PRESIDENT OBASANJO FULLY SUPPORTS DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001009

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958:QDECL: 05/03/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT OBASANJO FULLY SUPPORTS DEPUTY
SECRETARYQS PUSH FOR A DARFUR AGREEMENTQNOW

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CLASSIFIED by Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5,b.d.


1. (C) During the Deputy SecretaryQs May 3 call, President
Obasanjo promised his full support in the final Abuja push
for an agreement between the Darfur rebel groups and the
Government of Sudan (GOS). The President and the Deputy
Secretary shared ideas about possible ways forward to an

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agreement. As Foreign Minister Adeniji had foreshadowed
during a brief conversation before the Presidential meeting,
Obasanjo looked to involve African heads of state gathering
in Abuja for a malaria-tuberculosis-HIV/AIDS conference to
pressure all parties to reach an agreement. End Summary.


2. (C) Deputy Secretary Zoellick called on President
Obasanjo at his official residence on May 3, accompanied by
AF Assistant Secretary Frazer, the U.S. Charge dQAffaires in
Khartoum, the U.S. Ambassador in Abuja and members of the D
staff. The President was accompanied by Foreign Minister
Adeniji and members of the presidential personal staff.


3. (C) After initial pleasantries, the Deputy Secretary
asked the President for his views on the Abuja Darfur talks
between the Government of Sudan and Darfur rebel groups.
The President thanked the Deputy Secretary for coming to
Abuja and for continued U.S. involvement in the search for a
solution, including the presence of an American delegation
during the months of negotiation. The current AU draft text
that seeks to mediate between the Darfur groups and the GOS
is Qas good as we can get.Q The draft, in his view,
considered all elements that any of the parties had put on
the table, and took into account what was generally
acceptable to them. Salim Salim, the AU Darfur mediator,
had briefed him on it with the request that the President
help QsellQ it. Obasanjo said that though the text was not
perfect, he had agreed to try to win its acceptance.
Obasanjo then described how he had convinced the Vice
President of Sudan to agree QreluctantlyQ to the text,
rather than to bear the onus of having blocked an agreement.
Obasanjo said he had met individually with each of the rebel
groups in Abuja. In the face of their varying degrees of
intransigence, he had argued that delay risked further
splintering of the rebel groups and even of international
sanctions. He had argued that it was time to move from the
battlefield to politics: Qyou could win at the polls, but
absent an agreement, you could end up with nothing.Q
Obasanjo said he had pointed out to the rebel groups that if
they remained intransigent, they risked the perception of
being Qthe bad guy.Q


4. (C) After praising ObasanjoQs efforts for peace in
Darfur, the Deputy Secretary said that the reality is that
the GOS has accepted the draft text while the three rebel
movements have not. Hence, the task is to persuade the
rebels that they risk losing the opportunity for a
settlement. Yet, they continue to object to provisions for
demobilization, integration of forces and other security
issues. Under these circumstances, he saw two ways forward:
the first had been his effort to mediate; he was awaiting an
early response to his efforts of May 2-3. If that failed,
he continued, the other option would be to select certain
aspects of the GOS and rebel positions, incorporate them
into a text, and present it to all parties as our own
package of revisions. There would be sweeteners to
encourage its acceptance. With respect to non-security
issues, the U.S. and the U.K. have developed modest
adjustments to the AU text. In addition they would organize
a conference for raising assistance money. He would meet
individually with each of the rebel groups Q making the
point that the option was a settlement, or nothing. If the
parties want to come to terms, we will work with them. But,
the Deputy Secretary continued, levels of suspicion were
very high.


5. (C) Obasanjo observed that by May 4, a significant
number of African leaders will be in Abuja, including the
chairman of the AU, for a Malaria-Tuberculosis-HIV/AIDS
meeting. Obasanjo undertook to use their presence to get
the AU and its member states behind what the international
community is doing for a Darfur agreement. In response to
the Deputy Secretary, the President said he would underscore
with the other African leaders the importance of getting an
agreement, and that he would try, that very evening, to
persuade Sudan President Bashir to recognize that he has his
own stake in achieving a settlement. Turning to the issue
of a UN force in Darfur, Obasanjo observed that the Sudan
did not want one Q but Khartoum is even more afraid of a
NATO force, and would recognize that it has no choice but
accept one from the UN. The Deputy Secretary observed that

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it was obviously better to have a peace agreement, but, if
one were not achieved, Darfur would still need help from
international peacekeepers.


6. (C) This message has been cleared by D staff.
CAMPBELL