EMIRATES FOCUSED ON SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003140

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID ENRG MOPS PK AF AE
SUBJECT: EMIRATES FOCUSED ON SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN

REF: ABU DHABI 3027

Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: During a July 29 lunch with Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his younger brother
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher pressed

SIPDIS
for continued support of Afghan reconstruction and efforts to
bring Pakistan and Afghanistan together politically. Afghan
authorities had told the Emirates government that road
projects near Kabul were their highest priority. Boucher
also pressed for help with diesel fuel for the winter. Their
political mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan had seen
some progress, yet seemed bogged down in the inability of the
respective intelligence services to coordinate an agenda for
a joint meeting. Boucher urged the government to continue
its effort. The Foreign Minister expressed concern with
Iranian efforts to intervene.


2. (S) Summary continued: The Crown Prince noted a UAE
program to license teachers within the next four years. He
suggested that their experience might help in developing
training programs for Pakistani and Afghan teachers. The
Crown Prince stated that a decision on the possible dispatch
of up to 1,000 troops to Afghanistan would not come before
the end of the summer and should coincide with public
disclosure of its troop presence in Afghanistan (the current
250-man force has not been publicly acknowledged). End
summary.

Aid to Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) Prior to the arrival of the hosts, Boucher heard from
MFA Assistant Under Secretary for Political Affairs Tareq
Al-Haidan that the UAE recognized the importance of having an
Ambassador in Afghanistan and was actively pursuing the
issue. Boucher encouraged the UAE to move quickly.
Regarding aid projects, Al-Haidan recounted that a delegation
from the Abu Dhabi Fund had visited Afghanistan about two
months previously and was told that "main roads" near Kabul
were Afghanistan's priority. The Foreign Minister, upon his
arrival, confirmed that Afghanistan had identified "roads in
Kabul" as its top priority (but the Minister asked if the UAE
should contribute to Helmand where the need was greater).
Al-Haidan said that a $29 million project was under study and
would consume most of the $30 million the UAE had pledged in
Tokyo. This project was in addition to "more than $86
million" already committed, according to Al-Haidan, primarily
from the Red Crescent Society, the Sheikh Zayed Association,
President Khalifa (who reportedly donated armored vehicles),
and the government. The Emirates was therefore "helping in
many fields." Throughout the conversation, both leaders
reiterated their willingness to "do whatever we can" for
Afghanistan.


4. (C) Boucher pressed the UAE to help alleviate
Afghanistan's need for diesel fuel to weather the Afghan
winter, which would require $50 to $55 million per year. The
Crown Prince said the government would take a careful look at
the requirement ("Let me look into that").

Mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan
--------------


5. (C) "My government is deeply interested in getting both
countries closer together," Abdullah said of efforts to
mediate stronger ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan. "We
are glad to do what we can." He said the UAE-facilitated
dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan had been "very
cooperative," largely due to President Karzai's positive and
consistent approach. They had tried to host a meeting
between both intelligence services and the leadership of both
had agreed; their various staffs had yet to meet to fix an
agenda, however. He said Pakistan was primarily the one
dragging its feet and that the UAE would keep working to
press for the meeting. Boucher urged him to continue this
important effort.


6. (C) Abdullah said they would also try to facilitate
another Musharraf-Karzai meeting. He noted his concerns that
Iran might try to meddle with both parties if progress was
not achieved. He said the Iranian Foreign Minister, at the
OIC conference in Baku three weeks prior, had made an attempt
to mediate between the parties, but that both Pakistan and
Afghanistan claimed to the UAE that it had rebuffed Iran's
offer, noting that the UAE was already involved. The
Minister also commented that a $50 million offer by the
Iranians to build an Islamic Center in Kabul was "scary."
Boucher noted that Afghanistan had agreed to send 1,400
students to Iran when offered 4,000 spaces in the university.
When Boucher noted that this level was still too high, the
Crown Prince said "two is too many."


7. (C) The Foreign Minister noted that the Afghan government
did not always appear coordinated, citing an anecdote of
neither Karzai nor his Foreign Minister having been aware of
the Afghan stance "to support India's position at the NAM in
Kuala Lumpur." Such gaps in coordination raise questions
about staffing and leadership. He noted, nonetheless, that
Karzai was often more "capable of getting things done" than
Musharraf. The Afghan leader's decisions seemed to permeate
"all the way down," while Pakistani decisions sometimes have
fallen prey to bureaucratic inertia or infighting. Boucher
said the UAE should encourage the parties to talk about
border and tribal strategies as well as discuss Madrassas and
Islamic education.

Education -- more than Islamic studies
--------------


8. (C) On the topic of training and education, Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed said the UAE had stopped sending its
Islamic Studies students to Saudi Arabia due to extreme views
among the faculty there. He said the UAE sent some to study
in Morocco and "very few" to Egypt. (Noting that Egyptians
were by nature easily provoked, he said "every Egyptian
cleric" seemed to be supporting Hezbollah and he wanted to
see diminished Egyptian influence in schools.) He advocated
training local teachers in Afghanistan and Pakistan on site,
not relying on foreign instructors. He hinted that the UAE
might consider funding, but was not equipped to organize the
effort or to dispatch teachers itself.


9. (C) Boucher stated that education must include Islamic
studies to be credible, but that Islamic studies could not
color the entire curriculum. The Foreign Minister said that
"at the end of the day," it required a lot of teachers to
staff schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He shared the
Crown Prince's concerns about Egyptian teachers, who often
emphasized religion in "strange ways," partially due to
Muslim Brotherhood and Wahabbi influences. It was very
important to train Pakistani and Afghan teachers, he
concluded.


10. (C) The Foreign Minister welcomed dialogue with the U.S.
about teacher training methods. He said public schools in
Abu Dhabi would soon require all teachers to go through
training courses to obtain teaching licenses. After four
years, no teacher could teach "in any subject" without a
license. He said this was a new experience and might offer
insights into training for Pakistani and Afghani teachers in
the future, particularly those who spoke either Arabic or
English and might be able to join the training programs. The
Foreign Minister said that passing an exam was not enough to
obtain a teaching license, but would require approval by
other "agencies." He said being a teacher was very
sensitive, even for UAE nationals, suggesting that they did
not want the wrong influences in classrooms. Even a moderate
curriculum, if taught by a teacher with a "twisted mind," was
dangerous. Noting the importance of educating youth, the
Foreign Minister remarked categorically that "we cannot have
radical Muslims running our schools, no matter what subjects
they know."


11. (C) The Crown Prince said that a student who focused
only on the Koran and Islamic studies might leave 12 years of
education with "no idea about what is math, engineering, or
physics." If told that the earth is flat, such a student
might believe it. We have to give our top students
opportunity, he noted, adding that students of Islamic
studies tended to be less academically adept than those in
engineering or medicine, for example.

Media influence
--------------


12. (C) The Foreign Minister said the UAE must "invest" in
people who could appear on television with a moderate
message, even sponsor them discreetly. He said the reality
of stark and emotional images from Lebanon made it difficult,
"even with the right people," to explain what was really
happening. Similarly, he noted how hard it could be for
moderate Arabs to convince western viewers of Arab
perspectives.


13. (C) Many "good people" in the Arab world are against
Hezbollah, said the Crown Prince, but the media tended to
incite the public to back its cause. "The media is very
dangerous," he noted, recalling a story he has shared before
about his own son watching Al-Jazeera and finding its
coverage convincing. "We are fighting 24/7 what you call
free media." The Crown Prince called for more media debate,
with all issues aired equally. Some media offer debates
between those "100 percent pro bin Laden, and those who
support him 150 percent." "That's not professional media,"
he complained, adding that some stations covered unfolding
events in Lebanon from a similarly provocative perspective.
Information via the media should not "provoke" radical
responses. He was concerned that, according to a recent
poll, 56 percent of the UAE population gets its news from
Al-Jazeera.


14. (C) Noting that the mosques were full on Friday in the
Muslim world (and contrasting this to church attendance in
the west),the Crown Prince said the UAE tried to ensure that
a moderate message was preached there. He lamented, however,
the limited impact of the weekly UAEG-prescribed sermon. A
mere "52 lectures per year," he stated, "cannot compete" with
the ever-present media. Education of those with influence in
the mosques and the media must be addressed.


15. (C) Responding to Boucher's concerns that both the
Taliban and drug lords were increasingly organized in
Afghanistan, the Crown Prince asked what the future of
Afghanistan might hold. He warned against a leadership
vacuum. Boucher cited better governance and less corruption
as necessary elements of a brighter future. When Boucher
commented on Afghanistan's many needs, and its poverty in the
1950's and 60's, the Crown Prince quipped that "we were all
poor back then." He said Afghanistan had not necessarily
gone "downhill," but had simply been "frozen in history." He
noted the impact of the Mujahideen, which he clarified were
not necessarily following proper "jihad."

Troops to Afghanistan
--------------


16. (S) The Crown Prince stated that a decision on the
possible UAE dispatch of up to 1,000 troops to Afghanistan
would not come before the end of the summer. He said the
current UAE force in that country had not been publicly
acknowledged. They needed to find a way to go public as they
raised the number, and that an announcement was still
premature. The Crown Prince said each commander his people
spoke with (presumably on a UAE military visit to
Afghanistan) "wanted us." He anticipated an announcement in
the October/November time frame He also said UAE commitments
in Afghanistan were related to "the overall atmosphere" in
Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan due to public perceptions of
developments there. Boucher said the USG was happy to work
with them on the nature of the military deployment (possibly
to include PRT participation, training programs, or other
duties). At the conclusion of the meeting (after the Crown
Prince's departure),the Foreign Minister confirmed "we have
not announced that we have any" (troops in Afghanistan) and
said they aimed to lift the level of troops while also going
public with the contribution.

Gas/oil in Central Asia
--------------


17. (C) Regarding potential cooperation in Central Asia on
oil and gas projects, they believe that Turkmenistan has
enough gas for the Trans-Afghan pipeline and intend to
explore the project further. He said there were many
variables to coordinate before the UAE could sign agreements,
and that it would need six months to consult, evaluate and
come up with an answer.


18. (U) A/S Boucher has cleared this message.
QUINN