Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUDHABI2780
2006-07-05 12:47:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

DEADLINE FOR EXPORT CONTROL LAW "INTERFERENCE IN

Tags:  PARM PREL ETTC AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAD #2780/01 1861247
ZNY SSSSSZZH
P 051247Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6016
INFO RUCPDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 002780 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, ISN/CPI, PM/FO, NEA/ARP


USDOC FOR BIS DMCCORMICK, DJACKSON, WWYSONG
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND, DSTEPHENS, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC AE
SUBJECT: DEADLINE FOR EXPORT CONTROL LAW "INTERFERENCE IN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS"

REF: A. ABU DHABI 2688

B. STATE 102501

C. ABU DHABI 2771

D. ABU DHABI 2772

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 b and d.


S E C R E T ABU DHABI 002780

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, ISN/CPI, PM/FO, NEA/ARP


USDOC FOR BIS DMCCORMICK, DJACKSON, WWYSONG
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND, DSTEPHENS, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC AE
SUBJECT: DEADLINE FOR EXPORT CONTROL LAW "INTERFERENCE IN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS"

REF: A. ABU DHABI 2688

B. STATE 102501

C. ABU DHABI 2771

D. ABU DHABI 2772

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 b and d.



1. (S/NF) Summary. On July 4, Ambassador received a letter
from Brigadier Mohamad al-Qemzi, Chairman of the U.S./UAE
Counterproliferation Task Force and director of the Dubai
security service. The letter responded to Ambassador's ref A
demarche on "Improving the UAE Counterproliferation Effort"
to ForMin Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ),urging that the
UAE pass its export control law by July 15, develop an export
control enforcement regime, and cooperate on USG requests for
assistance. Although al-Qemzi's message stressed the UAE's
close international cooperation on non-proliferation issues
and an understanding of its importance, it quickly turned to
a rebuttal of the demarche and non-paper. Attached to
al-Qemzi's letter were "talking points" that stated that the
USG's "ultimatum" regarding the UAE's export control law
"represents an act of interference in internal affairs of a
friendly sovereign country, and there will be no discussions
regarding the timing of issuing a UAE government law with any
foreign country." The "talking points" also stated that the
ultimatum "disagrees with the spirit of cooperation between
the two countries and may affect back channels of
communication in sensitive issues." It is clear that
al-Qemzi has not yet grasped fully the depth and breadth of
the USG concerns regarding Iran's WMD and missile programs
and the role that the UAEG -- particularly Dubai -- must play
in countering Iran's efforts. End summary.


2. (S/NF) Al-Qemzi's letter also responded to a 17 June
letter from Ambassador explaining the role of the
USDOC/Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Export Control
Officer and the May visit of a DOC/Office of Export
Enforcement (OEE) Sentinel team. (Note: the Ambassador's 17
June letter responded to pointed questions from al-Qemzi

about DOC activity in the UAE. End note.) Al-Qemzi wrote
that, "The efforts of the Department of Commerce are
honorable; however it would be difficult to achieve full
benefit without the support of local authorities. Sentinel
team would find difficulties in receiving feedback from
commercial entities working in the UAE without legal
justification for their inquiries... Visiting commercial
entities operating legally in the UAE to conduct a check
without prior coordination with the authorities violates
diplomatic conduct (sic)."

Letter
--------------


3. (S) Following is the text of the letter and talking points
(marked SECRET) dated July 4, 2006 from Brigadier Mohamed Al
Qemzi, Director of General Department of State Security, to
the Ambassador.

Begin text:

July 4, 2006

Your Excellency:

I would like to thank you for your letter dated June 17, 2006
regarding the US Department of Commerce. The objectives of
the Export Control Office are honorable as are the efforts of
many other entities involved in the collective effort to
counter proliferation world wide.

In my capacity as Chairman of the UAE Federal counter
proliferation team, we work towards combining the efforts of
local, regional and international community towards
countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) as well as delivery systems technology. This effort
can not be fruitful without the collective efforts of various
parties.

The UAE counter proliferation team realizes the importance of
coordinated work on this issue and it involves various
federal and local government bodies in the process to
maintain a unified approach to the issue. The support from
international partners and the cooperation of the local

community helped us to overcome a number of challenges.

On the local level, we have been working closely with
different government, semi-government and private
organizations to make sure that the UAE is not used to
facilitate the proliferation of WMD. Raising awareness of
the parties involved helped our efforts to deal with dual use
material. Through working closely with local authorities
involved in licensing, customs, security as well as private
companies and shipping subcontractors we managed to make them
active partners in our counter proliferation efforts.

On the global level, we have been working closely with a
number of countries and international organizations on
matters of exchange of information, capacity building, as
well as creating direct links to facilitate field operations.

I have to say that the progress so far achieved,
inconspicuous as it may be, is quite sizable and has global
effect. We remain determined to continue this effort by
engaging local community and in close cooperation with our
friends and allies.

Once again I would like to thank you for taking a step
towards building better understanding of counter
proliferation efforts by various bodies in the US. I hope
that will reinforce a tradition of transparency and close
coordination that is based on trust and confidence.

Sincerely,

Brigadier Mohamed Al Qemzi
Director of General Department of State Security

Talking Points


1. The UAE considers the USA as a major partner in the global
efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD, as well as a
strategic ally in the international effort to counter
proliferation.


2. The UAE has been very supportive of all the initiatives
that are geared to enhance counter proliferation efforts
including working closely with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA),and being a signatory to the NPT as
well as its interest in Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). Lately the UAE supported the spirit of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).


3. The UAE has been a front runner in supporting global
initiatives to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology, chemical and biological agents technology as well
as the proliferation of delivery systems for WMD.


4. The UAE is an active partner with many countries in
supporting efforts to counter proliferation including the UK,
Germany, Holland, South Africa, Australia, Japan, Singapore
the USA and other countries. It has been engaging in
knowledge transfer programs as well as establishing
mechanisms for exchanging information and intelligence.


5. The UAE authorities maintained a very active and dynamic
back channels between security apparatus counterparts. This
relationship stands witness to the extent of cooperation
between the two countries.


6. The UAE, and Dubai authorities have approved a special
unit for US Customs in Jabal Ali port as part of the
Container Security Initiative. The UAE was the first Middle
Eastern country to support the initiative.


7. The efforts of the Department of Commerce are honorable;
however it would be difficult to achieve full benefit without
the support of local authorities. Sentinel team would find
it difficult in receiving feedback from commercial entities
working in the UAE without legal justification for their
inquiries.


8. Visiting commercial entities operating legally in the UAWE
to conduct a check without prior coordination with the
authorities violates diplomatic conduct and breeches the
spirit of confidence and faith that has been the foundation
of the relationship between the UAE and the USA.


9. Any international task force, such as the sentinel team,
that does not seek the proper representation from local
authorities, would find its mission critically hindered due
to lack of legal justification since no entity is legally or
even morally obliged to respond. This is probably due to
lack of insight about the business culture in the UAE.
Therefore, it is natural companies and commercial entities
operating in the UAE would not accept to provide feedback or
respond to any entity that is not vetted by a government
authority within its jurisdiction.


10. The response rate of the end use checks could be
critically flowed (sic) and accordingly not suitable for
reference let alone as a basis for decision making regarding
this issue. Reaching accurate response rate would require
legal cover by UAE authorities that would allow business to
respond without exposing their business details to an
unvetted entity.


11. With the reference to Mayrow case, the U.A.E Authorities
recently has taken all the necessary steps to monitor the
companies activities, branches and its staff, in order to
take suitable decision against it. Assuring the U.A.E.
transparency in this respect, we disclosed full details of
all related companies to representatives' of the US Agencies.
In addition to the above, the U.A.E had taken a decisive
action against number of companies involved in proliferation
of WMD, and we shared this information with other friendly
countries that contribute in counter proliferation of WMD.


12. The global perspective of counter proliferation efforts
require the UAE to be an active partner with various entities
and therefore can not base its judgments and action on the
sole objective of protecting US businesses.


13. The scope of work required to clamp down on proliferation
of WMD is diverse and cannot be limited to commercial
aspects. There is effort done on intelligence gathering and
on raising awareness to develop a sustainable legal
environment and business culture to support counter
proliferation efforts on the long run.


14. While transporting US dual use technology to unverified
end use is a main concern, the UAE experience indicates that
there are real concerns regarding high tech industrial
technology from the Far East, East Europe, Europe and Russia.
Realistically, this would require a wide angel approach to
international collaboration.


15. Further actions that would put strict restriction on UAE
business may not have great impact on the UAE since UAE
exports to the USA represent only 1.7% of its total exports
while its imports from the USA represent 6% of total imports
according to 2004 statistics. However, the demoralizing
effect of these actions maybe more frustrating.


16. While proliferation related diversions remain to be a
global challenge, the UAE has been taking serious steps to
restrict and monitor proliferation networks in close
collaboration with various security entities in the world
including the CIA.


17. In the absence of bilateral agreements, between the UAE
and US, which provide internationally accepted criteria for
indicting violators of non-proliferation codes, it is
difficult to impose legal actions against suspected
commercial entities.


18. So far the UAE has been using various bureaucratic
channels with local and federal authorities to take action
against violators. To maintain these channels, until a legal
framework is established, prudence, cooperation and
confidence are required.


19. The UAE federal Counter Proliferation team will continue
to work to contribute towards global counter proliferation
efforts while the legal framework is being developed.


20. The UAE is sympathetic towards the interest of US
businesses; however the national security of the UAE is
clearly paramount in any action taken in this matter. In
this context actions that can be deemed hostile against a
certain nation can not be publicized nor celebrated.


21. Unilateral action against the UAE, remains to be the
decision of the US administration, but is consequences may
affect the bilateral relationship between the two countries
on various vital issues but would most adversely distract the
global effort to counter proliferation.


22. The legal framework in the UAE needs to be developed in a
manner that would take in consideration global accord on this
matter as well as the strategic interests of the local
community. There is no regionally established legal
framework which necessitate that the UAE considers its
forthcoming legal framework very carefully.


23. Officially, Issuing an ultimatum to the UAE regarding the
timing of its forthcoming legal framework represents as act
of interference in internal affairs of a friendly sovereign
country, and there will be no discussions regarding the
timing of issuing a UAE government law with any foreign
country.


24. On an unofficial level, the ultimatum disagrees with the
spirit of cooperation between the two countries and may
affect back channels of communication in sensitive issues.


25. The global effort to sustain world security should set
the wider context of maintaining the permanence of the UAE-US
relationship. In this spirit both parties will protect
bilateral relations and guarantee that back channels remain
open.

End text.

Comment
--------------


4. (S/NF) Al-Qemzi was clearly stung by ref B demarche. As
he noted in the "talking points," the UAE believes it is
cooperating with the USG and international community, having
endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Statement of Interdiction Principles, cooperated with U.S.
and other countries on exercises and training programs, and
by being the first Middle Eastern country to become a part of
the Container Security Initiative. In fact, on July 4 MFA
Director for International Organizations and Conferences
Yacoub al-Hosani agreed to allow the U.S. to publicize the
UAE's participation in the PSI (ref C). However, it is clear
that al-Qemzi has thus far failed to grasp fully the depth
and breadth of the USG concerns regarding Iran's WMD and
missile programs and the role that the UAEG must play in
countering Iran's efforts.


5. (S/NF) Al-Qemzi is likely feeling pressure on a host of
counterproliferation issues, as the chair of the UAE's
counterproliferation task force, and the go-to person for
several USG agencies on law enforcement and other
counterproliferation requests. However, UAE Vice
President/Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai Mohammed bin
Rashid al-Maktoum (MbR) -- to whom al-Qemzi reports --
curiously did not mention al-Qemzi's letter to Ambassador
during a meeting on July 1, nor did MbR push back on the
request for early passage of an export control law. In fact,
MbR stated, "We can make the law and control what we can,"
but he did not elaborate on a timeline for passing the law
(ref D).


6. (S/NF) Embassy and ConGen will continue to monitor UAE
compliance with our frequent requests for information,
action, and cooperation on specific transshipment,
interdiction, and front company cases. Ambassador will also
follow-up with ForMin Abdullah bin Zayed on the al-Qemzi
letter and reiterate the importance of robust and continued
U.S./UAE cooperation on counterproliferation matters.
SISON