Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA233
2006-02-01 15:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

SUDAN: GNU PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR VIEWS ON DARFUR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS PHUM KDEM SU DARFUR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000233 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM KDEM SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: SUDAN: GNU PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR VIEWS ON DARFUR


Classified By: USDEL Team Member E. Tariot. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000233

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM KDEM SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: SUDAN: GNU PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR VIEWS ON DARFUR


Classified By: USDEL Team Member E. Tariot. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a two hour discussion with AU mediation
advisors, Government of National Unity Presidential Advisor
Magzoub laid out a negotiating position at sharp angles with
those of both erstwhile Acting Head of Delegation Mohammed
Yousuf and SPLM/GNU Darfur point-man Yasir Armin. Magzoub,s
latest stance, as conveyed to the Deputy Secretary,s Special
Representative to the Sudan, appears also to be a strategic,
and decidedly negative, re-calculation away from Bashir,s
position asserted to us during recent discussions with
Magzoub in Khartoum, and one that could further protract the
Darfur Peace Talks if unchecked by AU mediation. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C)In a January 30 meeting with the Deputy Secretary,s
Special Representative to the Sudan (D/SpecRep),AU advisors
Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed (STRICTLY PROTECT) described
Presidential Advisor and Chief Government of National Unity
(GNU) Negotiator Ahmed Magzoub,s articulation of his
delegation,s negotiating position as one largely unconcerned
with international community pressure, and increasingly
oriented toward the National Congress Party,s domestic
constituency. In a private meeting with the AU mediation
advisors earlier in the day, Magzoub offered up a blustery
but confident political calculation that the crisis in Darfur
could be allowed to continue indefinitely without
repercussions on the current government in Khartoum. He was
dismissive of the international community,s concern over the
conflict, opining that international pressure has reached its
climax. Moreover, he argued, &we,ve given them the CPA, and
they don,t want to undermine that8 through a hard-line
stance on Darfur. The presidential advisor claimed to be
undeterred by threat of ICC or UNSC action, and was equally
dismissive of any destabilizing factor posed by Chad or
Libya. &The Libyans only know how to start trouble, not
finish it,8 he said.


3. (C) The presidential advisor downplayed the Darfur
crisis, national impact, classifying it as &an ache.8
Political fallout could be avoided in Khartoum as long as the

situation in Darfur remained contained. He claimed that the
ongoing peace talks in Abuja were a non-issue for many
Sudanese. The conflict was too localized for most to care,
and as long as Southerners in government and elsewhere were
kept happy, the international community could be kept at bay.
(COMMENT: Our interlocutors stressed that GNU actions
against the Darfur diaspora suggest Magzoub,s nonchalant
attitude contains a degree of posturing. De Waal alleged
considerable GNU arm-twisting in response to &out of line8
demands at the peace talks. An ongoing Arab-consumer boycott
against Zaghawa merchants is proving to be an effective
manipulation tactic between Movements, adherents on the
ground and the parties in Abuja. END COMMENT.)


4. (C) Magzoub,s responses to AU advisors, queries on GNU
redlines centered on maintaining the NCP,s electoral margin
in the North, Khartoum, and East. Paramount in any political
agreement signed with the Movements was minimizing the
political costs: concessions that either alienated voters or
signaled GNU passivity to rebellion in other marginalized
areas were unacceptable. To this end, the Movements demand
for the vice presidency was moot, and although others within
the GNU delegation are inclined to concede the position of
Assistant to the President to the Movements, Magzoub
personally is against the idea. As for awarding Darfur
regional status, Magzoub evinced support, but only if the GNU
secured political cover by changing the label, and if the
Movements, could be persuaded to further discuss issues
related to its administration.


5. (C) The AU advisors stressed Magzoub,s repeated return
to, and nearly inescapable focus on, the impact of a
political settlement on future elections. Key constituencies
in North and Central Sudan are NCP,s to lose, and political
weakness on Darfur must not contribute to that possibility.
De Waal and Mohammed posited that President Bashir,s
coupling of NCP supremacy and Darfur remains uncertain. Our
interlocutors opined to D/SpecRep that Magzoub,s
near-singular focus on this element of the GNU,s political
negotiating strategy may be of his own doing, vice Bashir,s
instruction. Magzoub, as NCP secretary-general, is acutely
aware of the Darfur Peace Talks impact on the party,s
powerbase. Although Bashir appears to have given the GNU
delegation the order to make a deal, the guidelines are
loose, and the GNU &position8 shifts with each rotating
delegation head. Given this, they argued, the presidential
advisor,s reappearance at the Talks could protract the peace
process for months. Moreover, given the depth of personal
support for Magzoub within the party apparatus, should the
presidential advisor be able to deliver a pro-NCP peace
settlement, Vice President Taha will not be in a position to
overrule him -- no matter how cross-wise it is with Taha,s
initial signals to the international community. Equally
important, Magzoub,s self-professed anti-Western stance
makes it evident that, should Khartoum move on a unilateral
agreement with one of the Movements brokered by Magzoub
alone, the stragglers will be international community,s
problem.


6. (C) COMMENT: In a January 31 meeting with D/SpecRep in
Abuja, Magzoub,s tough stance was clear. However, it was
also evident that he wants to move the Talks forward, in
accordance with USG discussions with the GNU held last week
in Khartoum. International partners at the Talks have
launched an effort to quietly signal to Magzoub that walking
back the parties, progress at this stage would be viewed
poorly by the international community.
CAMPBELL