Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA232
2006-02-01 15:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

HOPES FOR PEACE AND TALK OF WAR AT DARFUR TALKS

Tags:  PREL PINS PGOV PREF PHUM ASEC SU DARFUR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000232 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2031
TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV PREF PHUM ASEC SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: HOPES FOR PEACE AND TALK OF WAR AT DARFUR TALKS


Classified By: USDEL Member Erin Y. Tariot, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000232

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2031
TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV PREF PHUM ASEC SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: HOPES FOR PEACE AND TALK OF WAR AT DARFUR TALKS


Classified By: USDEL Member Erin Y. Tariot, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The pace of the Darfur Peace Talks has
accelerated. The parties appear to have more of a negotiating
mandate, and although red-lines remain, those committed to a
settlement still outnumber the spoilers. International
observer corps, enthusiasm about the improved op tempo,
however, has been tempered by events in N,djamena, and
continued allegations of military excursions along the
Sudan/Chad border. The fragility of the rebel movements,
alliance has grown, increasing with it fears of
intra-Movement military conflict between JEM and SLM. Mixed
signals from Khartoum to Abdelwahid,s SLM faction remain a
significant impediment to the development of alternative
avenues toward peace. Issues at play on the Talk,s margins
could either scuttle or save a political settlement. The
latter is achievable only through rapid, coordinated, and
clear international action aimed at keeping the parties
focused at the table, and maintaining cooler heads in the
field. END SUMMARY.

--------------
PACE, PROGRESS ARE PROMISING, BUT(
--------------

2. (C) The hopes of the international observer corps were
buoyed by the post-Eid spike in activity at the Darfur Peace
Talks. Technical experts, save for previously promised and
still required USG military advisors, are in train. Skilled
AU mediation has established an important store of
cross-table goodwill critical for continued progress as
working groups approach thornier political/military issues at
week,s end. The inter-parties distance on security
arrangements remains significant, but progress is occurring,
albeit slowly. (NOTE: Pertinent security arrangement issues
septel. END NOTE.) Positive movement has been seen on
decisions regarding representation within the Council of
Ministers and National Assembly; proactive AU mediation has
been promised should the parties fall short. Reparations and
quantifying shares of natural resources remain the sole
obstacles to the conclusion of a wealth-sharing agreement.

The parties remain firmly anchored in negotiating mode.

--------------
TALK OF SLM/JEM VIOLENCE ABOUNDS
--------------

3. (C) In contrast, the attention of observers is
increasingly focused elsewhere, seized by an urgent sense to
shelter the fledgling progress from external events --
alleged and actual -- that are at best unclear and at worst
disturbing. Although the Abdelwahid Nur SLM faction (SLM/AW)
has been able to compartmentalize NMRD,s potential political
implications at the Talks, the same cannot be said for the
perceived threat of SLM/AW-JEM violence. &We remain
committed to a political settlement beneficial to all of
Darfur, and to the negotiating agreement that places us at
the same table with the other Movements, but should JEM
attack, for us, the talks are over.& Abdelwahid emphasized.
The SLM co-chair told PolOff January 28 that recent JEM
militia increases in and around Malit, and the &troubling8
arrival of Khalil in Darfur, have increased SLM concerns that
a JEM attack may be imminent. He posited with reference to
Ghelil &why is he here now, when he has been absent from
Darfur since the early 1990s?& His representatives alleged
to PolOff in the same meeting a substantial arms and militia
buildup by JEM throughout West and North Darfur, and have
promised the USDEL, although not yet delivered, a list of
purported locations.


4. (C) Abdelwahid,s concerns on field violence may be
premature, if only because they have been usurped by flaring
intra-Movement tempers at the talks themselves. On January
26, JEM ordered the removal of three dissenters from its
negotiating team after they internally criticized the NMRD
decision. The erstwhile JEM delegates were given 30 minutes
to vacate the hotel on the heels of their argument, made
during a sidebar on power-sharing, that the NMRD decision was
taken without proper Movement-wide vetting. Abdelwahid,s SLM
faction prevented the involuntary expulsion by offering up
rooms within the SLM delegation -- and a seat at on their
section of the negotiating table.


5. (C) On January 27/28, a physical altercation between four
JEM representatives and one of the dissenters -- at 3:30AM --
resulted in the man and his wife seeking medical treatment at
a local hospital. In an AU briefing January 28, the Deputy
Secretary,s Special Representative to the Sudan (D/SpecRep)

SIPDIS
pushed the African Union to take the assault seriously, and
not &smooth it out,8 as the AU was intending. (COMMENT: The
AU response to this request has improved. At its insistence,
JEM expelled the three attackers from the delegation and the
hotel. END COMMENT.)

--------------
IS KHT OFFERING A DEAL, AND WOULD IT MATTER?
--------------

6. (C) A cadre of AU mediators profess confidence that
Khartoum could be persuaded to deal on power sharing
arrangements. More forward-leaning AU resource people
believe a deal between Khartoum and Abdelwahid,s faction
could bring the talks to a final signing ceremony. Both
argue that it would be centered on two tenets: the creation
of an assistant president and the acceptance of Darfur as one
region, vice its current construct of three states. Sidebar
discussions between select AU resource people and the GNU
have elicited the following negotiating posture, should
Khartoum following through with its efforts to court
Abdewahid Nur: Assistant President would be removed from his
position, and replaced with a Darfur repetitive agreed upon
by the Movements. The portfolio for the position would be
modified, awarding the incumbent specific, and sole,
responsibility for Darfur. GNU would also concede to SLM/AM
regional status for Darfur, but through a gradual process
that would enhance the administrative and political
capacities of the Movements before ceding them complete
oversight of the new region.


7. (C) Although popular within some AU mediation circles,
SLM/AW has yet to be persuaded of the plan, and it remains
uncertain if they have even been approached by the GNU. In a
January 28 meeting with D/SpecRep, Abdelwahid initially
dodged the question of whether his faction was being courted
by Khartoum, instead lamenting his lack of access. &I have
been here throughout,8 he complained, &Mini is gone, Khalil
has never come, so why not approach me?8 Midway through the
meeting, however, he returned to the point unprompted,
actively soliciting D/SpecRep,s views on how such a move
would play in Washington. D/SpecRep demurred on the direct
question, instead emphasizing USG desire for a speedy and
sustainable peace in Darfur.


8. (C) Mixed signals from Khartoum, not at the table but in
Sudan itself, further strain the initial credibility of the
proposal. In follow-on talks with PolOff largely centered on
violence in Golo and Kaure, Abdelwahid and two advisors,
while seemingly receptive to the idea of dealing one-on-one
with the Government of National Unity, remained perplexed by
the alleged uptick in SAF activity against this faction of
the SLM. They stressed repeatedly their belief that Khartoum
is attempting to leverage recent SAF/SLM skirmishes in Darfur
to drive SLM-AW to a political settlement in Abuja. They
scoffed, however, at the SAF,s &misguided belief8 that
this would force SLM/AW to capitulate at the talks.

--------------
WHAT IS JEM THINKING, AND IS MINI ONBOARD?
--------------

9. (C) JEM,s post-NMRD objectives at the Talks, when
contrasted against Abdelwahid,s characterization of their
field activities, remain murky. AU Security Arrangement
Mediator Laurie Nathan (STRICTLY PROTECT) noted to D/SpecRep
and PolOff January 28 that JEM Chief Negotiator Tadjedine had
requested expediting the working group schedule so the sides
could immediately tackle disarmament modalities, ostensibly
an unusual request for a militia purportedly in the process
of weapons, stockpiling. Nathan further remarked to PolOff
January 26 that JEM,s position had &visibly sweetened8
during the plenary sessions on security arrangements normally
reserved for grandstanding. Nathan opined JEM,s transition
to listening mode appeared legitimate, albeit hobbled a
superficial understanding of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration mechanisms as they related to the CPA.


10. (C) AU advisor Alex de Waal (STRICTLY PROTECT) argued to
D/SpecRep and PolOff on January 27 that JEM s
Chadian/Libyan-influenced negotiating style made JEM a key
aspect in finalizing any possible political settlement
between SLM/AW and Khartoum &on behalf of the Movements,8
but maintained that JEM was not to be mistaken for a swing
vote to peace. De Waal claims JEM is psychologically
positioned the &jump and follow the strong man,8 and would
quickly align itself with a &winning8 SLM/AW faction --
regardless of the current pro-JEM power set-up within NMRD --
should an agreement be reached with Khartoum. (COMMENT: If de
Waal,s read of JEM,s motivating factors is correct, and
Abdelwahid,s assertion about JEM militia activity true, one
has to question what signals JEM is getting as to who
currently holds military supremacy in Darfur. END COMMENT).


11. (C) Mini Minnawi, absent from the Talks (and claiming to
us to be on the Sudan/Chad border, exploring ways to fortify
vulnerable allied populations there) remains somewhat of an
enigma in Abuja. His SLM negotiating team (SLM/Minnawi) is
led by three hard-line political advisors who remain
insufficiently schooled in military demobilization to move
the talks forward, and visibly nervous about the level
criticism (and in limited cases, outright dissent) from field
commanders about perceived capitulations by the Movements
at the negotiating table. De Waal has speculated Mini would
accept an agreement, even if led by SLM-AW, to avoid being
left out in the cold. (COMMENT: Whether Chad or Libya could
persuade Minnawi to remain a holdout to a SLM/AW-driven
political agreement in a fashion that would undermine peace
in Darfur remains the subject of considerable speculation at
the Talks, margins. We are arguably too close to the issues
here to accurately forecast the degree to which any such
theories are correct. END COMMENT.)

--------------
SAF/DARFUR VIOLENCE: LITTLE IMPACT, SO FAR
--------------

12. (C) Unlike previous rounds, recent skirmishes between the
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM/AW and SLM/Minnawi) and the
Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur have had a negligible impact
on the Talks. Although neither faction has relinquished their
status as the aggrieved party, both GNU and SLM-AW
interlocutors at the talks are satisfied that AMIS has the
situation in hand, and mechanisms exist for minimizing
fallout following the events in Golo. Abdelwahid,s SLM
faction -- to include the chairman himself -- maintains that
the SLM attack in Golo was in retaliation for the burnings of
21 villages in the immediate area that served as SLM supply
garrisons. Abdelwahid claimed to PolOff that a heightened SLM
alert posture triggered ground units to misread the SAF
arrival near Kaure as an approaching attack, and noted field
commanders have since been disciplined for the pre-emptive
strike. (NOTE: It is doubtful that said &discipline8 was
significant. Abdelwahid held a lengthy discourse on the
&burden of responsibility8 field commanders shoulder to
defend allied civilians from &SAF and Janjaweed
aggression,8 allowing for little difference between the two.
END NOTE.)

--------------
COMMENT:
--------------

13. (C) The situation in Abuja remains fluid, but the rapport
between the parties -- when at the table -- indicates an
improved environment. External events warrant a close look.
Equally important, the speedy delivery of resources: be it
political pressure in Khartoum or the arrival of USG military
advisors, is important for international community traction
once the parties truly commit themselves to crafting a final
settlement.
CAMPBELL