Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUDHABI4432
2006-12-06 15:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

MFA INQUIRIES ABOUT USG IRAN-WATCHING FUNCTIONS IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV IR AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7972
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #4432/01 3401523
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061523Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7822
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0084
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0271
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0070
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0338
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1131
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 6696
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0101
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004432 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR AE
SUBJECT: MFA INQUIRIES ABOUT USG IRAN-WATCHING FUNCTIONS IN
DUBAI

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004432

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR AE
SUBJECT: MFA INQUIRIES ABOUT USG IRAN-WATCHING FUNCTIONS IN
DUBAI

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador and Foreign Minister Abdullah
bin Zayed (AbZ) have had several conversations regarding the
functions of the USG's Dubai Iran Regional Presence Office
(IRPO),most recently on December 5. On December 6, at AbZ's
request, Ambassador met with Acting MFA number two Tariq
Al-Haidan, following Iran-inspired media attention
questioning the "anti-Iranian" activities of the USG on UAE
soil. Ambassador reminded Al-Haidan how open we had been
throughout the process of establishing IRPO, cited the
importance of publicly acknowledging IRPO's presence to
further our engagement goals, and noted Washington's
expectation that the UAEG would support U.S. diplomatic
activities focused on Iran. Al-Haidan stuck to his talking
points on IRPO, yet digressed into broader discussions of the
troubled relationship the UAE had with Tehran. Ambassador
acknowledged UAE sensitivities over negative media campaigns
while reminding Al-Haidan of U.S. goals and openness.
Visiting NEA/IR Deputy Director joined the meeting,
emphasizing the transparency of U.S. Iran-watching activities
in Dubai. End summary.


2. (C) At the request of Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah
bin Zayed (AbZ) Al Nahyan, MFA Acting Under Secretary Tariq
Al-Haidan invited Ambassador December 6 to discuss the Iran
Regional Presence Office (IRPO) in Dubai and recent media
attention focused on USG Iran-watching activities. Iran has
been stirring up media stories characterizing IRPO activities
as clandestine and detrimental to regional stability.
Ambassador led the conversation by noting that she had
discussed IRPO's role with AbZ many times since March 2006,
openly spelling out the staffing and goals of the office to
avoid any confusion when IRPO began work in August. She
reminded Al-Haidan that IRPO is physically located inside the
U.S. Consulate in Dubai and staffed by State Department
diplomats (identifying the primary function of each of the
five staff members). Ambassador was joined in the meeting by
visiting NEA/IR Deputy Director Henry Wooster.


3. (C) Al-Haidan asked why the U.S. was so public about its
"Iran" presence in Dubai when the office could operate
quietly out of the U.S. Consulate with no public notice. A
former ambassador to Iran, he asked why Dubai played such a
central role in our Iran-watching activities. Ambassador
stressed the U.S. desire to reach out to the Iranian people,
which required public acknowledgement of our efforts; an
ongoing International Visitor Medical Diplomacy exchange
involving Iranian doctors is one manifestation of the fruits
of that outreach. Ambassador lamented the fact that Iran was
making a fuss of a very straightforward presence. She noted
that the Iranian Interests Section in Washington operated
with 40-plus staff and engaged in visa, passport, and social
services, plus public affairs, student counseling, and
support for cultural events. Responding to Al-Haidan's query
about whey the U.S. had not established a similar presence in
Tehran, Wooster explained the parameters of the Algiers
Accord which prevented the U.S. from doing so. He added that
Iran-watchers in London, Berlin, Baku, Istanbul, Kabul,
Ashgabat, and Baghdad functioned similar to those at IRPO in
Dubai.


4. (C) Somewhat satisfied that few other cities compared
with Dubai in terms of the Iranian presence, Al-Haidan then
inquired about the nature of meetings with Iranian nationals,
asking whether IRPO rented rooms for that purpose.
Ambassador replied that meetings were conducted openly.
Al-Haidan said the UAEG was uncomfortable with Iran's
accusations that America was working against it in Dubai.
Ambassador asked whether the Iranian government had, as its
MFA spokesman had announced, in fact made a formal protest to
the UAEG on the IRPO. Al-Haidan confirmed that Iran had not.
Ambassador highlighted the fact that Iran was clearly
disingenuous, using the media to stir up sentiment without
engaging the UAE in a factual discussion about the small size
and open, diplomatic nature of IRPO. There was no valid
basis for Iran's complaint about the IRPO in Dubai.


5. (C) Wooster acknowledged the potential for Iran to
mis-characterize the U.S. presence, which we could best
combat through transparency. Dubai contained the most
significant Iranian Diaspora community, making it a natural
locale for U.S. diplomatic and public diplomacy outreach to
the Iranian people. (Al-Haidan put the Iranian population in

ABU DHABI 00004432 002 OF 002


the UAE at between 250 and 300 thousand). Ambassador noted
that we have no dispute with the Iranian people, but we take
issue with the policy of their government -- the U.S. needed
to reach out through IRPO Dubai and other locations to engage
in people-to-people diplomacy and other outreach and exchange
programs and expected the UAE to support those efforts. The
mandate of the IRPO is to provide the USG with a broad
political-economic analysis of the situation inside Iran and
to foster public diplomacy and cultural ties. Al-Haidan
stated again that the USG could pursue all of these functions
without the word "Iran" on the office door. Ambassador
replied that hiding our desire for outreach to the Iranian
people would be counterproductive. Wooster noted also the
many Iran-related activities that take place in Dubai, many
with an American connection of one kind or another, but with
no relation to IRPO or the USG. Iran had a tendency to blame
the USG for everything it found irksome.


6. (C) Al-Haidan was open about UAE concerns regarding Iran,
yet noted also the extensive trade and commercial
relationship that benefits the UAE (and creates a strategic
dilemma for the UAEG). He cited what the Iranians called a
"misunderstanding" over Iran's blatant occupation of three
UAE islands, for example, and said that official Iranian
visitors to the UAE often said things "completely different"
from reality. He pointed to Iranian arrogance about its
presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon; "we will be
everywhere," they seemed to assert. He said Iran boasted
that potential future U.S. sanctions would only have a
minimal impact. He suggested that any discussion with Iran
would get hung up on the nuclear question; one cannot talk to
Iran (about Iraq, for example) without reference to the
nuclear file. Additionally, Iran is "part of the problem" in
Iraq and therefore not a credible partner in any
"international conference" on Iraq, said Al-Haidan. He said
he saw no difference between Khomaini and Hakim -- although
Allawi and Hakim were different (one being a "national Iraqi"
and the other a "national Shi'a"). He chided Hakim for
calling on Iraq to pay war compensation to Iran; that is not
an Iraqi national interest but an Iranian position, he
emphasized.


7. (C) Ambassador again acknowledged UAE sensitivities over
Iran-inspired media reports while reminding Al-Haidan of the
strong U.S. conviction about reaching out to the Iranian
people. She hoped the UAEG would continue to share that
conviction and support our common efforts towards a more
stable region. In particular, she reiterated that the U.S.
expectation of UAEG support for IRPO as its makeup and
activity had been discussed over the past eight months or so.
Our activities are in the open, she emphasized.
SISON