DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED AFTER INTENSIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001076

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM, DARFUR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI DARFUR
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED AFTER INTENSIVE
NEGOTIATIONS


1. (SBU) Summary: The Government of Sudan and Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Minni Minnawi signed
the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5 following days of
intensive negotiations led by the U.S. and U.K. During a
final all-night, early morning session led by Nigerian
President Olusegun Obasanjo, SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi
overcame dissent among his commanders and personal tragedy,
to sign the deal. Faction leader Abdelwahid Nur and Justice
and Equality Movement leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim refused to
sign, citing various powersharing issues. In the final
moments, a group of non-Fur Abdelwahid faction members broke
ranks to sign the document. In the days following the
signature, Obasanjo and members of the international
community tried fruitlessly to convince Abdelwahid to join
the agreement. The African Union will leave the document
open for signature until May 15. International partners are
debating the utility of working with Abdelwahid or finding
another Fur leader to become party to the agreement.
Implementation of the agreement will be crucial to instill
confidence in the peace process. End Summary.

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INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY AND POWERSHARING
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2. (SBU) Deputy Secretary Zoellick and A/S for African
Affairs Jendayi Frazer led USDEL in four days of intensive
discussions with the parties on security and powersharing
issues. USDEL tackled the task of closing the remaining
gaps between the parties on disarmament of the janjaweed and
integration of the movements forces into the Sudanese armed
forced. U.K. Minister of State for International Cooperation
Hillary Benn worked on strengthening the position of Senior
Special Assistant and the regional authority in an effort to
persuade the movements to sign on. Zoellick and Benn met
with the African Union mediation and the parties continuously
from May 2 to 4, listening to their concerns and drafting
additional language for the AU Mediation Draft Peace
Agreement.


3. (SBU) The targeted discussions built upon US-facilitated
bilateral meetings between Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)
faction leader Minni Minnawi and the Government of Sudan over
the sequencing and conditionality of the disarmament of the
janjaweed and the assembly of movement forces. In addition,
USDEL had facilitated discussions between the two parties on
the integration of movement forces into the Sudanese Armed
Forces and police as well as offering education and training
for others. On powersharing, the U.S.-U.K. team developed
provisions to strengthen the position of Senior Special
Assistant by explicitly spelling out that this person is the
Chairman of the new regional authority and would have control
over key nominations and significant leverage in cases of
disagreement with state governors.

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THRILLA AT THE VILLA
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4. (SBU) The final stage of the negotiations featured an
all-night high drama at times resembling an episode of
"Survivor" beginning on May 4 and ending at 8:00 p.m. May 5
at the presidential villa, led by Nigerian President Olusegun
Obasanjo, African Union President Sassou Nguesso, and AU
Chairman Alpha Konare. Each party was brought in separately
to state their positions. First up was SLM's Minnawi
faction. Minni had told Deputy Secretary Zoellick earlier
that he could accept the agreement. However, he changed his
position at the heads of state meeting, putting forward
additional demands on powersharing from the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM). Obasanjo and USDEL asked him to
reconsider his position and gave him time to consult with his
politicos and commanders after chastising him for breaking
his word.


5. (SBU) Next up, SLM's Abdelwahid Nur, listened intently
to a letter to him from President Bush, and then refused to
sign because the document did not give Darfur a Vice
Presidency or immediately make it a region. He, too, was
sent off to reconsider his decision, but only after Obasanjo
reminded him that Nigerian peacekeepers died at the hands of
his troops and the President also accused him of personal
betrayal. USDEL reminded Abdelwahid of the consequences of
impeding the peace process while others asked him if he
wanted to be compared to Foday Sankoh or Jonas Savimbi. JEM
was the third party to face the heads of state. Dr. Khalil
Ibrahim restated maximalist demands including some on
compensation that demonstrated a lack of familiarity with the
agreement. In addition, he insulted Obasanjo personally. In
a moment of high drama, Obasanjo asked Khalil who he thought
he was and told Khalil that his disrespect for his elders and
authority indicated that he was "neither well-born or
well-bred". Obasanjo then unceremoniously kicked JEM out of
the villa. The session broke up at 5:00 a.m.


6. (SBU) Upon resumption four hours later, SLM faction
leader Minni Minnawi gave Obasanjo the needed breakthrough
when he accepted the agreement with reservations. Minni said
the reservations could be dealt with during the
implementation of the agreement. Minnawi also asked for time
to meet with the head of the Sudanese Government delegation
Magzoub Kaliffa and again brief his commanders prior to
signature. Minnawi had just heard about the death of his
brother allegedly at the hands of the janjaweed near Khor
Abeche that morning.


7. (SBU) Finally, Obasanjo brought in the Government of
Sudan delegation and told it that one of the movements had
agreed to sign. The Government of Sudan expressed its
concerns but accepted the document with the US-UK negotiated
changes. Pleased with the turn of events, Obasanjo relayed
a story about how monkeys rub both ends of a banana in the
dirt to prevent other monkeys from taking it back. He told
the parties they could not take back their consent to the
agreement.


8. (SBU) Obasanjo continued to work on Abdelwahid while the
signing ceremony was being arranged. Obasanjo held two other
meetings with him as did international partners, but to no
avail with Abdelwahid changing his "concerns" from region,
vice-presidency, compensation, to security issues.
Abdelwahid also appeared at the signing ceremony but was
personally asked to leave by Obasanjo after the President
determined that he did not intend to sign. A group of
non-Fur Abdelwahid members, led by Abderahmane Moussa, broke
ranks and entered the signing ceremony, adding to the day's
drama. (Note: Moussa has now been invited to the E.U. and
the upcoming African Union Peace and Security Council
Meeting. End note.)

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COMINGS AND GOINGS
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9. (SBU) The Government of Sudan delegation departed Abuja
on May 8. The rebel movements will be transported via UN
aircraft to Sudan on May 10.

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COMMENT
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10. (SBU) The final Darfur Peace Agreement represents the
best effort of the African Union mediation and international
community to meet the demands of the factious rebel
movements, which consistently demonstrated poor negotiating
skills and refused to back away from their maximalist
positions for five months. The U.S.-U.K. effort strengthened
the agreement in favor of the movements demands, particularly
on powersharing. SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi showed
genuine leadership as he accepted the DPA in the face of
concerns from his field commanders. He has already begun
talking to the SPLM about political party development.
Abdelwahid Nur lost a significant opportunity to prove
himself a leader by allowing bad advice and his own inflated
sense of self-worth get in the way of an important step
forward for the people of Darfur. Most observers want the
Fur to be party to the agreement, but wonder whether
Abdelwahid is the right person to pursue at this juncture.
Justice and Equality Movement proved it was not interested in
peace and can be expected to continue its spoiler role, most
likely from Chad. For its part, the GOS delegation wants
non-Zaghawa buy-in to the agreement and will make some good
faith steps toward implementation of the agreement. The
international community will need to keep pressure on the GOS
and Minnawi faction, as well as the non-signatories, to abide
by the accord in order to ensure the implementation necessary
to build the confidence that a peaceful Darfur is a genuine
possibility.


11. (SBU) This cable was not cleared by the Deputy
Secretary or A/S Frazer prior to departure.

SIPDIS
CAMPBELL