UAE CLAIM TO NEED MORE INFORMATION IN ORDER TO

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003169

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR ISN, T, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC AE
SUBJECT: UAE CLAIM TO NEED MORE INFORMATION IN ORDER TO
INTERDICT IRANIAN VESSEL

REF: A. SECSTATE 127528

B. CDA QUINN/ISN RUSSEL 8/4 EMAIL EXCHANGE

Classified By: CDA Martin Quinn, a.i., for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S/NF) On August 4 CDA met with MFA Director of Arab
Affairs, Ambassador Hamad Saeed Al-Zaabi shortly before
Friday noon prayers to request action on ref A NIACT. CDA
explained that the USG had information indicating that the
"Iran Isfahan," which had docked in Dubai that morning, was
carrying Chinese-origin graphite intended for use in Iran's
missile program. It was requested that the UAEG inspect and
detain the cargo. In earlier telcon MFA Asst U/S for
International Cooperation Mohamed Abdulrahim Abduljalil
pledged that UAE would do whatever it could to cooperate in
the matter.


2. (S/NF) At 1330 DHS/ICE attache AbdulRahman Adada delivered
reftel points to Khalid Khamas, Dubai Customs Executive
Director of Planning. Khamas said that Dubai Customs would
look into the matter. At 1530, Khamas contacted Adada and
said that since the "Iran Isfahan" contained 400-600
containers, it would be very difficult to locate the
containers of concern without container numbers. Khamas said
the ship was scheduled to depart Port Rashid at 1900 (local),
and that there was not much time to find the suspected cargo.
This information was reported to the Department at
approximately 1800 local time.


3. (S/NF) At about 2030 local time, Asst U/S Abduljalil
phoned CDA to say that without container numbers it was not
possible for the UAEG to inspect a ship that contained up to
600 containers, but implied they were doing their best. He
also asked what the USG wanted the UAE to do with the cargo
if it was seized and whether China would take it back. CDA
told Abduljalil that he had flagged the issue of the
container numbers and understood the difficulty, but at this
time we had no further information to share.


4. (S/NF) At approximately 2230, in response to call from
Department, CDA immediately contacted Abduljalil to make
arrangements for passing the container numbers provided in
ref B email and then personally delivered the numbers to the
MFA duty officer just after 2300 hours. Abduljalil thanked
CDA for the information, which he said he would convey to
Dubai Customs, and again indicated that the UAEG was
interested in full cooperation. It was unclear, however,
whether the vessel, scheduled to depart at 1900, was still in
port. The morning of August 5, Embassy learned that the
container numbers arrived too late to be of use. Sometime
between 2200 and 2300, the "Iran Isfahan" departed Port
Rashid.


5. (S/NF) Comment: In order to improve the likelihood of the
UAE favorably responding to U.S. interdiction requests, it is
critical that Embassy provide the UAE with as much actionable
information as possible. Although we cannot guarantee that
the UAE would have inspected or detained the containers had
we provided the container numbers at the time of the initial
request, it does appear that such information may increase
our chances of success in the future. Additionally, the MFA
Asst U/S communicated repeatedly his wish to cooperate and
laid out several criteria that the UAEG says must be met in
order for it to positively respond to these requests: 1)
evidence that the material is controlled; 2) confirmation
that the country of origin wants the material returned; 3) as
much advance notice as possible. CDA explained that we
cannot always meet these criteria, and can provide only the
information we have. However, Embassy notes that our chances
of successfully interdicting suspicious cargo will perhaps
increase if we are able to offer specific, complete, and
actionable information at the outset. End comment.


QUINN