AMBASSADOR KHALIZAD MEETS DEPUTY PM SHEIKH HAMDAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002633

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN EPET AF PK SO IR AE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALIZAD MEETS DEPUTY PM SHEIKH HAMDAN


Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: On June 15, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay
Khalilzad met with Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Hamdan bin
Zayed (HbZ) and urged the UAEG to engage the newly formed
government in Iraq. He also outlined USG support for PM
Maliki's goals of eliminating militias, and promoting
national reconciliation. HbZ welcomed the opportunity to
invite members of Iraq's government on official visits to the
UAE. HbZ also expressed interest in the UAE hosting an
energy sector conference for Iraqi participants, and restated
the UAEG's commitment to forgiving most of Iraq's debts,
noting that there was not yet GCC consensus on that issue.
HbZ reported that the UAEG was politically engaged in trying
to improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. HbZ
also expressed concern over the regional presence of Somali
illegal-aliens, noting that they may bring Islamic
fundamentalism with them to the UAE. End Summary.

2.(C) HbZ was accompanied by his chief of staff, Sultan
Al-Romeithy, and Colonel Hamad Al-Shamsi, State Security
Directorate. Ambassador Khalilzad was accompanied by
Ambassador Sison. Iyad Allawi accompanied Ambassador
Khalizad from Iraq and joined the meeting at its conclusion.

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Iraq Reconstruction/Reconciliation
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3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad briefed HbZ on the new Iraqi
government, noting that Iyad Allawi had just accepted the job
as Secretary General of the Policy Council the night before.
Khalilzad stated that there needs to be increased engagement
by Arab nations in order to counter Iran's influence. He
suggested that the UAEG invite Prime Minister Maliki and
others to make official visits to the UAE. HbZ agreed, but
noted that the UAEG had a "bad experience with Tarik
Al-Hashimi" during the recent hostage crisis involving UAE
diplomat Naji Al-Naoimi. HbZ stated that al-Hashimi failed
to return any calls from the UAEG, and that they had made at
least six attempts to contact him. (Note: HbZ extended a
telephone invitation to PM Malaki on June 16. End Note.)


4. (C) Khalilzad explained that the next six months were
critical in reconciling understanding between the government
and the insurgents, pointing out that there is an important
role for regional players to play in increasing the dialogue
and understanding between factions. Khalilzad told HbZ that
the disbanding of the militias is an essential part of the
reconciliation process. HbZ stated that the issue of
disbanding the militias is of "great concern to us," and
inquired what strategy is proposed.


5. (S) Khalilzad explained that in order for a DDR strategy
to work, resources would be needed. Colonel Hamad agreed
that the militias have to be eliminated, emphasizing the need
to remove "bad elements" from the Ministry of Interior at the
same time, in order to bring "any sense of control" over the
insurgents. Hamad noted that many Sunni had fallen into a
virtual warlord state, but suggested that the UAEG may have
an opportunity to play a significant role in calming the
insurgents by working through the Sunni alliance.


6. (S) HbZ added that the UAEG wants to be involved but
stressed the importance of there being a coordinated effort
within the "group of six" (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait,
Jordan, and Egypt). He stated that the UAEG has good
relations with the Shi'a councils from the south,
characterizing them as "nationalists." He suggested that
there be a collective effort to support them by helping them
establish television and radio stations, etc. HbZ agreed that
they could be a very effective influence, and that "We have
to concentrate on bringing Iraqi Shi'a nationalists into our
camp." Khalilzad replied that it was important to shift the
dialogue away from sectarian ties and that reconciliation
efforts must be framed as Sunni and Shi'a moderates against
the extremists. He re-emphasized the need to focus on a
reconciliation agenda. HbZ queried when provincial elections
would likely be held. Khalilzad briefed him on the issues
surrounding the timing of the elections.

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Economic Issues
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7. (C) Khalilzad requested UAEG assistance in encouraging
economic (especially oil industry) leaders, both regional and
international, to invest and work in Iraq, as Iraq needed to
sustain and expand oil production and exports. He outlined
the concept of an international compact for Iraq. He also
suggested that a conference might be beneficial and asked if
the UAE would host such an event. HbZ agreed, and promised
to confer with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed
(MbZ) in this regard. (He called Khalilzad the next day to
report that the Crown Prince had approved this idea.)

8. (C) Khalilzad urged the UAE to take the lead in the GCC on
the issue of Iraqi debt forgiveness, suggesting that the GCC
go at least as far as the Paris Club in forgiving Iraqi debt.
Without answering, HbZ inquired what Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
had committed to do. HbZ then added that the UAEG does not
have any problem with waving debt "in principle," noting that
the UAE had previously committed to former Secretary Baker to
waive most of the debt. However, "Saudi Arabia does not
agree with us on this issue." Khalilzad reported that he
recently had been in Doha, and that the Amir had proposed
forming a GCC-funded Iraqi Development Bank. Note: The
Qataris had mentioned USD 4 billion in GCC capital. HbZ
offered no comment on this proposal. End Note.

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Other Concerns ) Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia
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9. (S) HbZ told Khalilzad that UAE's efforts to mediate
between Afghanistan and Pakistan were on track. He said that
his brother, Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ),had
reported that the June 15 meetings between Karzai and
Musharraf had gone "very well." The two had agreed to "calm
the rhetoric" and to hold a meeting to coordinate
arrangements for "watching the borders." The Afghan and
Pakistani intel chiefs would meet later this week in Abu
Dhabi, he added. HbZ said that his brother had characterized
the Afghans as the "more rational and logical of the two
parties," after having met FS Khan and FM Spanta earlier that
day.


10. (C) Somalia: HbZ expressed concern that over 350 Somalis
had been caught in Oman recently, supposedly having transited
through Yemen. He stated that the UAEG is "very concerned
about them," noting that there are significant extremist
groups in Somalia, perhaps even active al-Qaeda cells, and
that these aliens may bring a brand of unwanted Islamic
fundamentalism with them.


11. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador
Khalilzad.
SISON