ASSESSMENT OF UAE TERRORIST FINANCING ENVIRONMENT

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003537

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP ABAGWELL, EB/ESC/TFS FOR DNELSON, KLEAHY,
NEA/I FOR PEVANS, JHUNTER
S/CT FOR TKUSHNER
NSC FOR JZARATE, MMALVESTI, THINNEN
TREASURY FOR DMCGLYNN, JROSS, KHECHT, RLOEFFLER
OFAC FOR SZUBIN, WLANGFORD
JCS FOR LTC GAVRILIS
DOD FOR SALLEN
USCENTCOM FOR PHOLTHAUS, RROTH
DIA FOR JBYRNE
CIA FOR PMUNOZ
NSA FOR ACOOLEY
FBI FOR WDAYHOFF
DHS FOR MMIDDLETON, JGALLION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PTER KTFN EFIN ETTC TC IQ
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF UAE TERRORIST FINANCING ENVIRONMENT

REF: A. SECSTATE 132693

B. 2005 ABU DHABI 3565

C. ABU DHABI 409

D. 2005 ABU DHABI 4468

E. 2005 ABU DHABI 4541

F. 2003 ABU DHABI 3476

G. 2004 ABU DHABI 1149

H. ABU DHABI 2633

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (SBU) Summary. In response to ref A, Embassy's country
team provides the following assessment of the
terrorist/insurgent finance operating environment in the UAE.
Responses are keyed to reftel, to the extent possible. End
summary.

Legal Regime
--------------


2. (SBU) Question. What laws in your host country
criminalize money laundering, terrorist financing and
insurgent financing? What are the penalties for violations
of counter-terrorist/insurgent financing laws?

(SBU) Answer. The two laws that serve as the foundation for
the UAE's anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terror
finance (CTF) efforts are the Anti-Money Laundering Law (Law
No. 4/2002),and the Counterterrorism Law (Law No. 1/2004).
Neither of these laws specifically addresses the issue of
insurgent financing, but the language in the Counterterrorism
Law can be interpreted to apply to insurgent financiers.
Article 2 defines terrorism as "every act or omission where
the offender commits himself to execute a criminal design,
individually or collectively, with intention to cause terror
between people or terrifying them, if the same causes breach
of the public order or endangering the safety and security of
the society or injuring persons or exposing their lives,
liberties, security to danger (sic)..." Article 12
specifically criminalizes terrorist financing, "Whoever
gains, provides, collects, carries or transfers property,
directly or indirectly, with intention to be used or knows
they are going to be used, in whole or in party, to financing
any act terrorist acts provided in this Decree by Law within
the State or abroad, whether the said act occurred or non
occurred, shall be punished with life or provisional
imprisonment. And shall forfeit the property or possession
subject of the offence and proceeds thereof or property
equivalent to their value, if transferred or substituted in
whole or in part of mixed with other property, gained from
legal sources (sic)." Additionally, Article 13 delineates
the same penalties for any individual carrying, depositing,
or transferring money or property with the intention of said
funds being used to finance terrorism.

3. (C) Question. What is the implementing mechanism for UNSCR
1267, UNSCR 1617 and related UN resolutions? What legislation
implements UNSCR 1483 and UNSCR 1518?

(C) Answer. The Counterterrorism Law is also the implementing
mechanism for all UN Security Council Resolutions relating to
combating terrorism, although it does not specifically
identify the resolutions. Article 37 states that the UAE
Counter Terrorism Committee is responsible for "follow(ing)
up and enforc(ing) Security Council resolutions on combating
terrorism and other international related resolutions in
coordination with concerned bodies at the State." Central
Bank Governor Sultan Nasser Al-Suweidi has told Embassy
officials that he pushed to have the law mention enforcing UN
resolutions, in order to give him the authority to freeze
accounts of persons designated by UNSCR 1267. Although the
UAE does not have a law specifically implementing UNSCR 1483
or UNSCR 1518, which impose economic sanctions against
designated officials of the former Iraqi regime, as a matter
of course the Central Bank Governor freezes the assets of all
individuals officially designated by the UN Security Council.


4. (C) Question. What are the implementing mechanisms that
bring the host country into compliance with the financial
action task force's 40 9 recommendations? Has the host
country joined the MENA-FATF? Has the host government
established a financial intelligence unit capable of being
accepted into the Egmont Group?

(C) Answer. Administrative Regulation No. 24/2000 implements
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 9 recommendations
on money laundering and terrorist financing that relate to
duties and responsibilities of financial institutions.
Pursuant to the recommendations, banks and financial
institutions (including the UAE's 106 money service
businesses - MSBs) must maintain records of their customers
(including copies of identification) and transactions, for as
long as an account remains open and for five years after its
closure, for the purpose of reconstructing transactions. In
concurrence with special recommendation (SR) VII, MSBs must
verify identity and maintain transaction details (including
name and address of originator and beneficiary) for all wire
transactions over $545 (one of the lowest thresholds in the
world). The regulation also outlines types of transactions
that could constitute money laundering and requires financial
institutions to immediately report them to the Central Bank's
financial intelligence unit, the Anti-Money Laundering and
Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU). The AMLSCU has been a member
of the Egmont Group since 2002, and the UAE is one of the
founding members of the MENA-FATF.

(C) In compliance with SR VI, the Central Bank issued a
regulation in 2002 requiring hawala dealers (hawaladars) to
register with the Central Bank. As of August 16, 2005, the
Central Bank had issued 190 licenses to hawaladars. These
registered hawaladars are required to submit records of every
incoming and outgoing remittance to the Central Bank every
quarter, and they are required to immediately report any
suspicious transaction to the AMLSCU. However, Embassy notes
that this regulation is largely voluntary -- there are no
sanctions for non-compliance imposed on hawaladars who do not
register with the Central Bank.


5. (SBU) Question. What other laws, regulations or legal
procedures have been enacted to combat terrorist/insurgent
financing?

(SBU) Answer. On February 13, 2006, the UAE issued Law No. 2
of 2006 on Cyber Crime. Article 21 of this law states that
anyone convicted of "setting up a website or publishing
information for a terrorist group with intent to...promote
their ideologies and finance their activities...shall be
sentenced to no more than five years in jail." Additionally,
Article 19 criminalizes money laundering via "internet or
other cyber means."


6. (C) Question. Please describe the host country's laws
and/or regulations covering freezing of assets, blocking of
transactions and asset forfeiture/seizure.

(SBU) Answer. Both the Anti-Money Laundering law and the
Counterterrorism Law authorize the freezing and confiscation
of assets, and they authorize forfeiture of assets if the
suspect is convicted. Article 31 of the Counterterrorism Law
gives the overall authority to seize or freeze assets to the
Attorney General's office that has jurisdiction over the
case. (Note: Although the federal penal code is applied
throughout the country, the UAE has three judicial systems --
federal, Emirate of Dubai, and Emirate of Ras al Khaimah --
and thus three separate Attorney General offices. End note.)
This article authorizes the Attorney General's office to
order the investigation of activities that the Attorney
General has "sufficient evidence to believe" are related to
the funding or committing of a terror activity stated in the
law, and the law stipulates that assets may remain frozen as
long as the law enforcement case is pending. Article 32 of
the Counterterrorism law authorizes the Central Bank Governor
to freeze accounts for up to seven days if he suspects the
funds will be used to fund or commit any of the crimes listed
in the law, but it stipulates that the Central Bank must
provide evidence to the Attorney General for prosecution in
order to maintain the freeze beyond seven days.

(C) In practice, the Central Bank holds freezes longer than
seven days, even if no evidence has been provided to the
Attorney General. The Central Bank Governor, Sultan Nasser
Al Suwaidi, is proactive and would rather keep accounts
frozen extra-judicially than to allow individuals access to
suspect funds. However, Central Bank officials have
expressed frustration when the USG has asked the Bank to

freeze funds but has not provided evidence that could be used
in a court of law. Central Bank officials have told us on
multiple occasions they are concerned that courts could force
them to release frozen assets based on a lack of evidence,
which would seriously damage the credibility and
effectiveness of the Central Bank.


7. (C) Question. Please describe the host country's
reporting regime for suspicious financial activity and/or
currency transactions.

(SBU) Answer. Central Bank Regulation 24/2000 outlines the
reporting regime for financial institutions. This regulation
requires banks, MSBs, finance companies, and any other
financial institutions operating in the UAE to follow strict
"Know Your Customer" guidelines. Additionally, financial
institutions must verify the customer's identity and maintain
transaction details (including name and address of originator
and beneficiary) for all MSB transactions over $545 and for
all non-account holder bank transactions over $10,900.
However, there is no minimum threshold for a transaction to
be reported to the Central Bank via a "suspicious transaction
report" (STR). Instead, the regulation states that financial
institutions must report to the AMLSCU any "unusual" or
suspected money laundering transaction no matter the amount
of the transfer.

(C) The Central Bank Governor has repeatedly told USG
officials that he stresses to financial institutions the
importance of "quality" STRs, vice "quantity." Between
December 2000 and November 2005, the AMLSCU had received 3031
STRs (of which, only 1105 came from banks and 170 from MSBs,
with the rest being referred to the AMLSCU by "other UAE
authorities" - i.e. the security services). As a data point
for comparison, the UAE Exchange (one of the UAE's largest
MSBs),processes 25,000 transactions per day. The head of
Standard Chartered's Compliance office told Econoff that "the
AMLSCU does not have the capacity to be inundated with STRs,
so we ensure that every single STR we send is absolutely, and
unquestionably, suspicious." He also noted that Standard
Chartered's compliance office conducts its own vigorous
review of all transactions. He said that Standard Chartered
maintains all of the required paperwork and transaction
records at the bank so that the Central Bank's examiners can
examine them at any time, and he said that the compliance
officers at other major UAE banks (such as Citibank, Lloyds,
ABN-AMRO, and HSBC) do the same. Technically, the Central
Bank has the authority to impose administrative penalties on
financial institutions that fail to report suspicious
transactions, but since there is no minimum amount that is
required to report, whether a given transaction should have
generated an STR is subjective -- thus making it difficult
for the Central Bank to claim that a financial institution
was negligent in failing to report any given transaction.

(C) The AMLSCU is an administrative, not an investigative
unit. If a person or business comes under suspicion, the
AMLSCU can request the individual's or business' financial
records from the UAE's 46 banks and 110 MSBs. The AMSLCU
will then analyze data based on the financial records and
data in the AMLSCU's STR database. The AMLSCU may then
recommend that the Central Bank Governor either a) freeze the
accounts, b) refer the case to law enforcement or the
security services for investigation or further action, or c)
take no further action.


8. (SBU) Question. Please describe the host country's
oversight of cross-border transactions, with particular
attention to physical transfers of currency. What laws and
regulations, if any, require declarations of cash? What is
the minimum amount of cash that individuals are required to
declare?

(SBU) Answer. There is no limit for how much cash can be
imported into the UAE; however in 2002, the Central Bank
established a cash declaration requirement of 40,000 dirhams
(approximately $10,900). Travelers are supposed to fill out
a declaration form and provide it to the customs authorities.
The form requests the traveler identify the purpose of the
funds and provide his/her identification, contact, and travel
details. According to the cash import regulation, customs
officers have the authority to seize undeclared cash. Cash
and travelers checks coming through shipments, postal
parcels, or courier services are also subject to the
declaration requirement.

Implementation
--------------


9. (S/NF) Question. Please describe in general terms the host
country's level of administration and enforcement of
counter-terrorist/insurgent financing measures. What has the
host country done to impede or disrupt mechanisms and
networks of terrorist/insurgent finance? What is the host
country's de facto policy toward inhibiting support?

(S) Answer. The UAE -- and especially the Central Bank --
recognizes it would be detrimental to the UAE's reputation
for terrorists or criminals to exploit the UAE's financial
system. As such, the Central Bank has implemented a number
of laws and regulations to try to prevent the misuse of its
financial sector, and widely publicizes its efforts in the
UAE newspapers. For example, the Central Bank noted in a
press release announcing a joint US/UAE seminar on Cash
Courier Operations on June 10th that "The seminar was held
from the standpoint of the United Arab Emirates policy to
exchange experience and technologies applied in friendly
countries in combating all types of financial crimes...This
is evident in the AMLSCU's 331 training programs, including
conferences, seminars, and workshops in relation to
encountering financial crimes, particularly money laundering
and terrorism financing, till date (sic)." Embassy country
team assesses that the Central Bank often judges that passing
laws and conducting training programs is a sufficient
deterrent and makes the UAE less vulnerable to abuse by
criminals and terrorist financiers. The AMLSCU does not have
the capacity or expertise to fully investigate suspicious
activity, and the UAE's law enforcement and prosecutorial
elements are not trained or pro-active in financial crimes
investigations. Even though the UAE's laws are very robust,
Embassy country team assesses that the lack of enforcement of
the laws makes the UAE's financial system vulnerable to abuse.

(S/NF) To date, the security services have been the main
element of the UAE to investigate and take action on terfin
cases; however, we have seen little evidence that they are
truly engaged on this issue. Both the federal State Security
Department (SSD) and Dubai's General Department of State
Security (GDSS) have elements that work against the terfin
target, and they are able to electronically monitor financial
transactions flagged by the AMLSCU's database as suspicious.
Additionally, the SSD has designated officials who work
alongside the Central Bank's AMLSCU and in several of the
UAE's semi-governmental charity organizations. However,
Embassy country team assesses that the primary intent behind
the security services' activities is to ensure individuals
and entities are not instigating or fomenting political
dissent.


10. (S) Question. Which host government organizations are
responsible for implementing the legislation, and how
effective is their administration and enforcement?

(S) Answer. Many elements of the UAEG are responsible for
administration and oversight of the UAE's anti-money
laundering and counterterror finance laws. The most visible
element is the UAE Central Bank; however, it mainly issues
regulations and oversees the financial sector. The Ministry
of Interior and state security departments are responsible
for investigating cases. The Ministry of Justice and the
appropriate Attorneys General offices are responsible for
coordinating any type of prosecution or legal action. The
UAE's various customs authorities are responsible for
implementing the cash declaration requirement, and the
Ministry of Economy oversees the UAE's security and
commodities market.

(C) The Central Bank Governor chairs the National Anti- Money
Laundering Committee (NAMLC) that is charged with overseeing
the UAE's national anti-money laundering policies and
efforts. Members include the Central Bank, the Ministries of
Interior, Justice, Finance, and Economy, and the Federal
Customs Authority. There is also a National Counter
Terrorism Committee that is comprised of officials from the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, and
Defense, the SSD, the Central Bank, and the Federal Customs
Authority. These two committees do not meet on a regular
basis, and they appear to be more policy-making bodies,
rather than action-oriented task forces.

(S) The Emiratis' clear preference for handling all types of
terrorism cases (including those with a financial angle) is
to deport the perpetrator, as opposed to prosecuting. As
such, the most active elements of the government are the
Ministry of Interior, police, and security services. The
least active are the prosecutors. Embassy country team
assesses that the failure to prosecute is due to a lack of
capacity and experience on the part of the prosecutors, and
to a lack of will in the Ministry of Justice.


11. (S/NF) Question. Please describe any raids or arrests of
significant terrorist/insurgent finance personalities. Did
those actions result in successful prosecutions, asset
freezes/seizures, etc.?

(S/NF) Answer. Embassy is only aware of one terror finance
related prosecution. In a January meeting, Brigadier General
Mohammed Al-Qemzi, director of Dubai's General Department of
State Security, told Treasury U/S Levey that Emirati national
Ali Sa'id Al-Kindi had been sentenced to a seven year
imprisonment for supporting the Iraqi insurgency. The courts
sentenced Al-Kindi under the provisions of the 2004
Counterterror law, but Al-Qemzi noted that the case had not
been made public (ref C).

(S/NF) The case of al-Qa'ida financier and Emirati national
Salah Salim Mohammad Ghanim al-Shamsi has been an ongoing
challenge for USG/UAEG terfin cooperation. The GDSS detained
Shamsi in 2003, and he served a combined 15 months in
detention. However, as Shamsi's activities pre-dated the
UAE's 2004 criminalizing terrorist financing, the UAE claims
it cannot prosecute him for his actions. According to the
GDSS, Shamsi cannot leave the country, he has to report on a
regular basis to an officer, he was forced to change his
phone numbers so that his past associates cannot contact him,
the license for his religious education center in Sharjah was
cancelled, he cannot leave Dubai without permission of the
GDSS, and he is not allowed to visit the bookstore he
previously owned. GDSS chief Mohammed Al-Qemzi told Treasury
U/S Stuart Levey in January 2006 that he believes the
provisions of Shamsi's parole are very "strict and severe"
and that Shamsi is "suffering enough" (ref C). In response
to U/S Levey's recommendation to designate Shamsi in order to
make an example of him, Al-Qemzi said he believed that
imposing restrictions on Shamsi were more effective, because
making his actions public could cause extremists to view him
as a "hero."

(S/NF) The USG is aware of one case where the UAE detained
three foreign nationals involved terrorist-finance
activities, at the request of another government. The
individuals were detained for several days, debriefed, and
then deported. In this instance, the UAEG did not share the
results of their investigation with the USG, and none of them
were ever taken to court for prosecution.


12. (S) Question. Have any assets been frozen/seized under
either the UNSCR 1267/1617 or 1483/1518 sanctions regime? Is
host country willing and able to investigate and, if
appropriate, act to freeze/seize assets based on information
provided by the USG?

(S) Answer. The UAE Central Bank freezes accounts of any
individual placed on the UN 1267 list. Between 2000 and
2005, the Central Bank froze seventeen accounts totaling
$1,353,170 based on the UN 1267 list. The accounts remain
frozen to date. Embassy is unaware of any accounts being
frozen under UNSCR 1483/1518.

(S) UAE law enforcement officials typically do not have the
expertise or resources to conduct detailed financial
investigations, and Central Bank officials claim that the
AMLSCU cannot initiate an investigation or refer a case to
law enforcement authorities unless there is evidence of
illegal activity in the UAE (ref D). Although the UAE has
used information from the USG to justify asset freezes, over
the past two years the Central Bank has become concerned that
doing so makes it vulnerable to law suits. As such, Central
Bank officials now tell us they will freeze accounts only if:
a) the account holder is listed on a UN list; or b) the USG
request comes through formal legal channels via the MFA or
Ministry of Justice (ref E). (Note: This precondition set by
the Central Bank has not yet been tested, as the USG has not
requested the UAEG freeze any accounts since telling us of
this new policy. End note.) Central Bank Governor
al-Suweidi told Treasury U/S Stuart Levey in January that if
an account holder is not designated by the UN, it is easier
for the UAE to simply close accounts -- vice freezing them.

13. (SBU) Question. How, if at all, does host country
prohibit persons located within its borders, as well as host
country nationals wherever located, from providing funds and
other financial assets and economic resources to
UN-designated sanctions targets?

(SBU) Answer. The main way that the UAE prevents individuals
from providing funds to UN-designated sanctions targets is by
disseminating the list of UN-designated individuals to the
financial institutions and requesting that they freeze the
accounts of the designated individuals and entities.


14. (S) Question. Please provide a current appraisal of the
host government's fulfillment of UN obligations under UNSCR
1483 to return to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) former
regime assets located in host country.
(S) Answer. UAE authorities did not discover significant
assets related to the former Iraqi regime. In July of 2003,
Central Bank Governor Al-Suweidi told Econchief that during
Operation Desert Storm, the Central Bank had frozen a small
sum of money belonging to Iraqi Airways, but that the UAEG
had not yet transferred the assets to the Development Fund
for Iraq (ref F). Additionally, in April 2004, Embassy
notified the UAEG that the USG intended to propose listing a
UAE-based company (Al Wasl and Babel General Trading) to the
UN 1518 Sanctions Committee (ref G). In the summer of 2004,
the UAE froze $43.5 million of Al Wasl and Babel's assets
that the company held on behalf of the former Iraqi regime.
As of late 2004, the Dubai Attorney General's Office was
investigating the case, but Embassy has been unable to learn
the status of the investigation. Despite multiple requests
to the Central Bank, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Dubai
Attorney General's Office, Embassy is unaware whether the
UAEG repatriated these assets to the Development Fund for
Iraq.


15. (C) Question. Has the country team demarched the host
government on repatriating Iraqi assets? Has the government
of Iraq demarched the host government on repatriating Iraqi
assets?
(C) Answer. Embassy has demarched the UAEG a number of times
regarding the repatriating of Iraqi assets, but we are not
aware of the Iraqis' ever approaching the Emiratis about this
issue.


16. (C) Question. Please describe the host country's actual
oversight over the formal financial sector, alternative
remittance systems and cash couriers. In particular, what is
post's assessment of the host country's enforcement, if any,
of laws and regulations involving cash couriers transiting
their borders with Iraq?

(C) Answer. The Central Bank resoundingly claims that its
laws and regulations are stringently applied and prevent
"wrongdoers" from misusing the UAE. However, there are
clearly gaps and vulnerabilities that terrorists and
criminals can exploit. Although the Central Bank has issued
guidelines to banks for what constitutes a suspicious
transaction, since there is no amount that automatically
triggers an STR, the reporting requirement is highly
subjective (see para 10). Additionally, Embassy country team
assesses that the hawala system in the UAE is extremely
vulnerable. As noted in para 5, there is no mechanism in
place to ensure that all hawaladars register, and there are
no penalties imposed on unregistered hawaladars. Reporting
indicates that individuals are exploiting this loose
regulatory environment to move money into Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan via UAE hawalas; however, it is difficult to
correlate this movement directly to terrorist financing.

(C) Embassy also notes that the requirement to report cash is
applied very loosely. There are no signs in airports or at
border crossings informing travelers of the reporting
requirement, and at no point during the transit process are
passengers given the declaration forms. Customs officials
have told Embassy officials that they do not view the
declaration system as a tool for combating money laundering,
and since the UAE is a cash-based society it is not
considered unusual for individuals to be carrying significant
sums of money. As such, any declarations filed by travelers
only create a record of the movement of the cash; the UAE
authorities do not necessarily use the information to begin
an investigation. In the spring of 2006, Embassy approached
the UAE about conducting a joint cash courier operation
targeting individuals trying to evade the cash declaration
system. However, the UAE's National Anti-Money Laundering
Committee has not yet given UAE customs authorities the
authorization to conduct the operation.

Communication
--------------


17. (S/NF) Question. Does the host government regularly
share terrorist/insurgent finance information with Embassy
officials?

(S/NF) Answer. The UAE does share information with the USG,
but only when asked. For example, in the spring of 2005,
Embassy's Legatt office requested the UAE Central Bank
provide certified bank records for use in the sentencing
phase of Zacarias Moussaoui's trial. The Central Bank
provided the requested documents in May of 2005. While the
UAE has previously provided thousands of such documents for
intelligence purposes, this is the first time any U.S. law
enforcement agency has received certified bank records from
the UAE Government for use in a judicial proceeding.

(S/NF) Embassy country team assesses that the senior levels
of the UAEG assume that information sharing is more
pro-active than it actually is. For example, in November of
2004 then Dubai Crown Prince (now UAE Prime Minister)
Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR) briefed CENTCOM Commander General
Abizaid on a Dubai-based network involved in facilitating the
Iraqi insurgency in Fallujah that the GDSS had identified and
disbanded (ref F). This information had not previously been
shared with the USG. MbR had the GDSS chief show a linkchart
with pictures, names, and details of suspected foreign
nationals and Emiratis involved. In a follow-up meeting with
the GDSS, the names and pictures of the Emiratis implicated
had been deleted.


18. (SBU) Question. Does the host government regularly share
terrorist/insurgent finance information with the government
of Iraq?

(SBU) Answer. Embassy is unaware whether the UAEG shares
terrorist/insurgent finance information with the government
of Iraq.


19. (S/NF) Question. Please describe the host country's
public affairs campaigns, if any, with respect to support for
terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq. Is such support
condemned, in part or in whole or not at all? Please provide
an assessment of the host country's receptivity to
proactively condemning the insurgency, if it does not already
do so.

(S) Answer. UAEG officials publicly and strongly condemn
extremism and terrorist attacks. UAEG officials prepare,
distribute, and monitor the Friday sermons delivered at
mosques; anti-extremism and the condemnation of terrorism
acts have been the repeated focus of these sermons. The UAE
has specifically and publicly condemned acts of sectarian and
terrorist violence in Iraq, such as the February 22 bombing
of the al-Askariya Shrine.

(S/NF) The UAE's intelligence service is working with five
other countries (Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Turkey, and Saudi
Arabia) to support Iraqi "nationalists" to counter sectarian
violence; this work is not publicized. Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan has said that this
"Group of Six" has been able to provide Iraqi moderates with
about ten percent of the $50-$60 million that they require
each month. Deputy PM Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan has
suggested that there be a "collective effort" to support the
Shi'a groups from the south by assisting them to establish
radio and television stations (ref H).

Background Information
--------------


20. (S/NF) A body of reporting indicates that financiers use
the UAE to raise funds for the Iraqi insurgency, but Embassy
does not have a clear picture of the mechanism for how the
funds are raised or the individuals involved. Anecdotal
reporting suggests that some money is collected from wealthy
patrons and that other funds are generated via trade-based
money laundering. Additional reporting has identified
instances where money was sent via courier, hawala, and
formal financial institutions. Although Embassy is
concerned that some charities in the UAE are wittingly or
unwittingly being used by extremist organizations, we do not
have any reporting that indicates UAE charities are being
used to funnel money into the Iraqi insurgency.


21. (S) Approximately 40,000 Iraqis reside in the UAE, an
unknown number of whom are former members of the IIS, GDS,
and the Ba'ath Party. We have no concrete information on how
many former regime members reside in the UAE, or whether they
are engaged in supporting the insurgency. The one exception
is former IIS officer, Khalaf Al-Dulaymi, who is designated
under UNSCR 1483 and whose family resides in Dubai. During
the January meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Task Force
(JTFCC),Treasury U/S Stuart Levey passed Central Bank
Governor Sultan Nasser Al-Suweidi the names of Al-Dulaymi's
family members. U/S Levey passed the same list to GDSS Chief
Mohammed Al-Qemzi the next day. (Note: Embassy does not know
what actions, if any, the UAEG has taken against Khalaf
Al-Dulaymi and his family. End note.)


22. (S) During the JTFCC meeting, Governor Al-Suweidi stated
that the Central Bank was in the process of responding to
FinCEN requests for information on Iraq insurgency members
with bank accounts in the UAE (ref C). He noted that the
Central Bank is willing to freeze accounts of individuals
designated by the UN, but he did not specify whether the
Central Bank had frozen the accounts of any former regime
members. He also stated that the UAE was willing to "watch"
any individuals the USG is concerned might be connected to
the Iraqi insurgency, and he requested that the USG provide
the UAE with names.

Comment
--------------


23. (SBU) Electronic copies of the Counterterrorism Law,
Anti-Money Laundering Law, and Administrative Regulation No.
24/2000 will be sent via email to Katherine Leahy in
EB/ESC/TFS and James Hunter in NEA/I.
SISON