STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL PLAN FOR THE UAE - OUR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004257

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, ISN/ECC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL KSTC AE
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL PLAN FOR THE UAE - OUR
THOUGHTS

REF: A. STATE 184118

B. ABU DHABI 4219

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reason 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft
EXBS program plan for the UAE. The UAE remains a major
concern as a transshipment point for WMD/missile related
products for a number of reasons:

-- the UAE still lacks an export control/transshipment
control law;

-- the UAE and Iran are major trading partners;

-- the UAE has demonstrated a reluctance to take aggressive
actions against diversions to Iran both out of concern for
the potential security repercussions and the impact on trade.



2. (S/NF) Post believes that the EXBS strategy should be
closely linked to our ongoing Counterproliferation Task Force
(CTF) efforts and the ongoing U.S. interagency discussions
on possible actions to take, should the UAE not implement
effective laws and enforcement mechanisms. The EXBS plan
would be an excellent topic of discussion at the next CTF
meeting. In addition, should we need to take actions to
encourage the UAE to pass and enforce its export control law,
we would want to make sure that our proposed training plan
helped move the UAE effectively toward that goal.


3. (C) Post offers the following comments on the proposed
EXBS action plan. We should focus the plan on a few key
items in the near term, with the understanding that further
cooperation and training will be forthcoming when the UAE
actually implements a new export control law. In addition,
we would suggest that the Department give consideration to
involving either Singapore or Hong Kong in training programs
on transshipment issues. Both are major transshipment hubs
and both have shown more progress in the establishment,
implementation, and enforcement of indigenous export control
systems. The UAE (especially Dubai) is likely to view their
experiences as relevant.


4. (S/NF) In general, we do not believe it would be effective
to offer the UAE any training on control lists or targeting
controlled goods until the UAE actually has an export control
law and implements control lists under that law. The UAE has
received multiple programs on control lists and claims to be
incorporating them into its export control law. A recent
message from the UAE regarding the transshipment of carbon
steel strips, suggests that the UAE is -- at least partially
-- consulting some of the international control lists (ref
b). It is unclear, however, as to whether it effectively
controls goods on these lists. Therefore, programs such as
Control List Gap Analysis, and Target and Risk Management
should be presented as pending passage/enactment of a law
rather than with any specific dates.


5. (C) International Border Interdiction Training - The UAE
would likely welcome this training as a way to strengthen its
border with both Saudi Arabia and Oman. Post notes, however,
that all of the information we have received on diversions
suggests that it would be more effective to target the ports
and airports before the land borders. (Note: The UAE has over
the last few years taken steps to tighten controls over its
long land borders with Oman and Saudi Arabia, although its
primary concern has been more to prevent the illegal entry of
goods and people rather than controlling the export of goods.
That said, given the UAE's highly efficient ports and lack
of export controls, we believe that the land border is less
of an immediate concern for WMD transshipment at the present
time than the sea and air ports. End Note.)


6. (C) Port Security Vulnerability Assessment -- The UAE has
agreed in principle to host a USG interagency critical
infrastructure assessment team. If this program is
coordinated with that effort, it could be very useful,
especially if the team looked at the UAE's main oil export
terminal of Jebel Dhana. It would therefore appear to be a
high priority action.


7. (C) Nuclear Commodity Identification training/WMD

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Commodity Identification Training -- The USG provided WMD
related training in Dubai in 2003/2004. This training should
build on the previous programs.
SISON