avian Flu in Nigeria: The Long Haul

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000596

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

USDA FOR FAS/OA, FAS/DLP, FAS/ICD AND FAS/ITP
USDA ALSO FOR APHIS
USAID REGIONAL HUB OFFICE ACCRA
CHERYL FRENCH APHIS DAKAR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO KFLU EAID AMED EAGR NI AVIANFLU
SUBJECT: Avian Flu in Nigeria: The Long Haul



1. (SBU) Summary: Despite a substantial effort to respond to
the Avian Influenza (AI) outbreak in Nigeria by the GON and
international partners, the epidemic clearly has not been
brought under control. Given the weak human- and animal-
health infrastructures, and the complicated issues of
federal-state coordination and resources, even with the best
will in the world, the AI situation will remain a serious
problem for the foreseeable future. Recognizing that
efforts to halt the spread in birds have been unsuccessful
to date, there is an urgent need to limit human exposure and
improve human surveillance. The Mission will consult with
other partners to develop and support recommendations to the
GON for the most effective strategy, given the limitations
in Nigeria. End Summary.

Still Not a Pretty Picture
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2. (SBU) A month after Avian Influenza (AI) was confirmed in
Nigeria, it is clear that the battle against AI is going to
be a long, hard slog. One UN Food and Agriculture
Organization official has predicted it would take three
years to come to grips with AI in Nigeria. The plans
currently implemented in Nigeria provide for a response
considerably after the fact in AI-affected areas. The plans
do not make any real attempt to catch and quickly halt the
spread of outbreaks in new areas. Much of the response so
far has focused on commercial or semi-commercial operations,
and has not yet tried come to grips with backyard flocks.
Yet culling backyard flocks may be the key to controlling
the spread of the virus and limiting human exposure.


3. (SBU) Even in Kaduna, which has been acknowledged to have
the most effective response, Western news agencies reported
that when they visited villages near Sambawa Farm, where the
first outbreak was confirmed, chickens were dying, but no
official had visited the affected villages, and villagers
had no information on what to do. Local press has reported
that dead chickens have been dumped at a number of sites,
and attempts to contact the state avian flu response unit
regarding this were unsuccessful. The USAID-designed and -
funded pilot culling program will be expanded to include
Katsina and Kaduna as well as Kano, at the GON's request.


4. (SBU) Surveillance remains weak and testing is slow.
Despite early reports of possible outbreaks in Jigawa State,
it is still officially AI-free, though outbreaks have been
confirmed in all surrounding territories. There are a number
of states with reports of suspected outbreaks and/or samples
sent for which there is no final determination. The most
recent report is of 1,000 dead chickens and ducks dumped in
Yola, the capital of Adamawa State in the Northeast.
Cameroon on March 12 became the fourth country in Africa to
report an outbreak of AI, after the virus was found in
poultry in Far North Province, which borders Nigeria. Tests
at the Pasteur Institute in Paris showed this outbreak was
H5N1. The outbreak in Cameroon suggests that the virus is
probably present in Adamawa and Borno States. Little
information is being made available about the extent of
outbreaks in affected states.


5. (SBU) Meanwhile, the outbreak officially reached the
southern half of Nigeria, as H5N1 was confirmed in Benue,
Anambra, Rivers, and Ogun States. The latter three are not
contiguous to other infected areas. In some cases the
outbreaks were found in urban districts, so there is a
strong chance the disease was imported in live poultry
coming from the North to urban markets. In other cases the
virus may be present but as yet undetected in intervening
areas.


6. (SBU) On possible human cases, we just don't know.
Western press reports from the field indicate that many
potentially exposed people are fearful of authority, and of
possible quarantine or worse. In an effort to get a clearer
picture, the Centers for Disease Control is carrying out two
human-surveillance activities to try to get a better sense
of the level of possible human exposure.


7. (SBU) The GON plans to pay compensation in Katsina,
Bauchi, and Nasarawa States -- although the compensation
program for now does not apply to small backyard poultry
farmers. The compensation as currently designed and
implemented does little to either encourage AI reporting,
facilitate culling, or to provide relief to industry or
householders.


8. (SBU) Comment: Despite its clear shortcomings, the
Nigerian response has been a substantial effort. The
unpalatable truth is that GON probably has responded about
as well as it is able to, given the weakness in its human-
and animal-health infrastructure. Even given sufficient
political will, Nigeria is unlikely to be able to control or
limit the impact and spread of AI in Nigeria or to its
neighbors. Given this, the major challenge is how to limit
human exposure and create human-surveillance capacity. An
early step would be to better link human surveillance with
animal surveillance and culling efforts. There is a serious
lack of resources reaching the state level in Nigeria.
USAID therefore is increasingly working directly with the
states. The mission also will consult with international
organizations and donor agencies on how to better direct
anti-AI resources to Nigeria's states, where they are needed
most.


9. (SBU) A second challenge will be managing the economic
impact. The AI epidemic has reached the stage that the
country's poultry industry could remain under semi-permanent
threat. This threat could be great enough to affect many
Nigerians who rely on chicken and eggs as important protein
supplements.


10. (SBU) Comment continued: If Nigeria's response has been
ineffective, it likely is among the most effective in West
Africa. Other states may look to Nigeria, through ECOWAS and
otherwise, for support in battling AI, and Nigeria may try
to be responsive. Any response, however, is likely to be at
the expense of the already overburdened effort in Nigeria.
From our perspective, it appears that just as Nigeria will
not be able to control or limit AI, neither will its
neighbors. Even if Nigeria or another country could do so,
any success would be likely to be undermined by a weak
response in neighboring countries.


11. (SBU) Comment continued: Mission proposes to consult
closely with other donors to assess the most effective
course of action given the ground realities and limitations
in Nigeria. We will then seek to provide some concrete
recommendations to the GON on how to proceed and to orient
our assistance to support those recommendations. Among
other things, we will look at supporting increased capacity
at the UN organizations dealing with AI.
CAMPBELL