Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUDHABI3782
2006-09-26 12:00:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

TERRORISM FINANCE: TALIBAN UAE STRATEGY

Tags:  KTFN PTER EFIN AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0558
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #3782 2691200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261200Z SEP 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7102
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1538
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0319
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003782 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT ECROWE, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: KTFN PTER EFIN AE
SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE: TALIBAN UAE STRATEGY

REF: STATE 145269

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003782

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT ECROWE, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: KTFN PTER EFIN AE
SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE: TALIBAN UAE STRATEGY

REF: STATE 145269

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.
4 (b & d).


1. (S/NF) Post appreciates the opportunity to comment on
reftel strategy for disrupting external financing to the
Taliban. We believe that the draft background paper covers
the issue in a comprehensive fashion. In the UAE
specifically, we would propose using the existing Joint
Terror Financing Coordinating Committee as our lead mechanism
for implementing a strategy of disrupting external financing
to the Taliban. We would additionally use opportunities for
Ambassador and/or senior Washington officials to raise USG
concerns with senior UAE officials including the Central Bank
Governor, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, and UAE Foreign Minister
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. In addition, our DEA
attaches are working closely with the UAEG to disrupt drug
and drug money flows through the UAE. As a key part of our
interaction with the UAEG we would recommend noting that the
UAE has special operations troops operating in Afghanistan --
and thus it is in its own interest to disrupt funding to the
Taliban.


2. (S) On September 12, during the 3rd meeting of the JTFCC,
Treasury A/S O,Brien raised U.S. concerns with cash flows to
the Taliban. Central Bank Governor Suweidi said
that the UAE was ready to cooperate and explained that the
UAE Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) had trained the Afghan
FIU and is looking to sign a memorandum of understanding with
its Afghan counterpart. The next round of the JTFCC is
tentatively proposed for January 2007. We would propose
following up on the issue during that meeting. The Governor
has accepted an invitation to attend the second U.S. - MENA
dialogue on anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance
in New York from December 11-13. This visit would be an
excellent opportunity for senior Treasury officials to meet
with him and press our strategy of disrupting financing to
the Taliban.


3. (C) We are currently working with the UAE to have it
accept a DHS/ICE-proposed operation to target cash couriers
in three UAE airports (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah).
Under the terms of the proposal, the DHS/ICE agents would
play a strictly advisory role. Post plans to present the
Central Bank with a paper describing the differences between
U.S. and UAE regulations on cash couriers on September 26.
Given the apparent importance of cash couriers in funding the
Taliban, this program could prove effective in disrupting
funding, should the UAE agree to implement it.


4. (C) Our DEA Attaches are focused on investigating the
financial flows associated with the Afghan narcotics trade.
The DEA Attaches are coordinating closely with the UAE to
combat drugs and drug money laundering activities related to
Afghanistan. In July, DEA attaches from the UAE and
Afghanistan met with the head of the UAE Drug Enforcement
Administration, Ministry of Interior, Dubai Police
Department, Sharjah Police Department and the UAE
Drug Liaison Officer assigned to Islamabad, Pakistan. UAE
officials reported that they are willing to share information
on the numerous heroin couriers, most of whom were traveling
from Afghanistan and Pakistan when they were interdicted.
SISON