SCENESETTER FOR GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE WITH UAE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ABU DHABI 002930

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR PM A/S HILLEN AND NEA DAS GRAY
DOD FOR OSD A/S ROODMAN AND JOINT STAFF J-5/JONES
USCENTCOM FOR J-5/MOELLER
NSC FOR RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS KNNP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE WITH UAE

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 2905 AND PREVIOUS, B) ABU DHABI 2855, C)
ABU DHABI 2782, D) ABU DHABI 2781, E) ABU DHABI 2695, F) ABU
DHABI 2422, G) ABU DHABI 2324, H) ABU DHABI 2285, I) ABU
DHABI 2209 (AND PREVIOUS),J) ABU DHABI 2129, K) ABU DHABI
1930, L) ABU DHABI 1903, M) ABU DHABI 1797, N) ABU DHABI
1724, O) ABU DHABI 1422, P) ABU DHABI 288

Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (S) Summary: Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to the June
27 Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) as an opportunity to clarify
key areas of potential cooperation with the UAE, particularly
vis-a-vis the very real threat that the Emirates feels from
Iran. The UAE is also likely to want to expand the agenda to
include Lebanon. The GSD comes within the context of a
number of recent exchanges, such as the Joint Military
Commission (JMC) in Washington and numerous visits to Abu
Dhabi by USG officials; we anticipate the GSD will build upon
those efforts to produce greater synergy and focus in our
cooperation. The UAEG has identified a strong and senior
core of five UAE participants for the GSD, selected for their
experience and proximity to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ),and is prepared to engage in the
six proposed topics. This message offers perspective on each
of the topics and UAE participants as follows:
--- Defense Cooperation (paras 3-8);
--- Developing Shared Assessment on Iraq (paras 9-13);
--- Regional Stability: Iran, Lebanon (paras 14-19);
--- Energy Infrastructure Security (paras 20-22);
--- Counterproliferation (paras 23-26);
--- Counterterrorism (paras 27-28);
--- and Biographic information (paragraph 29).
End summary.

Program
--------------


2. (C) Post anticipates the GSD taking place in one session
on July 27, running from mid-morning to an early afternoon
lunch time, at a venue to be offered by the UAE. The six
agenda topics will likely be addressed in turn during this
single session. No press or public statement is anticipated,
nor desired by the UAEG.

Topics: Defense Cooperation
--------------


3. (S) The UAE's contribution to U.S. defense interests in
the region has been extensive and enduring. We enjoy the
benefits of critical military facilities at Al-Dhafra,
Fujairah, and Jebel Ali, and coordination with a generally
accommodating UAEG. The UAE has also been a proactive
supporter with troops and equipment in places like Kosovo and
Afghanistan. As we express appreciation for these benefits
of partnership, we also try to remind our hosts that the
evolving nature of our military requirements mandates an
ever-flexible defense relationship focused on joint planning,
constant coordination, and strategic interoperability.


4. (S/NF) The GSD offers an opportunity to bring into
greater focus the need for close coordination of air and
missile defense capabilities in particular. We should
highlight again for the UAE the importance of
interoperability (with the U.S. and potentially with GCC
allies) in setting up a credible air defense -- which
naturally raises the questions of integrated Shared Early
Warning (SEW) systems, layered defense capabilities, and
possible acquisitions such as the PAC-III Patriot missile.
While the Emiratis have expressed skepticism about GCC
coordination on missile defense, this may be an opportunity
to press the UAE to play a more assertive role within the
GCC. The Iran threat does not lend itself to delay and GCC
inertia.


5. (S/NF) The Emiratis understand our arguments about
interoperability in discussing key air defense systems, but
have not been convinced enough to pursue a potential
purchase. We might reiterate the importance of having a
network of systems used by the U.S. and other allies in the
region to avoid developing an incompatible or even
dangerously conflicting air defense system (that may not
distinguish targets appropriately).

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6. (S/NF) In responding to apparent skepticism about the
Patriot's effectiveness last April, U/S Joseph (ref O) both
mentioned encouraging results from recent anti-ballistic
missile tests and explained that defensive measures do not
need to be 100 percent accurate -- just "credible enough" to
deter Iran by convincing it that the effectiveness of its
offensive measures has been eroded. (Note: Raytheon has
been trying for 10 years to get the UAE to purchase the
Patriot without any traction. According to one Raytheon
source, the UAEG loaned more than $1 billion to Russia to
help with debt relief after the fall of the Soviet Union and
Russia is reportedly trying to satisfy the debt by developing
and attempting to field the S-300 air defense system and its
follow-on S-400 system in the UAE. End note.)


7. (S/NF) At USCENTCOM,s direction, and with Directorate of
Military Intelligence permission, U.S. Army missile defense
experts recently traveled to the UAE to conduct an air
defense assessment. Previous potential Patriot emplacement
locations in the UAE were focused against the Iraqi threat.
The new surveys, completed April 19, identified six new
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 emplacement locations to deter
the Iranian missile threat. They would protect U.S. military
interests at Al Dhafra Air Base, Al Bateen Air Base, Minhad
Air Base, Fujairah Airport, Jebel Ali Port, and Fujairah
Port, and much of the surrounding metropolitan areas of
Fujairah, Abu Dhabi and Dubai.


8. (S/NF) Patriot, of course, is not the whole answer. The
issue to press home with the UAE is the need for strategic
depth and a layered air defense. Multiple lines of defense
in a strategic and sophisticated array, would have the best
chance of convincing Iran that it faces a capable adversary
across the Arabian Gulf. The creation and maturation of the
Gulf Air Warfare Center at Al Dhafra Air Base is also a huge
step in the direction of strategic preparation for a
contingency and carries inherent deterrent value;
nonetheless, an even more sophisticated line-up of exercise
scenarios and more strategic depth in the UAE's (and the
GCC's) air defense posture would have a much greater
deterrent effect on Tehran.

Developing a Shared Assessment and Agenda on Iraq
-------------- --------------


9. (S) Iraq is a natural focus of shared U.S.-UAE interests
and the UAE has contributed both financially and politically
to help stabilize that country. The July 3 visit of PM
Malaki to Abu Dhabi, accompanied by his ministers for
defense, oil, electricity, environment, and communications,
was well received by both sides and led to the creation of
three bilateral "groupings" to address security, military
assistance, and investment (especially in Iraq's energy and
telecommunications sectors where the UAE has sophisticated
capabilities). At the GSD we may wish to inquire about the
practical goals established by each of those groupings. We
understand from GSD participant Yousef Al Otaiba that the
military assistance portion of the UAE's commitment should
include a visit to Iraq by representatives of the UAE's
military and defense sectors to examine materiel and funding
needs, as well as seeking linkages between Baghdad and UAE
manufacturers of military hardware (ref D). We might also
encourage the UAE to accelerate the process of sending an
Ambassador to Baghdad, another issue raised during Malaki's
visit.


10. (S/NF) The GSD will follow the July 22-23 visit of
Deputy Secretary of Treasury Kimmitt and Department of State
Counselor Zelikow to discuss the International Compact for
Iraq, which was proposed by the GoI to lay a stronger
foundation for the reconstruction of Iraq and put the country
on a "credible path to sustainable development." This visit
follows a July 20 preparatory meeting in Baghdad and is
designed to get UAEG "buy in" for the compact. The UAE
previously agreed to host an energy sector conference for
Iraqi participants, and pledged $215 million to Iraqi
reconstruction in Madrid in 2004 (of which it has disbursed
around $80 million. The UAE has committed to forgiving most
of the $3.5 billion in Iraqi debt that it holds, but has said
that it is bound by the GCC to adopt a common position on the
debt. In commending the UAE for its substantial
contributions, we might also encourage Abu Dhabi, as

ABU DHABI 00002930 003 OF 007


Ambassador Khalilzad has done, to lead the GCC on assistance
to Iraq as a matter of regional stability.


11. (S/NF) The UAE continues active engagement with Iraq.
It has publicly supported the new Iraqi government and has
provided extensive security assistance, as well as attempted
to influence Iraqi moderates to participate more in the
political process. The UAE mission in Iraq faced recent
terrorist attacks with the killing of two Iraqi employees in
April and the kidnapping -- and subsequent release -- of the
Deputy Charge d' Affaires in May. Despite being directly
targeted, the Emiratis have stated that they intend to
continue their humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people
and to contribute to rebuild Iraq.


12. (C/NF) The UAE has also provided Iraq significant
security assistance. Its joint training programs with
Germany trained 431 Iraqi police and an engineering
battalion. The UAE gave Iraq engineering and military
equipment (including 100 trucks, four light reconnaissance
aircraft, 43 French Panhard Armored Personnel Carriers) and
$8 million toward the transfer of M-113 APCs from Jordan.
The UAE is currently interested in establishing ties with
Baghdad for its manufacturers of ballistic vests, ammunition,
and the TIGER, an all-terrain vehicle (similar in purpose to
the Humvee) manufactured by the Bin Jabr Group of Abu Dhabi
(ref D).


13. (S/NF) The UAEG shares our concern regarding Iranian
influence in Iraq and has reached out to moderate Shi'a to
encourage them to engage in the political process independent
of Iran. We understand that this effort includes visits to
the UAE by senior Shi'a tribal leaders from southern Iraq to
discuss ways to shed Iranian influence (according to State
Security sources),as well as encouraging and facilitating
Iyad Allawi's efforts to reach out to moderate Shi'a (ref E).
The UAE's intelligence service is also working, in
coordination with five regional neighbors, to support Iraqi
"nationalists" with significant funding (ref J).

Regional Stability, Especially Iran and Lebanon
-------------- --


14. (S/NF) IRAN: As MbZ told PDUSD for Policy Henry on May
17 (ref J),the UAE is concerned that Iran has "superpower"
ambitions and will have nuclear weapons in due time "unless
somebody stops them." We also know that the Emiratis are
ramping up their own surveillance activities targeting Iran
and Islamic extremists. (Their Directorate of Military
Intelligence -- DMI -- reportedly beefed up its personnel
conducting "electronic surveillance" from 60 to over 900 in
the last four years.) State Security Director Sheikh Hazza
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan told us last month that his organization
was forming a special unit to counter Iranian and Shi'a
influence in the UAE (ref E). Sheikh Hazza had earlier
expressed his concern to S/CT (ref K) that Hizballah in
Lebanon was serving as an important source of intelligence
for Iran, and MbZ told a State/DoD team in May that Hizballah
was "more dangerous than Al-Qa'ida" (ref J).


15. (S) In spite of that background of disdain for Iran, the
UAE prefers not to be confrontational in its public
statements and might speak of Iran's "worrisome" nuclear
program (ref L) or portray its concerns in terms of
environmental and ecological risks rather than as a military
threat (ref H). In calibrating a cautious
(non-confrontational) public posture on Iran, the UAE must
consider the implications for stability in a nation with very
close economic ties to Iran, a significant Persian-origin
population in the UAE, and a very proximate threat from a
much larger power. The UAE therefore supports a strong U.S.
stand on Iran, yet is hesitant to stand alongside us publicly
on the front lines (and may hesitate to join as participants
in exercises designed to send a clear message to Teheran).


16. (S) While pressing the UAE to join us insomuch as
possible in showing international solidarity against Iranian
nuclear ambitions, the U.S. delegation will also want to
elaborate on measures to deter Iran from acquiring or using
WMD by establishing a credible, layered strategic air defense
network, to include Patriot Missile and Air Defense, Aegis
cruiser, Airborne Laser, and Theater High Altitude Air
Defense. We might also press the UAE to enhance bilateral

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and multilateral training and exercises, to include crisis
and consequence management training, counter-ballistic
missile exercises, and denial and interdiction exercises.
(Note: USCENTCOM Commander has forwarded through USLO a
formal invitation for the UAE to host Exercise EAGLE RESOLVE
07 dealing with Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. We are
awaiting a reply. End note.) In spite of UAE hesitations,
we might also nudge them to consider participation in PSI
exercises such as LEADING EDGE 07.


17. (S) The July 9-11 DOVE PINE military intelligence
exchange with DMI is one example of a program which helps put
the Iran threat, and our various perspectives, into a focused
and practical context. During that exchange, DMI Chief
Al-Mazrouie expressed his view that Iran would try to avoid
escalation of the nuclear issue to the point of military
conflict, although the UAE must prepare for any contingency.
He felt Iran had too much to lose by provoking a U.S. Strike.
His worst case scenario would be a unilateral Israeli strike
against Iran -- endangering the entire region. (IIR 6 931
0168 06)


18. (C) LEBANON: The UAE is very concerned about the
deteriorating situation in Lebanon. In convoking G-8
ambassadors on July 17 (septel),Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Mohammed Hussein Al-Sha'ali pressed for a
concerted international effort, involving the Security
Council, to seek an immediate ceasefire. He also called for
greater UNSC efforts on Middle East peace in general.
Al-Sha'ali's primary concerns were that Israel's actions
recklessly violated Lebanese sovereignty, Israel could be
strengthening Hezbollah and creating a new and more dangerous
Al-Qa'ida, and the international community had lost its focus
on peace talks. He also cited Iran's hand in financing and
arming Hezbollah and reported Arab League consensus that
Hezbollah's actions were unjustified.


19. (C) The UAE's interests in Lebanon are highlighted by a
large local Lebanese community (over 70,000),Emirati
investments now at risk in Lebanon, and the fact that Beirut
is a favored summer vacation point for UAE nationals (the UAE
assisted in the repatriation of over 3,000 locals and 6,000
UAE residents during the current crisis). President Khalifa
has called for solidarity with Lebanon and an immediate
ceasefire, as well as UNSC intervention. The UAE is also
making significant humanitarian gestures to the Lebanese.

Energy Infrastructure Security
--------------


20. (S) President Khalifa, when he was still Crown Prince,
took an interest in energy infrastructure security in 2004
and set up an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate
security of key oil, power, and water facilities.
Unfortunately, we do not see sufficient coordination having
resulted from this exercise and the UAE remains in a position
of vulnerability, largely due to the ad hoc nature of diverse
approaches to the problem by disparate government entities.
For example, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for
securing the facilities and controlling access. The
military, on the other hand, is responsible for defensive
measures to protect the facilities from attack. It is not
clear that the two entities effectively coordinate or are
working to install interoperable systems.


21. (S/NF) The GSD takes place in the context of the UAE
more firmly grasping the vulnerability of its offshore and
beachside infrastructure (including oil, power, and
desalination). MbZ told Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Townsend on 22 April
that the UAE was "absolutely" worried about its oil
facilities (ref N). He told Townsend that there are three
international companies (two reportedly U.S. firms)
conducting risk assessments of the oil infrastructure and
maritime security for the UAEG. Ambassador delivered the
Critical Energy Infrastructure Security Strategy demarche on
July 5 to Al-Otaiba, requesting information on the UAE's
current security posture for critical sites and offering USG
assistance to improve security at those sites (ref C).


22. (S/NF) The UAE Navy for the first time ever included a
maritime oil platform (OPLAT) defense scenario in an exercise
with the US Fifth Fleet in February 2006. The Fifth Fleet is

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also working with the UAE Navy now to establish an OPLAT
defense Standard Operating Procedure, and has offered to take
UAE Navy representatives to Iraqi platforms to see how the
coalition handles command and control for OPLAT defense. The
Ministry of Interior is also enhancing security features at
the major refineries and export terminals by adding sensors
and CCTV systems.

Counterproliferation
--------------


23. (S) Given the enormous volume of goods shipped and
traded through the UAE, it is vital that we continue to
impress upon the UAEG the importance of tight controls on
items of proliferation concern -- including dual use items.
With Dubai being Iran's largest non-oil trading partner and
often the last foreign stop for vessels bound for Iran, UAE
commitment to countering proliferation is essential. To
date, the UAE's record on counterproliferation cooperation
has been mixed. The UAEG has interdicted shipments, closed
companies, and passed information to the U.S. in certain
cases. However, when USG requests involve items or companies
related to Iran (particularly if the items are dual-use),the
UAE is more reluctant to respond out of concern about
antagonizing its neighbor and jeopardizing a robust trading
relationship.


24. (S/NF) A case in point is the Mayrow example, in which
we strongly urged the closure of a group of Iranian front
companies involved in acquiring IED components. The UAE
promised full investigation and, to its credit, did ensure
the quick closure of some of the related companies. However,
Mayrow continues to operate in spite of its suspect
activities, reportedly because it is owned by an Emirati
national and is more difficult to close down through
"extra-legal" means (ref I). Additionally, we have
information that indicates one of the closed companies may
have resumed operations. The USG requested on July 16 that
the UAEG seize a suspect shipment related to this company
(Atlinx Electronics),but we do not know if the UAE has taken
action on this request (ref A).


25. (C) Despite considerable USG and international pressure,
the UAE has not enacted an export control system comparable
with those of members of the international control regimes.
In 2004, the USG provided a draft template (in English and
Arabic) for an export control law, and the UAE said it would
enact legislation soon. However, the law remains "stuck in
committee," and the UAE has never established a national
control list. We continue to press the UAE to pass an export
control law, and have increased pressure upon them to do so.
In June, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed more
stringent pre-licensing checks on controlled U.S. technology
bound for the UAE. The USG asked the UAE to enact
legislation, create an effective enforcement regime, and
consistently respond to U.S. requests for investigation,
information, and interdiction. Should the UAE fail to take
these measures by December, the USG may move the UAE to a
more restrictive licensing category and/or require a license
for all US-origin items transiting the UAE.


26. (C) The bilateral Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF)
initiated last February offers a good platform for
coordination, including through the three working groups on
export control, transshipment and interdiction, and
proliferation finance. We anticipate the second CTF meeting
either in September or after Ramadan (which ends in late
October). The UAE clearly has the capability to bolster its
counterproliferation posture; it needs to put more attention
into creating a strong legal framework and ensuring strict
enforcement. We hope you will encourage the UAE during GSD
discussions to assume a greater sense of urgency in pursuing
enforceable export control legislation.

Counterterrorism
--------------


27. (C) The UAE has an impressive array of technical
capabilities to bring to bear on the fight against terror.
The leadership generally understands the threat and seeks to
counter it with a combination of police work and up-to-date
technical tools. Difficulties arise, however, in the ad hoc
nature of coordination between the various institutions which

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need to fight a common threat with a common game plan. We
need to encourage greater cohesion between relevant
ministries and organizations to facilitate planning and
acquisition programs that ensure that the UAEG's significant
capabilities are indeed brought to bear in full force on
extremist activities. We are aware, for example, of
impressive crisis management centers being created by the Abu
Dhabi National Oil Company, the Dubai authorities, and
others. Likewise, USCENTCOM intelligence experts will
conduct a CT affiliation seminar for both Ministry of
Interior and DMI personnel July 15-30. These efforts are
not, however, linked to one another in a strategically
meaningful network. A robust counterterror effort must be
better unified at a federal level to ensure strategic impact.


28. (S) The UAE is cooperative in pursuing information
offered by the USG and we enjoy good working relations on
counterterrorism in general. However, the UAE does not
approach countering terrorism or extremism in a transnational
context. When the UAE identifies an individual as a terror
risk, it often arrests and deports foreign nationals, while
choosing to counsel and monitor UAE nationals. A more
rigorous investigative posture might lead to more
prosecutable cases and more effectively contribute to
international efforts to shut down transnational terrorist
networks. Recognizing that the USG is the only truly global
player in the CT arena, the best approach for the UAE would
be to materially enhance its cooperation with the U.S.

Participation
--------------


29. (S/NF) The five participants on the UAE side have been
identified for their experience and proximity to Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ).
They represent a strong core of senior advisors in MbZ's
trusted inner circle.

--- Major General Mohammed Sweidan Al-Qamzi, Commander, Air
Force and Air Defense. Born in Dubai, General Sweidan joined
the service in 1971 and has experience as a pilot and in the
air defense field. He assumed his current command in January

2006. He is one of the few senior military leaders from
Dubai and was the Al-Minhad Air Base Commander (located in
Dubai) for many years. As the former Deputy Commander of the
Air Force, General Mohammed oversaw for many years the UAE's
Air Defense functions. He will be the primary GSD
participant to provide military advice to the Chief of Staff
and MbZ concerning the air defense portion of the discussions.

--- Major General Saeed Al-Rumaithy, General Headquarters
Chief of Administration and Manpower. General Saeed rose
through the Land Forces to ultimately serve as UAE Land
Forces commander. His career encompassed significant
training in the U.S. Now serving in a critical GHQ function
with oversight of manpower and administration, he has
experience as MbZ's office manager for about eight years and
is reportedly being groomed to take over as GHQ Chief of
Staff in the future.

--- Brigadier Eissa Al-Mazrouie, Director of Military
Intelligence and Security. With years of experience as
executive officer to MbZ when the latter was GHQ Chief of
Staff, Al-Mazrouie enjoys insider status with the top
leadership. He oversees a productive intelligence
relationship with the U.S. military, including the July 9-12
DOVE PINE program focused on the exchange of military
intelligence with DIA, NGA, ONI, and USCENTCOM on Iran and
Iraq. Among his many duties he oversees the protection of
key infrastructure -- a critical aspect of the UAE defense
strategy.

--- Colonel Hamad Al-Shamsi, Director, External Affairs,
State Security Directorate (SSD). Colonel Hamad brings to
bear the experience and interests of State Security. Number
three at SSD, he is a close advisor to SSD Director Sheikh
Hazza bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, and often represents the SSD in
meetings between U.S. officials and UAEG leaders.

--- Yousef Al-Otaiba, International Affairs Director, Office
of the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (MbZ). As an MbZ confidant,
Al-Otaiba has proven to be one of the Embassy's best
interlocutors on the full range of security and policy issues

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of interest to the Crown Prince. Born into a wealthy
merchant family (father was also the UAE's first Minister of
Petroleum from 1973-90),Al-Otaiba has a degree in
international relations from Georgetown University. He
served in an executive position in the family automotive firm
before his selection as an International Fellow at the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington.

A Robust Political-Military Relationship in Context
-------------- --------------


30. (C) As a backdrop to the GSD, it is important to keep in
perspective the very healthy overall U.S.-UAE bilateral
political-military relationship. The UAE has continued its
excellent support in the war on terror and it has cooperated
with us in Afghanistan and in Iraq. This cooperation is
described in detail in the 2005/2006 Report to Congress on
Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (ref P). The UAE
provides basing and overflight for U.S. reconnaissance and
refueling assets, as well as naval logistics support. The
F-16 Block 60 program is a showcase of cooperation between
our nations. The UAE has taken delivery of 59 F-16 aircraft
(one was lost in a mishap on January 9, 2006). There are
U.S. pilots and training professionals here that are core
instructors for the program. Another example of our
expanding military cooperation is the Gulf Air Warfare Center
at Al Dhafra Air Base. Modeled on the U.S. Air Force Air
Warfare Center at Nellis AFB, NV, and the NATO Tactical
Leadership Program at Florennes, Belgium, this regional
facility is intended to enhance military interoperability and
cooperation between the U.S. and members of the GCC, Egypt,
Jordan, the UK and France. In the future, the U.S. plans to
help the UAE develop a state-of-the-art tactical range,
incorporate USN and USMC assets as participants, and use
tankers (USAF and others) for air-to-air refueling.


31. (C) We look forward to the GSD building upon a strong
political-military relationship and sharpening the focus of
cooperation in the face of very real threats in the region.
SISON