SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL WARD'S NOVEMBER 2006 VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002948

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON MASS KDEM NI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL WARD'S NOVEMBER 2006 VISIT
TO NIGERIA


Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1 .4 (b and d)


1. (C) Your visit to Nigeria comes at a critical, though
tumultuous time in the country's political evolution.
Increasing instability in the Niger Delta threatens the
nation's oil production, the government's primary source of
income; continuing outbreaks of avian influenza threaten the
nation's poultry industry, the source of livelihood for
thousands of Nigerians and the primary source of protein for
millions more; and a precipitous rise in political
recrimination and violence, as Nigeria lurches towards
presidential and legislative elections next April, threatens
the first transition from one elected regime to another in
Nigeria's history. While May 2007 may signal the end of
President Obasanjo's second (and last) term, election plans
remain tenuous. Voter registration is off to a rocky start,
several state governors are under threat of impeachment, a
state of emergency was imposed in Ekiti state, and there is
widespread perception that Obasanjo may manipulate the
uncertainty and chaos surrounding 2007 as a pretext for
extending his rule.

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THE POLITICS OF THE MOMENT
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2. (U) A crisis of legitimacy grips the nation, as the
federal government's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) recently began to investigate 33 of the nation's 36
State governors on charges of corruption. Impeachment
proceedings that would strip governors' of their immunity
have begun in a few states, allowing Obasanjo to declare a
state of emergency and impose an ex-military "Administrator"
to replace the elected government in Ekiti.


3. (C) During the first half of 2006, Nigerians wrangled
over the idea of extending Obasanjo's presidency for a third
term. Supporters of a constitutional amendment bill that
would have enabled Obasanjo to elongate his term allegedly
used bribery and intimidation to gather National Assembly
support for the bill. Anti-third term protests took place
throughout the country, and major political figures,
including Vice President Atiku Abubakar, national
legislators, state governors, particularly those from the
North, publicly decried the third term bid. On May 16, in an
ostensibly pre-determined outcome, the National Assembly
defeated the bill - proponents failing to secure the
requisite simple majority. Intrigue on this matter persists,
with few Nigerians willing to accept Obasanjo's promise to
leave office. Rumors abound that Obasanjo will attempt to
extend his rule by resurrecting the third term amendment in
advance of the December primaries, appointing and leading an
Interim National Government in May 2007, or 'instigating' a
national or electoral crisis that deems impossible the
holding of elections.


4. (C) Most media and popular attention is focused now on
election preparations for 2007. While no clear candidate has
emerged, former president (1985-93) and Obasanjo ally,
General Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) announced on November 8 his
desire to run on the ruling PDP ticket. Along with IBB,
another ex-military ruler Muhammadu Buhari (1983-85) is
considered a principal contender. Amidst the current impasse
with Obasanjo, VP Abubakar has made no secret of his
aspirations for office. While several other candidates,
including State governors, and new parties are now emerging,
none is of any great distinction. With primaries approaching
and political campaigns launching almost weekly, there has
been a precipitous rise in political recrimination and
violence. Several politically-motivated assassinations and
botched attempts of State governors and others have occurred
recently, and the Nigerian police have appeared either unable
or unwilling to thwart future attacks.


5. (C) Nigeria,s Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) is
responsible for voter registration and the conduct of the
polls. INEC has been dogged by poor organizational planning,
and inefficient procurement of election equipment. After a
long battle to move from a manual to an electronic voter
system, INEC is failing in its promise to make the process
more efficient and transparent. A severe shortage of Direct
Data Capture machines for the registration process resulted
in a delayed start to the registration process and, so far,
only an estimated one percent of the country,s 65 million
voters have actually registered, despite a December 15
deadline. While the GON and INEC both publicly highlight the

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progress they are making in their electoral preparations, we
remain deeply concerned that not enough progress has been
made to ensure not just that credible elections occur, but
that elections occur at all.

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UNREST IN THE NIGER DELTA
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6. (C) Hostage-taking has become a lucrative enterprise for
armed militants in the impoverished, under-developed Niger
Delta region. Most recently, on November 6, two oil workers
from the U.K. and the U.S. were released five days after
being taken hostage. In October, four Britons were seized
and later released after gunmen raided an expatriate
residential compound. August saw the release of twenty
foreign oil workers, including one American, after being held
for over two weeks. In January and February, the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) kidnapped
thirteen expatriates, including four Americans, and held them
in the jungle areas of Bayelsa and Delta States.


7. (C) Attacks on oil facilities have continued to reduce
Nigeria,s oil output, including a November 6 attack on an
Agip platform that shut down a further 55,000 barrels per
day, bringing total loss near to one third of production
capacity. The GON established a commission to look into
Delta regional development, but Delta leaders and militants
are divided regarding participation in the GON's efforts.
Although the Delta supplies the majority of the nation's
wealth, it remains poor and under-developed inducing a
climate of despair and anger and giving rise to the current
political malaise. The emergence of MEND, which has also
blown up oil installations, is a new and worrying trend in
the region, although the underlying frustrations are endemic
to the Delta. MEND and other copycat groups continue to
issue threats - most recently in November 2006 - against oil
installations and expatriates. If provoked, the militants
have said they would no longer take hostages, but rather kill
anyone they found working in defiance of their
"restrictions." On May 10, an American oil executive was
killed in Port Harcourt in an unrelated incident, but this
new mode of dealing with expatriates raises the stakes
significantly for all parties involved and has led to the
imposition of travel and security restrictions for the Delta
by both Shell and diplomatic missions.


8. (C) Any major military action could exacerbate the
already tense situation and, likely, endorse increased
hostage-taking. While the GON has so far been able to
restrain the military from rash action, military and
political officials maintain the indispensability of a
military solution to the crisis. Obasanjo, frustrated by
disruptions to oil production, called for the military to
respond using "force for force" and, characterized the
hostage-takers as "terrorists."

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THE MILITARY'S CONCERNS
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9. (C) While the Nigerian military has been better funded,
more professional and clearly subordinate to civilian rule
since 1999, it remains under-manned, under-equipped, and
under-trained for its myriad international peacekeeping and
internal security engagements. The high operational tempo
required to maintain its many domestic and international
deployments gives little rest to the weary. It is unclear
how long the current pace can be maintained. Although there
is no sign of atrophy at present, the Chief of Defense Staff,
while in his previous assignment as Army Chief, noted the
army's difficulty in mustering additional troops for Darfur
while also maintaining its internal security missions (NOTE:
In August, Nigeria withdrew 3500 troops from the disputed
Bakassi Peninsula. END NOTE).


10. (U) Despite Nigeria's position as the anchor of
U.S.-supported peacekeeping operations in the region,
Congressionally-imposed sanctions for the October 2001 Benue
massacre (lifted in 2004) and the protracted presence of
Charles Taylor reduced a security assistance program that had
been the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa. While Charles
Taylor was sent to face justice in Sierra Leone earlier this
year and Nigeria claims partial credit for brokering the
recent African Union (AU)-led agreement reached in the Darfur
peace talks, security assistance programs have not yet been
fully resuscitated.

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11. (U) Nevertheless, a significant number of
military-military activities continue. A seminar with the
Nigerian Air Force to develop a strategic vision, a robust
DOD HIV/AIDS program, and an active humanitarian assistance
program are in operation. In addition, several new programs
are underway, one of which links up the Nigerian military
with the California National Guard as part of the State
Partnership Program. In view of Nigeria's major peacekeeping
commitments, Nigerian military began training in April under
the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA)
Program.


12. (C) The senior Nigerian military leadership seems to
see participation in peacekeeping missions, especially UN
operations, as a means of restoring both soldiers' pride and
public confidence in the military. Nigeria has two
battalions of UN peacekeepers in Liberia and three battalions
in the AU Mission in Darfur. Obasanjo has noted the
possibility of committing troops to missions in Somalia, Cote
d'Ivoire, and DROC, but he has not stated where these
soldiers would come from.


13. (C) Due in part to the impetus given to the process by
NAVEUR's March visit, the US-UK-Nigeria talks on Gulf of
Guinea security are moving forward. At the Washington
session in April, the USG offered to work with the GON to
develop a "train and equip" program aimed at building a
riverine capability for operations in the Delta. A joint
US-UK-Nigeria assessment team visit helped to develop a
detailed proposal. In addition, the GON agreed to receive a
briefing team that will make a presentation of the Regional
Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) Program and explore GON
receptiveness to hosting an RMAC system. The initial concept
visit occurred in July, with follow-up technical and site
surveys scheduled for Fall 2006.

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SECURITY ISSUES
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14. (C) While we have received no specific threats against
American interests, and most Nigerians view the U.S.
favorably and admirably, significant segments of the
population oppose specific USG policies. In Northern Nigeria
- home to most of the nation's 70 million Muslims -
opposition to USG actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have served
to embolden public opinion against the U.S. and characterize
it as an enemy of Muslims. Since most Northern Nigerians
empathize and identify with the plight of their Muslim
brethren across the Islamic world, events there will
necessarily dictate and inform attitudes vis--vis the USG
here. It remains unlikely that public dislike for USG
policies translates into terrorism or poses any direct danger
to the U.S. Undeniably, rampant poverty, desperation, lack
of education, and incendiary preachers help fuel antagonism
for the U.S. in Northern Nigeria.

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES
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15. (U) Nigeria's robust economic reforms appear to be
losing momentum in the run-up to elections, hastened in part
by the August dismissal of Foreign Minister Ngozi
Okonjo-Iweala as the head of the Economic Intelligence Team.
We are watching closely Nigeria's increasing inflation rate
(running at 14%) and the management of its windfall revenues
from high oil prices. Although the GON successfully paid off
its sovereign debt (est. USD 30 billion) in April, 70% of
Nigerians subsist on less than $1/day inhibiting most from
meeting basic needs. Trade and investment concerns,
including arbitrary policies and deteriorating
infrastructure, are among the most contentious in the
bilateral agenda. Nigeria recently began implementing the
ECOWAS Common Economic Tariff, though its impact is mixed.
Despite Nigeria's improvement in Transparency International's
most recent Corruption Perception Index, most Nigerians
express continued, even growing frustration over corruption
and GON anti-corruption efforts are broadly viewed as
politically-motivated.


16. (U) Nigeria's score dropped on the most recent UNDP
Human Development Index. Declining school attendance and
literacy as well as a life expectancy of 43.4 years - driven
mainly by increased infant mortality and prevalence of
HIV/AIDS - characterize the plight of Africa's most populous

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nation. Widespread mistrust over safety has marred
U.N.-sponsored efforts to combat polio in Nigeria. The
impact of Avian Influenza (AI) - though under-reported by the
GON - has been extensive and devastating to commercial
poultry production, a major industry and employer. Aside
from AI becoming an epidemic and possibly mutating into its
human strain, the outbreak is almost certain to impact an
even greater number of subsistence farmers who rely on small
backyard flocks to supplement their diet and income.
CAMPBELL