SCENESETTER FOR SCA A/S AMB BOUCHER TO UAE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003027

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA A/S BOUCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS MASS EINV AF PK AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SCA A/S AMB BOUCHER TO UAE

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 2695, B) ABU DHABI 2633, C) ABU DHABI
2324, D) ABU DHABI 2129, E) ABU DHABI 1932, F) ABU DHABI 376,
G) 05 ABU DHABI 4696

Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Boucher, Embassy Abu Dhabi
welcomes your visit to discuss support for Afghanistan with
the UAE leadership. We have requested a meeting with a
senior member of the ruling family (the Crown Prince or
Foreign Minister). We recommend that you acknowledge the UAE
contribution to Afghan reconstruction and support for
Operation Enduring Freedom, while also reminding your
interlocutors that long-term stability in that country will
require our ongoing attention. You might touch upon the
UAE's non-official offer to expand its troop strength in
Afghanistan to assess current thinking on the topic in Abu
Dhabi. You might also share your appraisal of the current
investment climate in Afghanistan to encourage increased UAE
focus on potential projects there, as well as encouraging
government assistance (taking note of the UAE's preference
for project-oriented donations). Your hosts would also be
interested in your sense of relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan -- a relationship in which the UAE has invested some
of its own political capital. End summary.

Military Contributions to OEF
--------------


2. (S) The UAE's contributions to Operation Enduring
Freedom, ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, and
Afghan reconstruction are a testament to the importance the
UAE places on a stable Afghanistan. Significant among these
contributions is the continued presence of about 250 UAE
special operations troops serving under U.S. command at
Bagram Air Base. This initiative is a strong signal of
support from a key Arab coalition partner and has boosted
U.S.-UAE military coordination -- building upon similar
coordination in Kosovo. Since the start of OEF, the UAE has
also provided substantial assistance-in-kind to the Afghan
military, including the provision of vehicles, equipment, and
clothing. In 2002, for example, the UAE Armed Forces
provided the Kabul municipality 92 new vehicles -- to include
ambulances and fire trucks.


3. (S) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al
Nahyan floated the idea May 17 of increasing the UAE troop
presence in Afghanistan to 1,000 men (ref D). He said he
wanted the UAE contingent to "see action" to harden them for
potential future missions against extremists. Subsequent
discussions with UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff (ref C),as
well as exchanges at the bilateral June 21-22 Joint Military
Commission, clarify that the proposal remains under
consideration on the UAE side and is not yet a formal offer.
CENTCOM, in the meantime, has prepared a letter suggesting
that an expanded presence might focus on a conventional
infantry battalion, support in the establishment and staffing
of a "Commando School," and support for reconstruction and
development projects. That letter has not been passed to the
UAEG, as the Chief of Staff has indicated that the offer is
not yet ready for formal coordination.

Reconstruction Assistance
--------------


4. (C) Economic cooperation between the UAE and Afghanistan
has included investments and humanitarian aid. Of note, the
UAE's telecommunications giant Etisalat has been actively
trying to invest in Afghanistan's telecom market. Airlines
based in the UAE, such as Air Arabia in Sharjah, have flights
into Kabul and we have seen reports of investments in hotels
as well. The will to invest in Afghanistan is clearly
present when the conditions of a particular investment appeal
to UAE investors. The UAE has also committed to fund "Sheikh
Zayed City," presumably a neighborhood near Kabul built with
$4 million in UAE funds.


5. (C) A listing of UAE pledges and contributions to Afghan
reconstruction (which the UAEG asked be kept confidential) as
of last January showed over $70 million in commitments (ref
F). Not all funds have been expended, of course. The list
included $30 million pledged at the 2004 Tokyo Donors'
Conference, humanitarian aid, and commitments by UAE-based
charitable organizations (primarily the quasi-official Red

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Crescent Society -- the first Arab NGO on the ground in Kabul
following the fall of the Taliban -- and the Charitable
Foundation led by Dubai Ruler and UAE Prime Minster Mohammed
bin Rashid Al Maktoum). This $70 million complements
military assistance-in-kind, which may total a similar amount.


6. (S) When Ambassador Neumann met last November with
Information Minister (now Foreign Minister) Sheikh Abdullah
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Abdullah noted that Afghanistan needed
to be more proactive in seeking assistance in specific areas.
An excessively "insular" Afghanistan needed to "market"
itself better, he noted, citing other pressures on GCC aid
priorities (Pakistan earthquake, hurricane Katrina, Iraqi
infrastructure, Palestinian development). Appealing to
potential donors, according to Abdullah, would require the
recipient to be more specific and forthcoming in describing
its needs (ref G). The UAE typically tries to "projectize"
its foreign aid, and officials have told us that in the case
of Afghanistan, they are waiting on the right projects to
fund. (Note: By way of comparison, the UAE's earthquake
relief contribution to Pakistan began with $100 million in
medical and transport support, but was soon boosted by
President Khalifa to $200 million. End note.)

In Search of Political Stability
--------------


7. (S) On the political front, the UAE has worked to smooth
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan in a bid to bring
more stability to the region. That effort featured a June 15
meeting between Presidents Karzai and Musharraf, brokered by
the UAE. Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al
Nahyan reported that the meeting had gone "very well" (ref B)
and that the two had agreed to "calm the rhetoric" and to
coordinate border monitoring more closely. That meeting was
followed by a meeting in Abu Dhabi of the Afghan and
Pakistani intel chiefs. State Security Department (SSD)
Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al-Nahyan told us June 19
that this series of meetings should build trust between the
two countries' security services, adding that Afghanistan's
future relied on Pakistani understanding (ref A) You might
want to express appreciation for the UAE's mediation and
inquire about recent developments.


8. (S) Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed noted in May that
UAE commitments to Afghanistan would include sending an
Ambassador "very soon" (ref E). That has still not happened.
The Afghan Embassy in Abu Dhabi notes that the UAE has an
"active Embassy" in Kabul but that the Ambassador in
Islamabad oversees the Kabul mission. The Afghans have had a
fully accredited Ambassador in Abu Dhabi since February,
2005, partly to look after the more than 70,000 Afghanis
resident in the UAE (estimates run as high as 170,000
including Afghans with Pakistani passports).

Regional Petroleum Investments by the UAE
--------------


9. (C) The International Petroleum Investment Corporation
(IPIC),Abu Dhabi's overseas investment arm in the petroleum
sector, has two significant Asian investments: 1) a 40%
stake in the Pakistan Arab Refining Company (PARCO),which
does refining, marketing, and pipelines; and 2) investments
in refining and marketing operations associated with the
Hyundai Oil Bank in Korea. IPIC is reportedly reviewing
investments in Central Asia (with Conoco Phillips) but has
not made any concrete commitments. In the Caspian basin,
IPIC contacts note that Dragon Oil (based in Dubai and 52%
owned by Dubai's Emirates National Oil Company) has an
offshore concession in Turkmenistan which produces about
50,000 barrels per day. Unable to transport this oil to the
Gulf, however, Dragon Oil has a deal with Iran by which
Dragon sends the oil to Iran and receives an equivalent
amount of condensate at a location on the Arabian Gulf.
Given Iran's influence in the region, as well as its
geographic location vis-a-vis oil transit routes, any success
in Caspian Sea oil investments requires investors to work
with the often less-than-helpful regime in Tehran.

Other SCA-related Issues
--------------


10. (SBU) Of the South and Central Asian countries, the UAE
is closest to Pakistan, in which senior members of the
Al-Nahyan family (including the President, Crown Prince, and

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Foreign Minister) take personal interest. Traditional
hunting trips to Pakistan, as well as to Afghanistan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, partially explain the Al-Nahyan
interest. Of note on the investment front, the majority
government-owned UAE telecommunications concern, Etisalat,
acquired a 23.4% stake in Pakistan Telecommunications Company
Ltd. in 2005.


11. (SBU) The UAE hosts guest workers from throughout the
SCA region as well, with Indians, Pakistanis, and
Bangladeshis as the three largest non-Emirati groups.
Indians, in fact, form the largest single nationality group
in the UAE at an estimated 30 percent (Emiratis themselves
being closer to 20 percent). In addition to the estimated
1.2 million Indians, 500,000 Pakistanis, and 300,000
Bangladeshis, workers from Sri Lanka likely number near
100,000 and constitute over two percent of the population.
Remittances from these guest workers are important to each of
these countries. Finally, and unfortunately,
trafficking-in-persons (TIP) is a notable problem with girls
from Central Asia.
SISON