Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA234
2006-02-01 15:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

SUDAN: GETTING PAST "NO" ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Tags:  PARM PGOV PINS ASEC SU DARFUR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000234 

SIPDIS

PASS AF/RSA AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2031
TAGS: PARM PGOV PINS ASEC SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: SUDAN: GETTING PAST "NO" ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Classified By: USDEL Member E. Tariot. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000234

SIPDIS

PASS AF/RSA AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2031
TAGS: PARM PGOV PINS ASEC SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: SUDAN: GETTING PAST "NO" ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Classified By: USDEL Member E. Tariot. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Skilled AU mediation has wrested
control out of the hands of the incapable chairman of the
Security Arrangements Committee and established some
promising common ground between the parties at the Darfur
Peace Talks. The Movements, superficial grasp of the
modalities of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
continues to stifle meaningful progress in cross-table
plenary discussions between the parties. Tactical maneuvers
by the Sudanese Armed Forces along the outskirts of
Movement-held areas have reportedly heightened acute food
shortages within the Movements, field ranks, giving credence
to SLM/Minnawi and JEM field commanders, concern that their
political brethren may be negotiating their defeat at table.
Field command dissent (and the difficulties of obtaining
militia-level buy-in at the Talks) remains another barrier to
progress, exacerbating the Movements, lack of negotiating
confidence opposite a skilled, professional, national
military delegation. Shifting and extremely close-hold
security arrangements, red-lines within the Government of
National Unity,s (GNU) negotiating posture, all combine to
create drag on the pace -- and ultimate closure -- of the
Peace Talks as a whole. AU technical advisors argue that
resultant delays could be overcome with an increase of
skilled, technical military advisors with DDR implementation
experience. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


2. (C) Progress on the security arrangements front remains
promising, though the tough issues relating to disarmament
have not yet been discussed. The skilled mediation efforts
of AU technical advisor Laurie Nathan have resulted in the
parties opting out of AU mediation in lieu of cross-party
discussions between the GNU and the Movements -- a first for
the Security Arrangements Commission. Intensive,
collaborative problem-solving negotiations between the
parties at the working group-level resulted in a preliminary
enhanced ceasefire document on track for an agreement late
this week. Oriented toward strengthening the monitoring,

enforcement, and verification abilities of AMIS, the Joint
Ceasefire Commission, the Joint Commission, and the Joint
Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit, the document
also exacts precise concessions out of the parties to ensure
compliance.


3. (C) Although Nathan,s diligence has shown positive
results thus far, discussions between USDEL and a variety of
interlocutors at the Darfur Peace Talks indicate that without
improving the comprehensive technical capacity of the
Movements, progress in the Security Arrangements Commission
as a whole will continue to be inadequate. In one-on-one
discussions between the Movements and AU technical advisors,
all three factions (JEM, SLM/AW, and SLM/Minnawi) continue to
be hobbled by their lack of understanding about disarmament
and demobilization process. SLM/Minnawi negotiators
confessed to AU security arrangements team member Jeremy
Brickhill and Laurie Nathan (STRICTLY PROTECT) that field
commanders continued to be concerned that &assembly points8
meant anything ranging from specific geo-coordinates
vulnerable to SAF attack to concentration camps. SLM/AW
negotiators, in similar discussions, repeatedly asked at what
point disarmament was most appropriate during the transition
period. When queried by the AU advisors as to what SLM/AW
meant by &transition,8 advisors were met with &what does
it routinely mean?8 as the response.


4. (C) Movements, skittishness during security arrangements
discussions is exacerbated not only by the political
fragility of the Movements, negotiating position, but
reported SAF strategic victories (as the Movements have
categorized them to us) in the field. The December/January
period remains one Darfur,s worst with regard to cease-fire
violations, and allegations of under-reporting to the Joint
Ceasefire Commission (CFC) by both sides only bolsters
Movements, private claims to AU technical advisors that
their current field deficits are significant. Large-scale
military attacks have dropped off as Movements, leaders
attempt to bolster credibility at the table through selective
enforcement of the N,djamena Protocol. This downturn in
what previously served as a re-supply activity, coupled with
(apparently successful) tactical maneuvers by the Sudanese
Armed Forces along the outskirts of Movement-held areas, has
reportedly heightened acute food shortages within the
Movements field ranks. Internal schisms between
per-diem-supplemented SLM/JEM political advisors and
inconsistently paid and supplied SLM/JEM militia remain an
undercurrent of the Talks. Mini Minnawi,s lead negotiator,
Ali Tray, alleged to PolOff that the main reason behind
Mini,s absence from the Talks is to keep the commanders
&from throwing over the table in anger8 as they hear, third
and fourth hand, of Minnawi,s claims to &Western Sudan,8
and media reports alleging progress in disarmament talks.


5. (C) The GNU,s limited negotiating mandate continues to
keep the security arrangements commission off balance. Lead
security arrangements negotiator General Ismat Abdelrahman
noted to AU mediator that, although he could agree to
decisions on integration and assembly independent from
Khartoum, everything else required the approval, at a
minimum, of the Minister of Defense. Stove-piping issues
aside, the GNU delegation faces significant capacity issues
of its own. Abdelrahman admitted to Nathan in a private
mediation discussion that Khartoum remains highly concerned
about its ability to disarm the Janjaweed. In a frank
exchange that outlined the intense disagreement in government
circles on how to best handle ultimate Movement integration,
Nathan brought conversation to a standstill with his query on
the status of GNU planning for Janjaweed disarmament. After
a long pause, Abdelrahman admitted that the SAF remained
uncertain that it was capable of being even marginally
successful in executing the initiative, before recovering
with a less-than-convincing acknowledgement that &it will
be difficult.8


6. (C) Nathan offered the Deputy Secretary,s Special
Representative to the Sudan (D/SpecRep) well-considered
thoughts on how the USG (or other international partners
could hold the GNU accountable to its international mandate
to disarm Janjaweed and other Arab militias. The AU mediator
offered a two-track approach focused on the negotiating table
and targeted international pressure on the SAF. The latter
calls for dedicating U.S. intelligence and other capabilities
to ascertaining the scope and breadth of both known
arms-trafficking routes into and out of Darfur and
known/suspected munitions stockpiles. Such collection
efforts, shared and coordinated with like-minded diplomatic
partners, could be used to pressure the GNU to come to the
table significantly reduced red-lines. Given the fact the
GNU will offer up &the cheapest bottom-line possible,8
Nathan opined that only compelling evidence of GNU
intransigence ) beyond that of the deteriorating
humanitarian situation in Darfur ) could force GNU to
commit itself seriously to the security negotiations in the
face of otherwise shaky (and therefore easily stalled)
Movement position.


7. (C) D/SpecRep was enthusiastic about the idea, noting the
USG,s enormous success in using satellite images of razed
villages to pressure Sudan in the past. Once tied seriously
to the Talks, Nathan continued, the international community
could capitalize on the GNU,s Janjaweed disarmament concerns
by focusing the debate (and subsequent agreement) on
&neutralizing8 the Janjaweed threat. Nathan argued this
was not meant to absolve the GNU of its responsibility to
reign in its Janjaweed proxy, but rather establish a set of
benchmarks to which the international community could
reasonably hold the Government to account. (NOTE: In
follow-on conversations, Nathan has offered USDEL a white
paper on neutralization versus disarmament. USDEL will fax a
copy to AF/SPG once available. END NOTE.)


8. (C) Capacity weaknesses and limited mandates aside, the
chief obstacle to progress within the Security Arrangements
Commission so far: the sizeable shortcomings its chief AU
mediator, Nigerian General Geruba. He is unskilled at
mediation, and is repeatedly bowled over by both parties
during plenary discussions. Salim Mohammed Salim is familiar
with Geruba,s inadequacies, but his unhappiness with the
General,s approach has only forced Geruba to make defensive
decisions unhelpful to the process. The entire AU security
arrangements committee has approached USDEL and other select
partners with their concerns, and noted that Salim is
soliciting names to replace Geruba,s equally inadequate
deputy. (NOTE: USDEL and AF have discussed a specific list of
names that should be quickly submitted to Salim for his
immediate consideration and action. Current ad-hoc mediator
Laurie Nathan is scheduled to depart Abuja o/a February 9,
making Washington,s swift signal to Salim all the more
imperative. END NOTE.)
CAMPBELL