Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUJA119
2006-01-20 15:39:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

MEETING WITH THE NSA EVENING OF 18 JANUARY 2005

Tags:  PGOV PREF PREL NI HOSTAGES 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000119 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958 DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL NI HOSTAGES
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH THE NSA EVENING OF 18 JANUARY 2005

Classified by Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B)
and (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000119

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958 DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL NI HOSTAGES
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH THE NSA EVENING OF 18 JANUARY 2005

Classified by Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B)
and (D)


1. (S/NF) On January 18, 2006, Nigerian National Security
Advisor (NSA) Aliyu Mohammed told the Ambassador that he
expected a quick resolution of the Delta hostage crisis.
He said he would be a candidate for the presidency in 2007
if President Obasanjo steps down at the end of his second
term and if Gen. Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) chooses not to
run. He also raised the possibility of a military coup
should President Obasanjo manipulate the political process
to stay in office after his term expires.

-------------- --------------
Assessment of the Hostage Crisis and General Stability in
the Niger Delta
-------------- --------------


2. (S/NF) Aliyu Mohammed said that the Federal Government
of Nigeria (FGN) had established a committee to resolve,
through negotiation, the current hostage crisis in the
Delta. The committee is chaired by Bayelsa State Governor
Jonathan Goodluck, and includes his Deputy Governor,
representatives from the state governments in the region,
the Nigerian military, the State Security Service (SSS),
and the National Police Force (NPF). Aliyu said that while
the committee had only just started its work, he believed
the crisis would be over within the next 24-48 hours, with
the hostages being released in return for unspecified FGN
undertakings. He raised the possibility that in lieu of
responding to the hostage-taker demands that Ijaws Dokubo
Azari and deposed governor of Bayelsa state Diepreye
Alamieyeseigha be released, the state governors would
undertake to increase the number of Ijaws in their
governments. However, in virtually the next breath, he
said that the FGN and the committee still did not know
which militia group was actually holding the hostages, and
that the previous day, negotiations had been with the
"wrong" militia group.


3. (S/NF) Aliyu said that the basic Niger Delta Region
issues must be addressed, otherwise, the cycle of violent
attacks against oil sector infrastructure and personnel
will only continue. He cited poverty and unemployment as
the two key factors contributing most to the state of

lawlessness and admitted the failure of the FGN, State, and
Local governments to undertake and execute the reform
programs necessary for development. Aliyu also said that
the local militias "outgunned" the military assets at the
disposal of the FGN in the Delta. He said that there are
two key issues where the FGN most needs our help: (1)
strengthening the FGN's military and police capacity and
(2) interdicting the oil bunkering, the profits of which
fund the militias. It is the profits from oil bunkering,
he said, that enable the militias to purchase war materiel
such as small assault weapons, rocket propelled grenades,
and ammunition. Aliyu claimed that the local state
governors are responsible for "98 percent" of the oil
bunkering. Aliyu observed that the FGN hesitated to send
in the Nigerian military to deal with the disparate
militias (many of which have links to the governors) for
fear that it would overreact, resulting in such
humanitarian and political disasters as the Zaka Bian and
Odi massacres, mentioning them by name. Recalling previous
suggestions of assistance by EUCOM to help improve security
in the Niger Delta, he noted with regret the FGN's
reluctance to accept outside help.


4. (S/NF) The Ambassador expressed concern over the loss
of oil production. He noted rapidly increasing world
petroleum prices. Aliyu responded by saying that
production has not yet been drastically affected: Shell has
only lost 130 - 150 k barrels per day (bpd) in production
capability. Aliyu also said that Shell has committed not
to shut down production in fields unaffected by militia
activity. He noted that ExxonMobil has spoken to him
regarding security threats, but he doubted they were
sufficient to cause it to draw down in production. The
Ambassador asked whether he could confirm if Agip or Total
had also suffered from attacks. Aliyu said he had not
heard of any. The Ambassador then asked him for his frank
assessment as to whether the current violence was, in
essence, the declaration of war against the oil companies,
which the militia group Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND) makes it out to be. Aliyu responded
that the militia groups were simply increasing their level
of rhetoric to force more oil company concessions, and that
in another week or two, the region's stability would be
restored.

5. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked Aliyu how he thought China
and other South and East Asian countries would react to the
violence in the Delta. He replied that both China and
India are primarily concerned with securing access to the
natural resources they require and that they are undeterred
by the real or perceived safety concerns of the Delta
Region. He also noted that former Minister of Defense
Theophilus Y. Danjuma (a long-term Nigeria kingmaker) is
currently negotiating oil contracts with China.
-------------- --------------
Assessment of President Obasanjo's Third Term Agenda
-------------- --------------


6. (S/NF) Aliyu told the Ambassador that he would run for
President in 2007 if Obasanjo and former Chief of State
Ibrahim Babangida do not. What the President intends to do
is not clear. Aliyu noted that when potential candidates
express interest in running for the Presidency, Obasanjo
"frowns" at them. Aliyu said Obasanjo would like to change
the constitution so that he can legally contest for a third
term. However, Obasanjo has not yet determined what his
chances of success would be. Aliyu said that he has
discussed a possible Obasanjo third term with many in his
"peer group," who feel as he does: no matter how good a job
Obasanjo is doing, a constitution must not be changed for
the benefit of one person. Aliyu discussed two key
challenges facing Obasanjo and his third term bid. First,
Obasanjo is deeply unpopular with the masses of Nigerians
who are progressively impoverished, while the richest one
percent of Nigerians, who are getting richer because of the
economic reform program and higher oil prices, support his
third term aspirations. Second, Aliyu said that in light
of the President's efforts to impose and support adherence
to constitutions in other places in Africa, such as TOGO,
Obasanjo's manipulation of the political process in Nigeria
would undercut his -- and Nigeria's -- international
reputation.


7. S/NF) Aliyu said that Obasanjo is raising vast sums of
money for a possible third term bid. Obasanjo is working
through a consortium called Transcorp, which is controlled
by some of the country's richest elite, including Gbenga
Obasanjo (the President's son) and Aliko Dangote, one of
Nigeria's richest men. (Transcorp recently purchased the
Nicon Hilton Abuja, the largest hotel in Sub-Saharan
Africa.) Should Obasanjo try to amend the constitution,
Aliyu continued, bribery and intimidation would be
widespread if the effort were to succeed. Aliyu said that
likely bribes would be 130 million Naira for a National
Assembly Senator, 75 million Naira for a member of the
House of Representatives, and 30-35 million Naira for
members of State Assemblies. He also confirmed that
Obasanjo is using the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) to attack his political enemies. He
cited EFCC investigation of the state governor of Enugu,
formerly a very close friend of Obasanjo, once he expressed
interest in the Presidency. Aliyu observed that Obasanjo
"would take a Sergeant from the Nigerian Army and make him
President of Nigeria rather than hand over to Atiku," the
current Vice President. Aliyu noted that Obasanjo has
successfully dismantled much of Atiku's political machinery
and his financial base. If Obasanjo succeeds in staying in
power for a third term, Atiku will "be either in exile or
in jail." Aliyu said that Obasanjo's enmity toward his
Vice President and erstwhile political ally is solely based
on Atiku's presidential aspirations.


8. (S/NF) Turning to former Head of State, Ibrahim B.
Babangida (IBB),Aliyu commented that IBB is not really
interested in the Presidency, but rather in remaining a
relevant player in Nigerian politics. He said that there
are those around IBB, however; whose livelihoods would be
severely affected should the former chief of state be
marginalized. And, Aliyu continued, IBB's wife has
ambitions to be First Lady. Aliyu said he and IBB would be
meeting with Obasanjo on January 19 to try to "smoke out"
the President's real intention about 2007. In any event,
he continued, by March 2006, it should be clear whether or
not Obasanjo will run for a third term.


9. (S/NF) Aliyu said that his assessment is, if Obasanjo
contests for a third term, it will be a catalyst for
instability in Nigeria. Aliyu said that he is concerned
over the potential for a military coup, undertaken by mid-
ranking officers if their seniors hold back, such is the
popular dissatisfaction with the status quo. In effect, as
in the past, "Nigeria would invite the army back to save
the state." The Chief Justice is already complaining that
the Obasanjo government rides roughshod over rulings of the
Supreme Court. Instability in the Delta is undermining the
security of the entire country, the North is marginalized
and the people are ever more impoverished. Thus, there may
be already reason enough to call in the military. Obasanjo
remaining in power past 2007 could be the tipping point.
And, if the military leadership did not move, then middle-
rank officers would. The result would be a resumption of
Nigeria's "coup culture" - - but more violent and bloody
than in the past.


10. (S/NF) Comment: Aliyu contradicted himself on the
current Delta crisis, saying in one breath that it will
soon be over, and in the next, that the FGN lacks the
military capacity to resolve the security issues - -
thereby implying that the FGN will not be able to resolve
the crises in the short term. He says that there is now
the political will to address such deep seated problems as
lack of development and oil bunkering. Aliyu showed
confidence in the ability of Governor Goodluck's committee
to resolve the immediate crisis.


11. (S/NF) Comment, continued. More than the Delta, Aliyu
wanted to talk about his own presidential aspirations and
what Obasanjo is going to do. At present, Aliyu thinks
that Obasanjo will try for a third term -- and, if
successful, will so destabilize the state that a military
coup would be a distinct possibility. Like many other
"establishment" Nigerians, Aliyu is particularly frightened
of a "mid-level" officer coup, with its potential for
radicalism. However, Aliyu, like Vice President Atiku,
thinks that Obasanjo "may come to his senses" -- by the end
of March. Aliyu's open discussion of the possibility of a
coup was chilling; he has been involved in most of them
since the end of the Biafra war. Aliyu badly wants the
presidency, but, he will only actively seek it if both
Obasanjo and Babangida step aside. Aliyu appears to be
close to breaking with Obasanjo, whom he has served for the
past six years, and there are rumors of his impending
resignation. While Aliyu seemed to agree when the
Ambassador talked about the importance of free and fair
elections in Nigeria, he also appears remarkably sanguine
about his ability to win, even though he is largely unknown
to the Nigerian man in the street. End comment.
CAMPBELL