UAE OIL SECTOR - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE STILL VULNERABLE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004397

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM A/S HILLEN, NEA/ARP, EB/ESC/IEC/EPC
ENERGY FOR SENIOR FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR MOLLY WILLIAMSON, SENIOR
ADVISOR GETTO, AND DAS BRODMAN
OVP FOR KEVIN O'DONOVAN
NSC FOR TOWNSEND, AND ZARATE

E.O. 12958: DECL 12/4/16
TAGS: EPET ENRG EINV PTER AE
SUBJECT: UAE OIL SECTOR - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE STILL VULNERABLE

(U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D).

REFS: ABU DHABI 3370, ABU DHABI 2445, 05 ABU DHABI 4367, 05 ABU DHABI
3439, 05 ABU DHABI 3243


1. (S) Summary: U.S. and UAE corporate officials told visiting PM
officer Bruce Averill that the UAE has undertaken some improvements
in protecting its critical infrastructure and some steps toward
developing an integrated crisis management structure, but that
progress has been glacially slow. They noted the vulnerability of
both Jebel Dhana port (the UAE's main export terminal with a capacity
of 1.5-1.6 mb/d) and the UAE's power and desalination plants to
attacks, as well as oil slicks and other water-borne pollution. End
Summary.


2. (C) The November 14 visit of Bruce Averill, William C. Foster
Fellow in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, provided an
opportunity to obtain an update from U.S. companies and UAE oil
officials on the UAE's progress in protecting its critical
infrastructure. Averill and Econchief met with Raytheon
International Vice President Middle East Robert Lunday, Exxon
Al-Khaleej President Frank Kemnetz, ADNOC Offshore Division Manager
Ali Al-Shamsi, Supreme Petroleum Council Crisis Management Team
Leader Nick Glover, and ADNOC's new Head of Security Martin Fuller.
(Protect all).

Assessing the Problem
--------------


3. (S) Over the past few years, Abu Dhabi has commissioned at least
three different risk assessments of its onshore and offshore oil and
gas facilities: an offshore risk assessment, an onshore assessment,
and an "independent" assessment commissioned by the Minister of
Presidential Affairs, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. The UAE
has taken some steps to address the deficiencies identified. ADNOC
recently brought in a new head of security, Martin Fuller, who is
seconded from BP and a former UK military officer. It appears,
however, that progress has been glacially slow. Glover commented
that ADNOC (or the larger UAE) appeared to still be "in the denial
phase" with regard to security. With regard to the power and water
system, Glover noted that the UAE's electricity grid is still not
interconnected and that sea water intakes for power/desalination
plants are vulnerable to oil spills.


4. (S) The critical infrastructure protection problem is exacerbated
by the large number of players involved, including the Ministry of
Interior's oil field security division, the coast guard, and the UAE
military. Currently, the oil field security division provides
physical protection and security for the onshore fields and
facilities, as well as background screening for all ADNOC employees.
Kemnetz explained that, although ADNOC funds the security program,
until recently it has had little input (or interest) in security,
because that was an MoI prerogative. Kemnetz suggested that ADNOC's
security reviews were premised on a concern that they might not be
getting the security that they were paying for.


5. (C) In November, Martin Fuller joined ADNOC as head of security;
he appears to be eager to improve security, first at the onshore
facilities and then offshore. He explained that he was hopeful that
ADNOC would be issuing a tender for the next phase of physical
security improvements soon (either by the end of November or possibly
as late as January 2007. In three to four months, he said, the
tender could theoretically be granted and that phase could be
completed in around a year. Fuller asserted that these security
improvements were within the authority of the operating companies to
undertake. (Note: Fuller is still new to his job, and he has not
fully internalized all of the bureaucratic issues that he will face.
End Note.)

Jebel Dhana Port Vulnerable
--------------


6. (S) Glover briefly described vulnerabilities of the Jebel Dhana
port/Ruwais power plant infrastructure. He said that the port had
three single point moorings (SPM) and the worst Very Large Crude
Carrier (VLCC) channel "in the world. There is a 120 degree turn in
the shipping channel and a second 60 degree turn in a channel that is
only 400 meters wide. The channel is dredged to 20 meters, but the
edge is a "sheer wall" to 5 meters. In addition, there is a high
spot in the channel that can only be cleared at high tide. He noted
that tankers had grounded in the channel several times in the last
few years. In summer 2005, the former GM of the Abu Dhabi Company
for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) told econchief that he thought that
Jebel Dhana was vulnerable to maritime attacks. If it were taken
out, he noted, ADCO would "be out of business for months." (ref d)


7. (S) In addition, Glover explained that the neighboring
power/desalination plant was vulnerable to oil spills. Two years
ago, its water intakes had "no protection", but now there is a berm.
The sea water intakes for the primary power plant are in only 6 ft of
water. The plant is now operating on diesel fuel rather than natural
gas and has its own SPM for offloading diesel. It is, however,
highly vulnerable to diesel spills.


Vulnerability of Offshore Installations
--------------


8. (S) Lunday explained that the UAE understands the vulnerability of
its coasts, borders, and offshore oil and gas facilities. He stated
that security at the UAE's main offshore facility, Das Island, is
weak. He also noted that Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin
Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) had asked Raytheon for capabilities, including
anti-missile defenses and other weaponry, to protect the offshore oil
infrastructure from attack. Lunday stated that oil companies
preferred to have only surveillance capability rather than weapons on
their facilities, since weapons raised insurance rates. For this
reason, MbZ "wanted barges" in the area to serve as weapon
emplacements. Lunday noted that the biggest challenge was command
and control and determining whether a fishing boat was a threat or
not. In addition, he explained that much of the UAE's offshore
defenses were currently helicopter mounted, which meant that response
time from shore bases was a factor in the equation. (Comment:
NAVCENT is proposing a war game with the UAE Navy involving
protection of offshore oil facilities to take place in December or
January. This effort could help jump start our broader efforts with
the UAE on critical infrastructure protection.)

Crisis Management
--------------


9. (S) Lunday provided a brief history of the UAE's efforts to
improve its crisis management capabilities. Currently the UAE lacks
a centralized command and control system, and police and military
communications systems are not interoperable. Lunday explained that
the Ministry of Presidential Affairs had contracted with Raytheon to
design a strategy to develop and operate a crisis management
structure. (Ref A). The concept would be to develop a National
Emergency Management Agency to oversee the national crisis management
center that coordinated all UAE federal and emirate level
authorities. In June, the UAE established its National Security
Council. There is currently a directive to designate a head of the
National Emergency Management Agency. In the meantime, Lunday noted
that Dubai wanted to create its own crisis management center and that
it would replace Dubai Police's "old center," which is better than
anything that Abu Dhabi has. The problem, Lunday stated, is that all
players agree on the need for a coordinated approach to crisis
response, but they are not yet cooperating. In the meantime, ADNOC
is continuing to set up its own state of the art crisis management
center, using web/EOC software. Glover said that he would be more
than happy to make the system or center available to any interested
UAEG entity. His crisis response teams are also training constantly.

Sison