GSD ISSUES REVIEWED AT JMC WORKING GROUP MEETINGS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004302

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- REFERENCES IN TEXT CORRECTED

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR PM A/S HILLEN, NEA DAS GRAY
DOD FOR OSD A/S RODMAN AND DAS KIMMITT
NSC FOR ABRAMS, DORAN AND RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016
TAGS: MCAP PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS IR AF AE
SUBJECT: GSD ISSUES REVIEWED AT JMC WORKING GROUP MEETINGS

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 4166 (General Moseley)
B) ABU DHABI 4077, 4078, 4079 (GSD visit)
C) ABU DHABI 3851 (UAE Defense Spending)

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Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Working groups following up on the June, 2006 Joint
Military Commission (JMC) met November 14 in Abu Dhabi,
reviewing action items and charting a path towards deeper
U.S.-UAE military cooperation. The thoroughness of UAE
engagement on a number of items discussed, including topics
which are also part of the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD),
indicate that the UAE is focused on procurement and
coordination issues critical to defending the nation
(although concrete decisions tend to take time). UAE Armed
Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Hamad Mohammed Thani
Al-Rumaithi (in a separate office call) put the UAE effort
into perspective by clearly stating to U.S. delegation head
Rear Admiral John Miller (DCDR NAVCENT) that the UAE did not
"trust" the Iranian regime and continued its contingency
planning.

Seeking Predator B
--------------


2. (S) UAE Air Force and Air Defense Commander Major General
Mohammed Sweidan Al-Qamzi (JMC working group chair and a core
member of GSD),reiterated the UAE's request for Predator B
(armed),a point made multiple times during GSD discussions
October 19 (ref B). The UAE sees the Predator as
particularly appropriate to border patrol missions, and also
raised this request with Air Force Chief of Staff General
Moseley on October 29 (ref A). UAE participants cited their
"special relationship" with the U.S. military a number of
times during the meetings, suggesting that close ties
warranted exceptional treatment in procurement (and
intelligence exchanges).

Still uncertain on air defense options
--------------


3. (C) The U.S. has for some time pressed the UAE to
consider an interoperable air defense network, such as
Patriot PAC-3, as part of a layered, integrated system to
help defend against Iranian missiles. The UAE has made no
clear decisions, but has agreed within the context of the
Bilateral Air Defense Initiative (BADI) to receive a team
within a three-month time frame to at least discuss options
for future systems -- Patriot PAC-3, HAWK "21" upgrade, and
SL-AMRAAM among them. The U.S. delegation to the working
groups presented a time frame of "within one year" to begin
discussion of actual purchases, a target to which the UAE did
not object. (Note: The UAE has often raised the
complexities of FMS procurements as a complicating factor in
big-ticket purchase decisions. Any final decision on air
defense will no doubt take time as the UAE sorts out options,
juggling air defense needs and systems available on the
international market (see ref C for context on UAE defense
spending decisions). End note.)

Goal of Shared Early Warning
--------------


4. (C) Also related to BADI, the UAE agreed that a U.S. team
should visit in January to discuss Shared Early Warning
(SEW); the basic SEW system could be installed quickly and at
a reasonable cost (five to seven million USD for equipment
and 5-year operating costs). The UAE agreed to focus on SEW
requirements in coming months, potentially working towards
eventually building and integrating a common air picture.

Support for Afghanistan
--------------


5. (S) The working group also reviewed CENTCOM planning to
assist in the transport of 50 additional personnel and
equipment (including 6 BMP fighting vehicles and 4 LeClerc
tanks) to Afghanistan. The goal is to complete the airlift
to Tarin Kwot (possibly via Kandahar) by late November.
Discussion of additional troop plus-up to Afghanistan is
pending further decisions by the UAEG. Expansion of the UAE
Special Operations Forces compound at Bagram AFB was also
discussed. (Note: In sidebar discussions with USLO Chief it
was clear that this request for additional space at Bagram
was not/not related to earlier discussions of an additional

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1,000 UAE troops to Afghanistan. End note.)

Exercises and training
--------------


6. (C) The U.S. delegation took the opportunity to thank the
UAE for joining LEADING EDGE 07, in spite of negatie
pressure from Iran prior to and during the execise. This
represents the UAE's first participaion in a PSI exercise.
Working group also discused a broad range of exercises and
issues associated with training, military exchanges, visas,
logitics, and intelligence exchanges.

Navy communictions
--------------


7. (C) The U.S. ured the UAE to study potential acquisition
of Lin 11 (and ultimately Link 16) communications systems to
facilitate intra-UAE coordination as well as nteroperability
with the U.S. A site survey anda LINK 16 demnstration are
planned in December nd January respectively, followed
immediately bythe Command and Control Interoperability Board
(CCIB) in January at Eglin AFB, Florida.

Implementation Agreement shared
--------------


8. (C) The UAE passed to the U.S. delegation a draft
implementation agreement setting out parameters for the
administration of future JMC working groups. The document
has been forwarded to the USCENTCOM Judge Advocate and J-5
for review. The implementation agreement is not specifically
related to the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) as had
been anticipated. The current DCA has been languishing
(un-ratified by the UAE) for some time; the UAE team offered
no new views on the DCA beyond suggesting that it represented
a "good faith" agreement rather than an iron-clad legal pact.


9. (C) Comprised of working groups for Training and
Operations, Logistics, Intelligence and Security, Armaments,
and Communications, the JMC follow-up engaged a large group
of Emirati officers (over 30) in issues critical to deepening
our military engagement -- also advancing GSD-related
interests. In fact, from a mil-to-mil perspective, UAE
engagement in this JMC working group discussion was on par
with a full JMC.
SISON