LEBANON A KEY TOPIC IN A/S HILLEN DISCUSSION WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003632

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR PM, NEA/ARP, NEA/ELA, NEA/IR
NSC FOR EABRAMS AND MDORAN
CENTCOM FOR RADM MOELLER AND AMB RROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2031
TAGS: MASS PREL EAID LE QA IZ SY IR AE
SUBJECT: LEBANON A KEY TOPIC IN A/S HILLEN DISCUSSION WITH
ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE

REF: STATE 147383 (Lebanon Security Assistance)

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Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs John Hillen and Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) met on September 11
and discussed the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD),Qatar and
Lebanon. MbZ welcomed the GSD scheduled for October 19 and
reiterated his concern for growing Iranian influence in the
region, offering that Ahmadinejad was "lost in another era"
and should not be allowed to get away with extreme behavior.
Hillen raised U.S. concern with Qatar's recent worrisome
behavior and MbZ offered harsh criticism for Qatar, noting
that Qatar was "spoiled" and was using its large U.S. base
for political cover. Qatar's weak position on Iran, coupled
with all the trouble caused by Al Jazeera, led MbZ to
question Qatar's true intentions.


2. (S) Summary continued: MbZ requested his Lebanon
assistance team meet with the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi to
coordinate assistance efforts for the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) more closely. Concerned that Hezbollah "thought it had
won," MbZ agreed with Hillen that urgent reinforcement of the
LAF and Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) were critical
to give the Lebanese government a decisive presence in the
south. The UAE is willing to help fund this project, said
MbZ, but would demand results on the ground. Hillen pledged
to coordinate U.S. efforts on the LAF with UAE. End summary.

GSD and Increasing Iranian Dangers
--------------


3. (S) MbZ stated Iran will have nuclear weapons in the
future, "it is not a matter of if." Iran was determined to
have that capability and regional allies needed to work
against that Iranian desire. Dealing with Iran sooner will
be cheaper, he suggested. Referring to Ahmadinejad's
provocative statements on Israel and the holocaust, MbZ
stated one "cannot talk like that in the 21st century and get
away with it." MbZ predicted the region "will still see bad
times before good times." Hillen raised the possibility of
Iranian miscalculation given recent Israel-Hezbollah fighting
in Lebanon. MbZ agreed with Hillen that the dangers of
miscalculation leading to conflict were very real. MbZ added
that to deal effectively with Iran in the future it is
important to "fix Lebanon" today.

Disappointment with Qatar
--------------


4. (S) MbZ ended the GSD discussion by hinting the USG be
careful in sharing potential planning on Iran with certain
GCC countries (comment: MbZ was clearly referring to Qatar)
because that information would be leaked to Iran. Taking
this cue, Hillen raised U.S. concerns with Qatar and inquired
whether Hamad bin Jasem's (HbJ) actions reflected simple
mischief or a new strategic direction for Qatar. Hillen
emphasized that the GSD was based on a shared strategic
perception of the Iranian threat, and Qatar's recent behavior
called this calculation into question. MbZ said he had no
reason to defend HbJ personally, but that he (MbZ) did not
think HbJ was the problem. He asked how long the U.S. had
harbored doubts about Qatar and acted somewhat surprised that
the U.S. had not "seen it coming" when Qatar voted the wrong
way in the UNSC on 31 July.


5. (S) MbZ said he had cautioned Qatar long ago to act more
prudently but that Qatar held its hosting of a U.S. base as a
"backbone" of sorts protecting it from U.S. retaliation. MbZ
said Qatar needed to know where the red lines were and light
censure from the U.S. only gave an "overconfident" Doha "a
few extra meters to work with" as it moved ever closer to a
precipice. Hillen stated that Qatar may not understand that
U.S. basing in the region is continually reviewed and must be
designed to address current regional threats. MbZ returned
unprompted at the end of the meeting to the deployment and

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basing of U.S. forces and stated that if the USG wished to
discuss this topic in the upcoming GSD, it should provide a
direct sense of timing and keep this discussion away from the
Qataris. On the UAE's relations with Qatar, MbZ said he
would continue to buy gas from them but would not "adopt"
their positions.

Stubborn Syrian Meddling
--------------


6. (C) Syrian interference in the region was a problem, said
MbZ, adding that Egypt "tried to accommodate" Asad and Jordan
did likewise. Saudi had given up trying to convince Syria to
mend its ways a year ago. The UAE also "gave up on Bashar"
when it could find no "breakthrough" in his thinking. The
UAE was willing to "pay a large bill" to create a stable
region, as the alternative was too difficult to contemplate.

Aftermath of Recent Fighting in Lebanon
--------------


7. (C) MbZ stated that the situation which arose in Lebanon
was "something that everybody expected, but not in this way."
He said few anticipated Hezbollah to be so aggressive and
Israel to suffer "that much failure." Hillen said
miscalculations fed the crisis; MbZ said the UAE did "not
accept" the notion that Hezbollah came out ahead in the
exchange, adding that it is "bad to let them think they won."


8. (C) Hillen discussed the need for a muscular peacekeeping
force. The key was now to support Lebanon, strengthen the
LAF and ISF, and coordinate assistance from the GCC, the UK,
and France for a cohesive approach to helping Lebanon carry
out UNSCRs 1559, 1701 and the Taif Accords. Preventing
Hezbollah from constituting a military force was critical,
said Hillen. MbZ agreed that we are all seeking a "strong
government" in Lebanon, which was difficult as long as
Hezbollah maintained its current role. He called for a
stronger Lebanese military and more capable "security
agencies" and expressed a willingness to assist if results
were likely. MbZ stated frankly, the UAE is "paying a hell
of a lot of money" building infrastructure in return for
little appreciation from Lebanon ("we pay and they swear at
us").


9. (C) MbZ said strengthening the Lebanese government would
not work if done "as is being done in Iraq." Like Iraq,
Lebanon was inhibited by Iran's involvement and ethnic
divisions. MbZ asked rhetorically "who can wait 25 years"
for Lebanon to stabilize? He called for tangible
improvements within five years, working "from top to bottom"
to change Lebanon and "cut down" Hezbollah. He said Syria
must be kept out of the process of elections in Lebanon; "if
they have a role we will go another four years without
progress." Hillen expressed two primary desires: 1)
coordinated assistance to Lebanon to make a larger impact
quickly, and 2) urgent action. MbZ replied that "we are
there" and ready to coordinate efforts now. He said the
Saudis were similarly engaged. MbZ called for recruiting
more Sunni and Druze soldiers, less Shi'a (MbZ said the
current 40% ratio of Shi'a should be reduced to 15%). Hillen
cited pre-conflict studies of Lebanon's security assistance
requirements by the U.S., UK, and France. MbZ said he wanted
to "compare notes" on each others' roles in training and
equipping the LAF. He said his team leader now on the ground
in Beirut would like to interface with the U.S. Embassy in
Abu Dhabi when he returns to the UAE shortly. (Note:
Embassy has received a releasable version of CENTCOM's LAF
needs assessment. We will share this information along with
that contained in reftel -- plus Embassy Beirut's suggestion
on ammunition needs -- with MbZ's Lebanon team during an
upcoming meeting. End note.) MbZ added that Iran would
"never let go" of its desire for regional influence and Syria
was also stubbornly backing Nasrallah (who he said was one of
"those people who should be dead yesterday").

UAE-Saudi Relations "More Brotherly"
--------------

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10. (C) Unlike sour relations with Qatar, MbZ said the UAE
had better communication with Saudi Arabia than before,
suggesting that Prince Bandar kept the dialogue coherent.
Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal was often "sailing alone" in
the past but seemed to be falling into line these days and
communicating more effectively with the world. MbZ added
that it can be "difficult to have a serious conversation with
(King) Abdullah."


11. (U) Assistant Secretary Hillen cleared this message.
SISON