UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR REQUESTS TRAINING BEFORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002211

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR U/S SLEVEY, RLEBENSON, PHEFFERNAN, KHECHT
FBI FOR TFOS MMOREHART, FWAIKURT
DHS FOR ICE KDELACOLLI, JGALLION
MANAMA FOR JBEAL
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND, JZARATE, NSHAMPAINE, MMALVESTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2016
TAGS: PTER KTFN AE
SUBJECT: UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR REQUESTS TRAINING BEFORE
CASH COURIER OPERATION COMMENCES

REF: A. ABU DHABI 2081

B. STATE 68520

C. WALLRAPP-GALLION DHS/ICE TELECON DATED 5/30/06

D. 2005 STATE 208617

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. At the request of the Central Bank Governor,
Embassy's Joint Terror Finance Coordination Committee (JTFCC)
team met with the UAE's JTFCC team May 29 to discuss the
proposed U.S./UAE Cash Courier Operation. Although the
Ambassador had briefed the Governor on this operation during
the April 30 JTFCC meeting (ref A),the Governor requested
additional information. During the course of the meeting, it
became apparent that the UAE Central Bank had put the
operation (which had originally been scheduled to commence on
May 20) on hold because the Governor was concerned that the
U.S. was working directly with Dubai Customs -- vice the
federal authorities. At the end of the meeting, Ambassador
and team agreed to provide federal and emirate-level customs,
Central Bank, and airport authorities a cash courier seminar
on June 10. Following the seminar, the Ambassador requested
that the U.S. and the UAE identify three UAE airports and
launch the U.S./UAE Cash Courier Operation. The Governor
also reiterated his request for an MOU to formalize the
JTFCC. Action request for DHS/ICE contained in para 5. End
Summary.


2. (C) On May 29, Ambassador, accompanied by Econoff, LEGAT
(FBI),Regional Legal Advisor (DOJ-OPDAT),and Abu Dhabi and
Dubai DHS/ICE attaches, traveled to Dubai to meet with the
UAE's JTFCC team. The UAE side was chaired by Central Bank
Governor Sultan Nasser al-Suweidi. He was accompanied by
Brigadier Mohammed al-Qemzi, Director of Dubai's General
Department of State Security (GDSS); Ahmed bin Butti,
Chairman of Dubai Customs; Mohammed al-Muhairy, Director
General of the Federal Customs Authority (FCA); as well as
several mid-level Central Bank, GDSS, Dubai Customs, and FCA
officials. (Note: the GDSS was formerly called Dubai State
Security Organization (SSO). End note.)

Cash Courier Operation
--------------


3. (C) At the request of the Central Bank Governor,
Ambassador and the DHS/ICE attache Bill Wallrapp outlined the
details of the proposed U.S./UAE Cash Courier Operation.
Ambassador told the Governor that on April 19 she and
Wallrapp met with Sultan Bin Sulayem (SbS),Chairman of Dubai
Ports, Customs, and Free Zones, and proposed a joint
operation whereby DHS Customs officers would assist Dubai
Customs officers in targeting cash couriers knowingly trying
to evade the UAE's currency reporting requirements.
According to the proposal, DHS and Dubai Customs would
identify three daily high-risk flights to target for a period
of a week. DHS would then work with Dubai Customs to provide
technical assistance targeting manifested passengers and air
cargo of the identified flights. Ambassador noted that the
operation is designed to allow Dubai to take enforcement
actions against individuals who are actively and knowingly
evading UAE currency reporting requirements. Ambassador told
Al-Suweidi that SbS supported the operation, and within two
hours of the meeting, Dubai Customs also indicated it wanted
to proceed with the proposal. She also reminded the Governor
that during the April 30 JTFCC meeting, she had briefed him
on the basics of the operation. The Governor and FCA's
Al-Muhairy asked a number of questions about the specific
role of the U.S. authorities. Ambassador and Wallrapp
assured them that the DHS officers would be in an advisory
capacity, and that this would be Dubai Customs' operation.


4. (C) During the meeting it became apparent that in mid-May
the Central Bank Governor had forced the postponement of the
planned May 20 operation launch because he felt that Dubai
Customs was overstepping its bounds as an emirate-level
entity. Al-Suweidi remarked, "There is no U.S. bilateral
relationship with a state in the UAE's federation." After
laying the marker that the crux of the problem is the UAE's
long enduring federal/emirate power struggle, Al-Suweidi
identified a way forward. He noted that conducting this
operation only in Dubai airport leaves the other airports
vulnerable. He requested that the USG provide all of the
UAE's federal and emirate-level customs authorities with a

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training program on how to target manifested passengers on
high-risk flights, "so that we can harmonize and coordinate
at the federal level." Ambassador agreed that conducting the
operation in only one airport might facilitate the
"whack-a-mole" syndrome, whereby the smugglers shift their
operation to other airports. The two teams agreed to a
one-day seminar on June 10 in Dubai to educate the customs,
Central Bank, and airport authorities on how to conduct an
operation. Ambassador stressed that the purpose of the
seminar will be to develop the cash courier operation, which
should be implemented in at least three UAE airports as soon
as possible this summer. (Comment: Although the Central Bank
Governor did not commit to a date for the actual operation,
Embassy believes the upcoming June visit of Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism
(APHSCT) Fran Townsend will provide an excellent opportunity
to underscore the importance of this operation. End comment.)


5. (C) Action Request for DHS/ICE Financial Investigations:
Per ref C, DHS/ICE should send an ICE agent with a financial
background to participate in the operation, which Embassy
hopes will commence prior to the end of June. End action
request.

JTFCC MOU
--------------


6. (C) During both the Jan 24 and April 30 JTFCC meetings,
and during an April 22 meeting with EB A/S Tony Wayne in
Washington (ref B),Al-Suweidi requested a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between the two sides to "formalize" the
JTFCC. In the May 29 meeting, the Governor reiterated this
request. Al-Suweidi emphasized that an MOU would enable the
UAE to call the appropriate federal and emirate officials to
the JTFCC meetings without referring the matter to the UAE
ruling family leadership on each occasion. The Governor
stated that the MOU should be sent to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and that the MFA would determine which UAE body
should officially chair the JTFCC. Aware that APHSCT
Townsend plans to be in the UAE in late June, the Governor
requested a meeting with her to discuss the JTFCC.


7. (C) Comment. Although Embassy previously recommended
against an MOU, we believe that the Governor's repeated
requests and the basis for his argument merit a response.
Embassy will prepare a draft MOU and forward it septel for
interagency clearance. We believe the MOU should be general
and follow the outlines of the original JTFCC proposal (ref
D). It will state that the JTFCC is a
brainstorming/coordination committee that will meet two to
three times per year to discuss terrorist financing. It will
also explicitly state that the day-to-day contacts and
cooperation between various USG and UAEG agencies will
continue at the status quo. Embassy will prepare the MOU and
forward it to Washington by Monday, June 5, so there will be
time for review and comment in advance of APHSCT's June
visit. End comment.

SISON