UAE MFA OFFICIAL'S PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003257

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR DEPSEC KIMMITT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS EAID IZ AE
SUBJECT: UAE MFA OFFICIAL'S PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ
-- CALL FOR "STRONG MAN"


A) STATE 124125, B) ABU DHABI 3097

Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: MFA's second-in-command, Acting Under
Secretary Tareq Al-Haidan, offered the Charge his strong

SIPDIS
views on the poor security situation in Iraq on August 12.
He said the Secretary's call for a "new Middle East" in the
context of the Lebanon conflict begged the question of what
sort of democracy the U.S. sought, arguing for a slower
transition from central authority. Al-Haidan opined that
what Iraq needs is a "strong man" and decisive central
government to bring stability -- a prerequisite for
non-violent political reform. He said the current "disaster"
opened the way for outside (Al-Qa'eda and Iranian) influence.
Al-Haidan said the UAE had "no one" in its Embassy in
Baghdad due to security concerns and could not urge investors
to invest in a country they could not safely visit. End
summary.


2. (C) Acting MFA Under Secretary Tareq Al-Haidan (number
two in the Ministry) pressed the Charge August 12 on the
security situation in Iraq and the meaning of the "new Middle
East" that the Secretary referred to in public comments on
the Lebanon conflict. Asking "what is this new Middle East"
(a question echoed also in recent UAE editorials),Al-Haidan
lamented the international isolation of the
democratically-elected Hamas government and asked "what kind
of democracy" the U.S. sought. He stressed that democracy
sometimes brings unfavorable results and that we should deal
with the regional situation "as it is" before pressing for
democracy as the answer. In Afghanistan, he said, "last year
was better than this year" in terms of stability and
progress. A country needs time to make the transition, he
argued.


3. (C) On Iraq, Al-Haidan suggested a "five-year transition"
to democracy. The country needed a strong central
government, he argued, and to achieve control over the
security situation in particular before introducing democracy
"in a measured way" over time. Iraq needs the tools of
effective governance and authority to control developments.
Al-Haidan said that a strong central authority acceptable to
the coalition, the Iraqi people, and regional neighbors would
be preferable to a Prime Minister who did "not know what was
going on" outside of Baghdad. He referred to the "disaster"
of an Iraqi Cabinet whose members would participate in
meetings and then refer to their various political factions
for guidance rather than implementing government decisions.
He said the Iraqi Prime Minister had no control. Without a
strong central government, Al-Haidan lamented, "you have
opened the way for Al-Qa'eda and Iran to work freely in Iraq."


4. (C) Stability was imperative before Iraq's neighbors
could effectively discuss reconstruction, stated Al-Haidan
when asked about UAE views on the Iraq Compact. "Control is
the number one" priority, he said, vital to facilitating a
non-violent transition to democracy. Describing Iraq as
"completely out of order," Al-Haidan wondered aloud why the
U.S. did not seek out a strong leader, even from among the
former ranks of the Iraqi military, to oversee this
transitional period. "Now you need a strong man in Iraq."
He also argued for the reintroduction of the second echelon
of former Iraqi military officials (not necessarily the top
tier) as one way to bolster security and permit U.S. forces
to leave urban areas in Iraq.


5. (C) The Iraqi people themselves did not see their
government taking control of the situation, according to
Al-Haidan, who added his view that "this government is not
controlling the country." He called on the U.S. to "pave the
way" for political reform by establishing security first.
"Who will come to build Iraq" if their security is not
assured, said Al-Haidan, noting that there was "no one in our
Embassy there" due to security concerns. (Note: The UAE's
security concerns in Baghdad were complicated by the
abduction of its Charge earlier this year. This is the first
time we have heard, however, that "no one" currently staffs
the mission. End note.) Al-Haidan said that UAE diplomats
had been unable to leave their homes and "do anything" due to
security concerns; if a diplomat's role was limited to making
phone calls, that could be done from Abu Dhabi.


6. (C) Regarding potential UAE investments in Iraq,
Al-Haidan said the UAE could not send its own people to Iraq
if it did not know whether they would come back safely.
Similarly, he said the UAEG could not urge others (i.e.,
potential investors) to go. He questioned whether other GCC
countries had a meaningful diplomatic presence in Baghdad.

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7. (C) Comment: Al-Haidan is generally frank but not a
purveyor of doomsday scenarios. We cannot know how closely
his strong statements on Iraq reflect the current views of
the senior UAE leadership, although he has usually proven to
adhere to approved positions and also to reflect broader
local (grassroots) concerns. His current position as
second-in-command at the MFA suggests his status as a trusted
advisor to the Minister. Al-Haidan's views may therefore be
a credible reflection of broader sentiments in the UAE, yet
may not necessarily represent authoritative policy on how
Iraq should be governed. Nevertheless, it may be significant
that his pessimistic assessment was shared just days before a
Treasury/State visit to discuss the Iraq Compact. End
comment.
QUINN