Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUDHABI2126
2006-05-22 13:08:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
UAE: UPDATE ON SHUTTING DOWN ACTIVITIES OF
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002126
SIPDIS
NOFORN
NSC FOR DAVID STEPHENS, JOHN ROOD, FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN
ZAROKE
COMMERCE/BIS FOR DAS WYSONG, U/S MCCORMICK
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY
STATE FOR T, ISN, NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PTER IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE: UPDATE ON SHUTTING DOWN ACTIVITIES OF
COMPANIES ACQUIRING IED COMPONENTS
REF: A. STATE 67763
B. ABU DHABI 1836
C. ABU DHABI 1894
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 b and d.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002126
SIPDIS
NOFORN
NSC FOR DAVID STEPHENS, JOHN ROOD, FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN
ZAROKE
COMMERCE/BIS FOR DAS WYSONG, U/S MCCORMICK
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY
STATE FOR T, ISN, NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PTER IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE: UPDATE ON SHUTTING DOWN ACTIVITIES OF
COMPANIES ACQUIRING IED COMPONENTS
REF: A. STATE 67763
B. ABU DHABI 1836
C. ABU DHABI 1894
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S) SUMMARY. On May 22, Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah
bin Zayed (AbZ) asked for USG "patience" as UAE authorities
looked into Mayrow-associated company linkages within the UAE
and the Gulf region. AbZ reiterated several times that the
UAEG took the information provided by the USG "very
seriously" and was taking "all necessary steps" to
investigate the companies in question, identify the
individuals associated with them and the linkages among the
firms, shut the firms down, and prevent the reappearance of
such activities on UAE soil. He asked that the USG "not
place the UAE in an awkward situation" while such
investigations were underway. Three of the companies had
been shut down, and the USG would receive an update on the
remaining Mayrow-associated companies and individuals "in a
week or so." END SUMMARY.
2. (S) Embassy and ConGen have briefed federal and Dubai
Emirate senior officials on the urgent need for updated
information on actions taken to shut down the activities of
Mayrow and associated Dubai-based companies suspected of
acquiring IED components since the April 30 demarche to
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed and May 1 demarche to
Dubai State Security Director Mohammed al Qemzi (refs A, B).
3. (S/NF) The following summarizes Embassy and ConGen
actions and UAEG responses:
--On May 19 and 21, Ambassador spoke with Foreign Minister
Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ),emphasizing the need for updated
information on Mayrow and associated companies. On May 19,
she noted that three Dubai companies had been reported as
closed and another two as being "on the way" to being closed
(ref B). The status of the latter two, and that of two
others (Yaghmaie and Ghasir),remained unclear.
--On May 21, Ambassador reported to AbZ that there was USG
concern that Mayrow, or individuals associated therewith, had
continued to operate since the April 30/May 1 demarches. She
informed AbZ that Embassy and ConGen officers had contacted
State Security Dubai directly on the need for a status
report, and that information on actions taken against
specific individuals was important as these individuals
should not be permitted to relaunch their activities under
new company names. AbZ agreed to follow up with SSO Dubai.
He reiterated how seriously the UAEG took these reports,
especially in view of the UAE Special Force presence in
Afghanistan (250-strong).
--Per ref C, Dubai Customs agreed on May 6 to return a
shipment of components destined for Atlinx Electronics to the
United States and to enter Mayrow and associated companies
into its data base. On May 22, Dubai Customs Audit
Department informed DHS/ICE attach that Dubai Customs had
discovered that another shipment (digital components and
silicone) related to the May 6 seizure had been discovered.
This second shipment had arrived in Dubai on May 2 and was
subsequently released to Atlinx before Dubai Customs had
entered of Mayrow or associated companies its database (ref
C). Note: as of May 22, neither Dubai Customs nor DHS/ICE
attach has any information of subsequent U.S.
origin-shipments arriving in Dubai destined for Mayrow or
associated companies.
--On May 20, SIMO asked SSO for an update on SSO activities
against Mayrow and related companies and the individuals
associated with them. However, as of May 22, SSO has not yet
provided a response. Further details are being reported via
separate channel.
--Ambassador informed Foreign Minister AbZ May 22 afternoon
that -- although three companies have been reported as closed
-- the lack of updated information could well result in
public and media scrutiny of why two (and possibly more) of
the eight companies named in ref A demarche were still
apparently operating three weeks after federal and Dubai
authorities were notified of USG concerns. An hour later,
the Foreign Minister telephoned Ambassador to report that
details on the remaining five Mayrow-linked companies would
be provided "within a week or so." He requested Washington's
forbearance as the UAE authorities looked into
Mayrow-associated company linkages within UAE and the Gulf
region. AbZ reiterated several times that the UAEG took the
information provided by the USG "very seriously" and was
taking all necessary steps to investigate the companies in
question, identify the individuals associated with them and
the linkages among the firms, shut the firms down, and
prevent the reappearance of such activities on UAE soil. He
asked that the USG "not place the UAE in an awkward
situation" while such investigations were underway. He added
that "20 of the 24 Iranian companies in Dubai" of concern to
the U.S. and UAE had been closed.
SISON
SIPDIS
NOFORN
NSC FOR DAVID STEPHENS, JOHN ROOD, FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN
ZAROKE
COMMERCE/BIS FOR DAS WYSONG, U/S MCCORMICK
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY
STATE FOR T, ISN, NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PTER IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE: UPDATE ON SHUTTING DOWN ACTIVITIES OF
COMPANIES ACQUIRING IED COMPONENTS
REF: A. STATE 67763
B. ABU DHABI 1836
C. ABU DHABI 1894
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S) SUMMARY. On May 22, Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah
bin Zayed (AbZ) asked for USG "patience" as UAE authorities
looked into Mayrow-associated company linkages within the UAE
and the Gulf region. AbZ reiterated several times that the
UAEG took the information provided by the USG "very
seriously" and was taking "all necessary steps" to
investigate the companies in question, identify the
individuals associated with them and the linkages among the
firms, shut the firms down, and prevent the reappearance of
such activities on UAE soil. He asked that the USG "not
place the UAE in an awkward situation" while such
investigations were underway. Three of the companies had
been shut down, and the USG would receive an update on the
remaining Mayrow-associated companies and individuals "in a
week or so." END SUMMARY.
2. (S) Embassy and ConGen have briefed federal and Dubai
Emirate senior officials on the urgent need for updated
information on actions taken to shut down the activities of
Mayrow and associated Dubai-based companies suspected of
acquiring IED components since the April 30 demarche to
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed and May 1 demarche to
Dubai State Security Director Mohammed al Qemzi (refs A, B).
3. (S/NF) The following summarizes Embassy and ConGen
actions and UAEG responses:
--On May 19 and 21, Ambassador spoke with Foreign Minister
Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ),emphasizing the need for updated
information on Mayrow and associated companies. On May 19,
she noted that three Dubai companies had been reported as
closed and another two as being "on the way" to being closed
(ref B). The status of the latter two, and that of two
others (Yaghmaie and Ghasir),remained unclear.
--On May 21, Ambassador reported to AbZ that there was USG
concern that Mayrow, or individuals associated therewith, had
continued to operate since the April 30/May 1 demarches. She
informed AbZ that Embassy and ConGen officers had contacted
State Security Dubai directly on the need for a status
report, and that information on actions taken against
specific individuals was important as these individuals
should not be permitted to relaunch their activities under
new company names. AbZ agreed to follow up with SSO Dubai.
He reiterated how seriously the UAEG took these reports,
especially in view of the UAE Special Force presence in
Afghanistan (250-strong).
--Per ref C, Dubai Customs agreed on May 6 to return a
shipment of components destined for Atlinx Electronics to the
United States and to enter Mayrow and associated companies
into its data base. On May 22, Dubai Customs Audit
Department informed DHS/ICE attach that Dubai Customs had
discovered that another shipment (digital components and
silicone) related to the May 6 seizure had been discovered.
This second shipment had arrived in Dubai on May 2 and was
subsequently released to Atlinx before Dubai Customs had
entered of Mayrow or associated companies its database (ref
C). Note: as of May 22, neither Dubai Customs nor DHS/ICE
attach has any information of subsequent U.S.
origin-shipments arriving in Dubai destined for Mayrow or
associated companies.
--On May 20, SIMO asked SSO for an update on SSO activities
against Mayrow and related companies and the individuals
associated with them. However, as of May 22, SSO has not yet
provided a response. Further details are being reported via
separate channel.
--Ambassador informed Foreign Minister AbZ May 22 afternoon
that -- although three companies have been reported as closed
-- the lack of updated information could well result in
public and media scrutiny of why two (and possibly more) of
the eight companies named in ref A demarche were still
apparently operating three weeks after federal and Dubai
authorities were notified of USG concerns. An hour later,
the Foreign Minister telephoned Ambassador to report that
details on the remaining five Mayrow-linked companies would
be provided "within a week or so." He requested Washington's
forbearance as the UAE authorities looked into
Mayrow-associated company linkages within UAE and the Gulf
region. AbZ reiterated several times that the UAEG took the
information provided by the USG "very seriously" and was
taking all necessary steps to investigate the companies in
question, identify the individuals associated with them and
the linkages among the firms, shut the firms down, and
prevent the reappearance of such activities on UAE soil. He
asked that the USG "not place the UAE in an awkward
situation" while such investigations were underway. He added
that "20 of the 24 Iranian companies in Dubai" of concern to
the U.S. and UAE had been closed.
SISON