MBZ'S VIEWS ON IRAQ COMPACT, HIZBOLLAH AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003097

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***CORRECTED COPY***

DEPT FOR C - ZELIKOW, NEA/ARP
TREASURY FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR J-5 RADM MOELLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID EFIN KDEM LE QA IZ AE
SUBJECT: MBZ'S VIEWS ON IRAQ COMPACT, HIZBOLLAH AND
AL-JAZEERA

ABU DHABI 00003097 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.
4 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt
and Counselor of the State Department Philip Zelikow won Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan's support for
the International Compact on Iraq during their July 22 visit.
However, MbZ said that he was less worried about Iraq than
about Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia. MbZ argued that
Hezbollah should be eliminated, but predicted that if the
Israelis didn't succeed in two weeks, "Arabs would pour over
the border to fight," egged on by the media. He sharply
criticized Al-Jazeera for providing &95% propaganda for the
bad guys," and Qatar for acquiescing in Al-Jazeera's control
by staff linked to Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and
jihadists. MbZ also noted Iranian nuclear ambitions as a
major concern. On terror finance, both sides briefly
discussed the need to ensure that UAE charities were not
abused by contributors funding jihad. End Summary.

The Iraq Compact
--------------


2. (C) In their 90-minute July 22 meeting, Deputy Secretary
Kimmitt explained to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) that the Iraq Compact is a means
for the Iraqis to agree to specific economic reforms in
return for international support. Kimmitt added that the UN
had agreed to co-sponsor the compact, supported by the IMF,
the World Bank, and a preparatory group (including the U.S.
and the UAE) that had either pledged $200 million to Iraqi
reconstruction or had agreed to debt relief of $4 billion.
Kimmitt noted the ambitious timetable for the compact, with
the hope being that the preparatory group would be able to
meet at the end of August/early September, brief the IMF, the
World Bank, and the UN at their respective September
meetings, and sign a compact document in November. He
explained that there had been a hope that the preparatory
group could "launch" the compact in Baghdad, but that
regional events had intervened. Despite that, he noted, there
had been significant preliminary work done with members of
the delegations that had gone to Baghdad.


3. (C/NF) MbZ asked where the venue for the signing would be,
adding "definitely not Baghdad." He said that, given
security concerns, he didn't think there would be anyone
willing to go to Baghdad. MbZ added that he thought that
location would play a big role in achieving a successful
launch for the compact, suggesting that the "biggest player
in the region" (i.e., Riyadh) could host. Counselor Zelikow
replied that the Saudis had already suggested having the UAE
host, a suggestion that startled MbZ. Kimmitt agreed that
security was a factor, but noted that the U.S. had offered
other delegations the same security package that it had
offered its own delegates.


4. (C/NF) MbZ told the delegation "You will get your (Iraq
Compact) support. I can't say that (publicly) right now, but
I can assure you of UAE cooperation." He said that the UAE
would work to help the Iraqis. He added that he believed
that Iraq "needed a push" but that it could "stand on its
own." Iraq had wealth, manpower, and land along with more
PHDs than Indonesia. He stressed that what Iraq needed was
better management and security. MbZ added that he was more
worried about Afghanistan, Palestine, and Somalia, noting
that Palestine and Somalia "can't stand on their own."
(Comment: It is unclear whether MbZ's reticence to provide
public support reflected his concerns about a need for
regional coordination. It is also possible that MbZ was
unable to commit financially without knowing whether his
older half-brother, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed
Al-Nahyan, approves. President Khalifa is in Rabat on an
official visit. End comment).


5. (S/NF) Zelikow said that a key challenge for Iraqi PM
Maliki would be to deal with his security situation and to
take on the Shi'a extremists, which would be politically
difficult. The compact would serve as a critical incentive
for the Iraqi government to make hard choices, he said. The
problem, he noted, was that there was a perception that Gulf
Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, were ambivalent about

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the compact. Zelikow asked whether MbZ could provide any
insights as to Saudi ambivalence. MbZ said that he thought
security concerns were important, but not the deciding factor
for the Saudis. The key factor, he said was the amount of
support they would get from Washington when Princes Saud and
Bandar visited. The other point, he noted was the concern
about Arab media, especially Al-Jazeera, adding that if "you
invite Qatar, you take away one excuse" from the Saudi Arabia
for not participating and make it more likely the Saudis will
attend.

Lebanon & Hezbollah
--------------


6. (S/NF) MbZ recommended that the party thank Saudi King
Abdullah for his "courageous stance" with regard to
Hezbollah. It was the "greatest decision" in the history of
the Arabs and "took guts.8 Now, he added, the Saudis were
"getting massacred in the media.8 The UAE would help out
Lebanon "as we can," but we are not going to "put ourselves
in the fire zone."


7. (S/NF) MbZ said that in his discussions with USG
officials, he had long noted that Hezbollah was a greater
threat to civilization than Al-Qaeda. He noted that
Hezbollah could blow up an embassy in Argentina and leave no
fingerprints for 2-3 years, and that Hezbollah had 20 years
experience with fighting the best army in the world. He
stressed that if Hezbollah was not eliminated it would be
"worse for everyone," but that if Israel didn't defeat
Hezbollah within two weeks, large numbers of Arabs would pour
across the Syria-Lebanon border to fight. Zelikow noted that
Hezbollah was also tied into Iraq, with Hezbollah training
Iraqi jihadists. He said that the U.S. view was that
Hezbollah must be defeated, but that Lebanon must be saved.


8. (S/NF) MbZ opined that Al-Jazeera was using the conflict
with Israel to justify fighting to defend Hezbollah. If some
"holy man" said fighting the U.S. in Iraq or the Israelis in
Lebanon was a first class ticket "not to Dubai but to
heaven," people bought it. MbZ added that irresponsible TV
personalities were sending young boys to die in order to
demonstrate that they had a following.

Qatar and Al-Jazeera -) strong words
--------------


9. (S/NF) Continuing in the same vein, MbZ sharply criticized
Al-Jazeera. He said that the U.S. was losing the media war,
which cost it casualties in Iraq and in Afghanistan. He
added that a recent poll in Abu Dhabi on the causes of the
conflict in Lebanon showed the following response: 50% said
the Israelis want to occupy the country, 2% said that
Hezbollah provoked the attack, 2% said Iran backed the
conflict, 2% said Arab governments were weak, and 40% said
that the U.S. was telling the Israelis to attack Lebanon. He
argued that this was because 56% of the UAE public watches
Al-Jazeera. Anti-U.S. propaganda can convert pro-American
Arabs to Anti-American Arabs, he stressed.


10. (S/NF) MbZ said that the perception was that Al-Jazeera
existed because CENTCOM protected it. Asking that the U.S.
not share his views with Qatar (as he claimed it had in
2004),he said that Qatari actions on Al-Jazeera were more
than "irritating," and that he did not understand Qatar's
decisions. He said that he believed that the "good guys"
were fighting three battles: Lebanon, the Iran-Syria link,
and the media. He stressed that the UAE had no problem with
free and independent media that aired both sides of an issue.
He argued, however, that there can't be a station giving 95%
propaganda for the "bad guys" operating out of a country with
the largest CENTCOM base in the Middle East (i.e., Qatar).


11. (S/NF) MbZ said that although the Qatari ruling family
finances Al-Jazeera, the people "controlling" it were the
same ones financing Osama bin Laden, Hamas, and Iraqi
jihadists. He said that the Qataris had cut a deal for
protection. MbZ added that he thought Qatar had been
"completely hijacked," adding that "if you didn't have
Al-Udaid Air Base there, Qatar would soon find itself in a
position where it could not even buy a Diet Coke8

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(presumably because its irate neighbors would descend on it).
Weathering this storm, Zelikow agreed that this might be an
opportune moment to press Qatar to be more responsible, and
that it might no longer be able to play both sides of the
street.

Saudi Arabia
--------------


12. (C/NF) MBZ said that the UAE and Qatar had conflicts with
the Saudis, noting that the UAE and the Saudis had fought 57
battles over the last 250 years in response to Saudi efforts
to occupy the UAE. He said the Saudis are "not my dear
friends, but we need to get along." On GCC coordination, MbZ
noted that while the UAE had a problem with Saudi Arabia,
including the border and the UAE-Qatar pipeline (the Dolphin
project),but that "we all" needed to look at the bigger
picture: U.S. troops fighting and dying in Iraq and
Afghanistan trying to bring stability to those countries, and
Iran trying to build nuclear weapons, which it would succeed
in doing unless it received a "clear message" not to. He
stressed, however, that he wasn't suggesting that the first
option was "bombing" Iran."


Democracy in the UAE
--------------


13. (C/NF) MbZ noted that the West was pushing Arab states
toward democracy, adding that "this is fine with us," but
that the approach needs to be tailored. MbZ asked,
rhetorically, how he could accept a member of parliament in
the UAE whose loyalty was to "Tora Bora," with another six
members' loyalty to a "guy in Egypt," another ten to a "guy
in England" and the last ten uncommitted. He asked whether
the Kuwaiti parliamentarians were working for the Kuwaiti
people or for others. He said it was easier in some
parliaments (Lebanon, Afghanistan) to have loyalty to a
militia rather than to a country. MbZ argued that he could
not have a parliamentarian whose loyalty was not to the UAE.

Charities
--------------

14. (S/NF) On terror finance, Kimmitt and MbZ briefly
discussed charities. Kimmitt noted that there was a need to
ensure that the financial system, including charities, was
not abused by terrorists and proliferators. MbZ stated that
"a lot of money" was being spent on jihad. Muslim
contributors would give money to charity, and the charities
would send it to jihadists. The media was inciting such
behavior, he added.

Participants
--------------


15. (SBU) UAE Delegation

--Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
--Major General Ali Mohammed Sobaih Al-Kaabi, UAE Land Forces
Commander
--Rashed Al-Hareb, Office Director to UAE Foreign Minister
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan


16. (SBU) U.S. Delegation

--Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of Treasury
--Dr. Phillip Zelikow, Counselor of the Department of State
--Ambassador Michele J. Sison
--RADM Robert Moeller, CENTCOM
--Evangelia Bouzis, NSC Director for Iraq
--J. Alexander Monsarrat, Department of State
--Vickie Alvo, Department of the Treasury
--Olier John (notetaker)


17. (U) This cable has beencleared by DepSec Kimmitt and
Counselor Zelikow.
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