Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA2816
2006-10-29 14:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VOTES ON STATE OF EMERGENCY IN

pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHUJA #2816/01 3021436
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291436Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7599
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 5390
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002816 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINR ELECTIONS THIRDTERM NI
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VOTES ON STATE OF EMERGENCY IN
EKITI

REF: LAGOS 1297

Classified By: Political Counselor Russell J. Hanks for reasons 1.4 (b
and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002816

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINR ELECTIONS THIRDTERM NI
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VOTES ON STATE OF EMERGENCY IN
EKITI

REF: LAGOS 1297

Classified By: Political Counselor Russell J. Hanks for reasons 1.4 (b
and d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a surprise move, both chambers of the
National Assembly voted October 26 to approve the state of
emergency declared by the President in Ekiti State. While
the press reports that the Senate vote was unanimous, Embassy
contacts indicate that the results were questionable and
possibly a violation of established Assembly procedures. As
a result, procedural questions remain outstanding and many
members of the National Assembly came away with hurt feelings
or worse. Perhaps most troubling are the legal and
procedural questions arising from the vote and the increased
level of cynicism about the prospects for elections in 2007.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Press reports indicate that the Senate vote was
unanimous. However, this assertion is difficult to believe.
Prior to the vote, PolOff spoke to 2 Senators, both
long-standing opponents of the President, who declared that
they could never vote for the state of emergency (SOE). They
saw it as an attempt by the President to extend his term in
office. Other members echoed these statements. Press
reports say that the Senators reached a deal in executive
session where the President promised to not declare further
SOEs. Additionally, the President agreed to consult Senate
leaders before declaring another SOE. One Senator pointed
out that such promises have in the past proved to be
"worthless."


3. (C) At best, the vote showed strong arm tactics by the
Presidency in order to secure approval for the Ekiti SOE.
Prior to the chambers convening, members who were opposed to
the state of emergency were in the lobby and available for
interview. The PDP caucus, however, was meeting privately to
discuss strategy to secure approval of the action. One House
member told PolOff that President Obasanjo had talked to the
them the previous evening to demand that PDP members vote in
favor of the SOE. We later received confirmation that the
President also met with Senate members.


4. (C) According to a member who attended the PDP caucus

meeting on October 25, Obasanjo told the members that he had
known about corruption issues surrounding Ekiti Governor Ayo
Fayose for more than three years. When one member asked
Obasanjo why he had not already taken action, the President
became visibly angry and told the member to "shut up."
Another PDP caucus member described the President's tirade as
"venomous," and quoted the president as saying, "Any of you
who vote against it will not get the nomination (for
re-election) in my PDP." In a conversation with PolCouns,
one member said, "it is obvious that this man (Obasanjo) does
not plan to go anywhere in 2007." PolOff and PolFSNs spoke
to a number of Senators and House members in the national
assembly building on the 26th. Each of these people said
that Obasanjo was behind the impeachment in Ekiti, with most
saying he had "laid a trap" for the state government. The
trap allowed him to declare an SOE when multiple people
claimed to be governor. The consensus opinion prior to the
Senate's deal was that if this SOE was allowed to stand,
Obasanjo would later declare SOEs in Plateau and possibly
Anambra states.


5. (C) At worst, the vote shows an open breach of standard
procedure in the National Assembly. The only thing we can
say with confidence about the Senate vote is that it would
have been difficult to build a unanimous consensus in one day
on a vote to which many members were openly hostile. The
picture on the House side, however, is somewhat more clear.
One member spoke with PolCouns after the vote and said that
when the House went in to executive session, it quickly
became clear that there were not enough votes to sustain the
measure. The House broke, the PDP members caucused, and then
the House reconvened in executive session. While media
reports indicate various members saying a vote was taken,
those reports do not provide uniform vote tallies. Our
contact says that is because a result was simply announced.


6. (C) Even if the vote was taken in good faith, we believe
there was another procedural problem. Paragraph 4 of reftel
reports that the approval had to come from a "two-thirds
majority of all members of each House." Media reports
indicate that 82 members of the Senate were present, and this
is consistent with PolOff's observation from the gallery
before the Senate went in to executive session. If the vote
was unanimous or nearly so, two thirds would be possible.

ABUJA 00002816 002 OF 002


However, reports indicate that less than one-half of the
House was present. PolOff was not in the House gallery, but
there seemed to be sparse attendance from the traffic through
the lobby. Contacts in the national assembly told PolCouns
that "far fewer" than two-thirds of the members were present.
Anecdotally, two of PolOff's contacts in the House sent him
text messages saying they were traveling in their
constituencies and would not be present for the vote. Thus,
two-thirds approval of "all members" would be impossible even
if everyone voted in favor of the resolution. All reports
indicate that the House recorded some votes against the bill.


7. (C) COMMENT. Nigerians are engaged in widespread
speculation that the state of emergency in Ekiti State is
part of the plan by President Obasanjo to create unstable
conditions in the country, allowing him to declare a broader
state of emergency and thus extend his time in office. More
troubling are the legal and procedural questions raised by
the irregularities in this vote as well as the political
implications of its outcome. The Nigerian Bar Association
previously opined that the entire concept is invalid under
the constitution and the subversion of the National
Assembly's Rules of Order raise serious questions about
transparency in governance and the legality of many actions.
The President and EFCC Chairman Ribadu also made comments
publicly and privately to the effect that the ends justify
the means regardless of rule of law issues, another troubling
aspect. Further, with the heated political climate and the
uncertainties over Obasanjo's 2007 intentions, declaring a
state of emergency in Ekiti state and attacking the regime's
political rivals could tend to polarize the ruling elite,
agitate the populace and encourage untoward activities by the
security services, either in support of or against the
current government. END COMMENT.
CAMPBELL