Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUDHABI2081
2006-05-20 07:40:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

U/S LEVEY CO-CHAIRS 2ND U.S./UAE JTFCC MEETING

Tags:  PTER KTFN PARM MCAP IR AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1556
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #2081/01 1400740
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 200740Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5217
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ABU DHABI 002081 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB A/S WAYNE, EB/ESC/TFS DNELSON, KLEAHEY,
NEA/ARP STHORNE, TREUTER, S/CT HCRUMPTON
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, PHEFFERNAN, RLEBENSON, KHECHT,
MEPSTEIN, ASZUBIN
FBI FOR FWAIKART, MMOREHART, MHUDSON, JHERRING
CIA FOR CTC/FINO
DHS FOR DHS/ICE, FINANCIAL AND TRADE INVESTIGATIONS,
KDELLACOLI, JGALLION
NSC FOR JZARATE, FTOWNSEND, MMALVESTI, NSHAMPAINE, MTAYLOR
MANAMA FOR JBEAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2016
TAGS: PTER KTFN PARM MCAP IR AE
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY CO-CHAIRS 2ND U.S./UAE JTFCC MEETING

REF: A. ABU DHABI 409

B. STATE 57203

C. STATE 62100

D. ABU DHABI 1409

E. STATE 209792

F. ABU DHABI 1887

G. ABU DHABI 440

H. STATE 68520

I. ABU DHABI 2080

J. ABU DHABI 1836

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, for reasons 1.4 b and d.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ABU DHABI 002081

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB A/S WAYNE, EB/ESC/TFS DNELSON, KLEAHEY,
NEA/ARP STHORNE, TREUTER, S/CT HCRUMPTON
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, PHEFFERNAN, RLEBENSON, KHECHT,
MEPSTEIN, ASZUBIN
FBI FOR FWAIKART, MMOREHART, MHUDSON, JHERRING
CIA FOR CTC/FINO
DHS FOR DHS/ICE, FINANCIAL AND TRADE INVESTIGATIONS,
KDELLACOLI, JGALLION
NSC FOR JZARATE, FTOWNSEND, MMALVESTI, NSHAMPAINE, MTAYLOR
MANAMA FOR JBEAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2016
TAGS: PTER KTFN PARM MCAP IR AE
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY CO-CHAIRS 2ND U.S./UAE JTFCC MEETING

REF: A. ABU DHABI 409

B. STATE 57203

C. STATE 62100

D. ABU DHABI 1409

E. STATE 209792

F. ABU DHABI 1887

G. ABU DHABI 440

H. STATE 68520

I. ABU DHABI 2080

J. ABU DHABI 1836

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary. The second meeting of the Joint Terrorist
Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi
April 30, 2006. The JTFCC was chaired on the UAE side by
Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser al-Suwaidi and on the
U.S. side by Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. Governor al-Suweidi
began the meeting by discussing the UAE's concern with Somali
remitters, including the UN-designated company Al Barakat.
He also expressed concern about how to differentiate between
"conduits" of terrorism financing and actual "terrorist
financiers." The UAE team agreed to study its charity
regulations to identify "loopholes" in its procedures. U/S
Levey again passed the paper on Human Appeal International
(HAI) to the Central Bank, Ministry of Social Affairs, and
Dubai State Security Organization. During the JTFCC, the UAE
delegation described its procedures for monitoring the flow
of cash into the country. Central Bank officials told the
U.S. delegation that the Bank is vulnerable to lawsuits for
freezing the funds of proliferators based solely on U.S.
requests. The two delegations agreed to hold the third JTFCC
meeting September 12 or 13, 2006. In separate meetings on
May 1, Dubai State Security Director discussed his

organization's "quiet" approach to preventing extremist
organizations from gaining a foothold in Dubai, and the
Chairman of Dubai Ports, Customs, and Free Zones told U/S
Levey that the international community needs to use both "the
carrot and the stick" against Iran. (For a readout of the
first JTFCC meeting, see ref A.)


2. (U) Summary continued. Action requests for Treasury and
State EB/TFS contained in para 17. End summary.

--------------
JTFCC
--------------


3. (S/NF) On April 30, the U.S./UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
Coordinating Committee met for the second time. The U.S.
delegation, led by Treasury Under Secretary for Financial
Crimes and Intelligence Stuart Levey, included David Nelson,
Director, Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions,
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs; Frank Waikart, FBI
Special Advisor; Joe Gallion, Financial Investigations
Section Chief, Department of Homeland Security, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (DHS/ICE); Matthew Epstein and
Kristen Hecht, Treasury Financial Analysts; Jason Beal,
Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Attache;
Ambassador; DHS/ICE Attache; Legat; SIMO Deputy Chief; and
Acting Econ Chief. The UAE delegation, led by Central Bank
Governor Sultan Nasser al-Suweidi, included officials from
the Central Bank's Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases
Unit; the UAE Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and
Social Affairs; the federal State Security Department; the
Dubai State Security Organization; the Dubai Department of
Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities (DDIA); and Dubai
Customs.

Al-Barakat
--------------

4. (C) After opening remarks, al-Suweidi began the
substantive discussions with a question about Somali hawala
dealers (hawaladars) and the designated Somali remitter, Al

ABU DHABI 00002081 002 OF 007


Barakat. He said that during his recent trip to London, UK
officials expressed concern about money flowing from Europe
through UAE hawaladars to Somalia. Matt Epstein told the UAE
delegation that the U.S. remains concerned about certain
Somali hawaladar networks that continue to operate
internationally, including in the United States. Al-Suweidi
noted that the Central Bank has maintained its freeze on Al
Barakat accounts in the UAE, but that they are finding other
ways to transfer money. Al-Suweidi and U/S Levey agreed that
it would be useful for the UAE, UK, and U.S. meet jointly to
discuss this issue. U/S Levey said the USG would come
prepared with specific information that could be shared with
the UAE and the UK.


5. (C) Abdulrahim al-Awadi, Executive Director and In-Charge
of the Central Bank's Anti Money Laundering and Suspicious
Cases Unit (AMLSCU),told the U.S. delegation that one of the
UAE-based Al Barakat operatives whose assets were frozen
continues to proclaim innocence, and has provided invoices
demonstrating that the cash was used to purchase legitimate
construction equipment for shipment to Somalia. Al-Awadi
said that the UAE needs assistance from the U.S. in
determining which individuals are "legitimate and which are
wrongdoers." He requested U.S. assistance in reviewing the
individuals on a case by case basis to identify the innocent.


6. (S) Al-Awadi said that when the Central Bank froze the
UAE-based Al Barakat accounts, the UAE asked the U.S. to
coordinate with the UAE's security forces to apprehend the
individuals, although this has never happened. According to
the Central Bank Governor, "We want you to take the people
away. As far as we can tell, they have financed terrorism,
but what can we do? Our authorities are happy to give them
to you." U/S Levey explained that if the UAE is unable to
prosecute these individuals for financing terrorism, it is
still important to freeze their accounts to prevent them from
operating. (Note: The UAE's law criminalizing terrorist
financing was passed in August 2004, after the Al Barakat
accounts were frozen. Thus, the UAE is unable to use this
law to prosecute the individuals involved. End note.)


7. (C) At the conclusion of the discussion on Somalia
remitters and Al Barakat, al-Suweidi requested a paper
explaining the difference between terrorist financers and the
"conduits" who simply transmit the money. He asked that the
paper contain a description of the different penalties
involved for each (i.e., prosecution versus fines and/or
closure). Al-Suweidi added that if al-Barakat is only a
conduit, then the Emiratis need to know, so this information
can be passed to the judicial system, because the Central
Bank would like to drop the case.

Charities
--------------

8. (C) Prior to the JTFCC meeting, U/S Levey and the
delegation met with Hussein al-Sheikh, special advisor on
charities to the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA). U/S Levey
and al-Sheikh discussed the U.S. interagency paper on charity
regulations prepared for the JTFCC meeting (ref B).
Al-Sheikh noted that the UAE constitution delegates certain
authorities (like the ability to license and regulate
non-profit organizations) to each of the UAE's seven
emirates. The federal MSA licenses charities in Abu Dhabi
and those that operate outside of their "home" emirate.
Al-Sheikh told U/S Levey that the MSA does not have any
authority over charities licensed by local municipalities.
In response to U/S Levey's question about who monitors the
disbursement money, al-Sheikh said that the Central Bank
does. Al-Sheikh also reported that charities must either
send money oversees through the UAE Red Crescent, or obtain
MSA's approval in order to send money abroad, but he was
unable to say how the Ministry or the Central Bank enforces
this requirement. He did note, however, that most of the
charities licensed by MSA fund local, vice international,
causes.

ABU DHABI 00002081 003 OF 007




9. (C) U/S Levey told al-Sheikh of the USG's concern about
the Ajman-licensed charity Human Appeal International (HAI)
and passed him a copy of the paper that had been prepared for
the January JTFCC meeting. Al-Sheikh said that the MSA has
no authority to monitor or investigate HAI's international
transfers, and that such authority lies with the Ministry of
Interior, state security, and the Ministry of Justice.
Recognizing the vulnerability posed by the emirate-level
licensing and monitoring system, al-Sheikh recommended
discussing this issue at the JTFCC and noted, "It would be
good if the committee recommended an amendment to the federal
law." (Note: In a recent meeting between Ambassador and the
Central Bank Governor, al-Suweidi told Ambassador that he
thought the UAE should require that all international charity
transactions be subject to MSA oversight, regardless of which
entity licenses the organization. Ref D.)


10. (C) At the JTFCC meeting, al-Sheikh began the charities
discussion by observing that the federal MSA's regulations
regarding charitable organizations are in-line with the
FATF's Best Practices Paper on Charity Regulation and the
Interpretive Note, and with the MENAFATF's Best Practices
Paper on Charity Regulation. U/S Levey agreed that the
federal regulations are strong, but he queried whether
municipalities applied the same guidelines to the locally
licensed charities. Al-Sheikh responded that the framework
of the federal laws should be applied to the locally licensed
charities. He also said that although local governments
license and regulate the organizations, "for sending money
abroad, I thought they are regulated by the Central Bank."
Al-Suweidi replied that the Central Bank had issued
regulations stating that charities cannot open bank accounts
without approval of the MSA. When Ambassador observed that
the USG is also interested in knowing which body has the
ability to enforce the regulations, al-Suweidi replied that
local authorities must go to the Ministry for a license in
order to open a bank account. He said that if a charity is
unable to get the license, it cannot open an account, and
"what is the point of a charity with no account?" (Comment:
Embassy notes that the Central Bank should be involved in
more than just ensuring that only licensed charities open
accounts. It also must be involved in monitoring the
transactions of charities. The Central Bank's regulation
states only that no financial institution may open an account
unless it presents an MSA license. It does not stipulate
that the account cannot transfer money outside of the
country. The requirement that international transactions go
through the UAE Red Crescent is a 1999 amendment to the 1974
Charities law. End comment.)


11. (S) Raising HAI, U/S Levey asked which entity is
responsible for monitoring where a charity's money goes and
to ensure it is not diverted. Answering, al-Suweidi said
"That responsibility falls on the board members of the
charity and the local government." Al-Awadi told the
delegation that the members of HAI's board are "very honest,
with no bad associations. I am sure if there are any
violations, that if the Ministry takes it to the board, they
will take action promptly." U/S Levey responded that, while
it is possible that the board is unaware of HAI's illicit
activities, it is important to investigate the matter fully.
Al-Sheikh said that MSA would examine the HAI paper, discuss
it with the Ajman municipality and the Central Bank, and
determine what action should be taken. (Comment: Although
al-Sheikh committed to consult with the Ajman municipality,
the MSA does not have the authority to take any action. As
al-Sheikh observed during the earlier meeting, such authority
lies with the Ministry of Interior, the federal State
Security Department, and the Ministry of Justice. End
comment.)


12. (S/NF) U/S Levey stressed that he is not only interested
in HAI, but that he is also concerned about the UAE's
decentralized charity monitoring regime in general,

ABU DHABI 00002081 004 OF 007


particularly as it relates to charities' international
contributions. The representative from the federal State
Security Department (SSD) said that local charities are not
allowed to transfer money abroad, but that they are supposed
to donate in the form of in-kind aid or project assistance.
These activities are subject to approval by the local
authorities and state security. He said that when a UAE
charity wants to work abroad, SSD conducts an internal check
on the charity and checks with the security services of the
recipient country. If SSD determines that either the
donating or recipient charity has questionable connections,
then it does not authorize the organization to work
internationally. The SSD representative said the UAE would
prepare a paper describing the process for sending money
abroad. Agreeing that this was a good idea, al-Suweidi told
U/S Levey that the UAE would coordinate a paper discussing
the UAE's interagency system. He also noted that the UAE
team would "examine the loopholes and see how to address
them." (Note: On May 6, Acting Econchief spoke with Sami
al-Gargash, of the Dubai Department of Islamic Affairs and
Charitable Activities (DDIA). Al-Gargash, who attended the
meeting, said he was very frustrated that the MSA
representative did not mention that Dubai has its own system
to monitor charities. He said that he wrote a letter to the
Central Bank Governor requesting that the UAE team hold a
coordination meeting in advance of the next JTFCC meeting, so
that the UAE teams can better prepare and coordinate what
they will discuss. End note.)

Cash Couriers
--------------

13. (C) The UAE began the discussion of cash couriers by
providing a copy of a paper al-Awadi prepared for the recent
EU/Gulf Cooperation Council meeting in Brussels. Al-Awadi
provided a briefing on the paper. The paper outlined the
UAE's requirement to declare imported cash over 40,000
dirhams (approximately $10,900),and it noted that customs
authorities may seize undeclared funds and refer cases to the
attorney general for investigation and possible prosecution.
The paper also described customs inspection techniques, such
as passenger screening and technical inspection of luggage
and freight. Al-Awadi reported that the UAE recently placed
signs in its international airports notifying passengers of
the cash reporting requirement. Governor al-Suweidi observed
that even though the UAE law does not include reporting
requirements for outbound cash, customs machines scan
outgoing baggage for substantial amounts of cash. Al-Suweidi
told the U.S. delegation that at the point of entry,
individuals are asked to declare their cash. If they do not
declare money, but the machines identify that they have cash,
then customs officers search the individuals. In response to
a question about procedures at the land borders, the SSD
representative said that they check all incoming luggage, and
they do not allow people to carry cash over the border in
excess of 40,000 dirhams. "If we find money, then we call
the Saudi authorities. We turn him back with the money and
require him to send it via a bank," he said.


14. (S) Ambassador briefed the UAE delegation on the recently
proposed joint tactical cash courier operation between Dubai
Customs and DHS/ICE. Ambassador noted that the USG is
pleased that Sultan Bin Sulayem, Chairman of Dubai Ports,
Customs, and Free Zones, was fully supportive of the proposed
May operation targeting high-risk incoming flights for
search. Ambassador also reported that she had briefed the
operation to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed
al-Nahyan and UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed
al-Nahyan and that they had supported the idea.


15. (C) Governor al-Suweidi requested a paper describing how
our customs officers monitor the U.S. land border. He asked
that the paper identify any difference in approaches at the
Mexican versus Canadian borders. Waikart said that the FBI
would discuss this issue with the UAEG during upcoming
training. Governor al-Suweidi also asked about drug money

ABU DHABI 00002081 005 OF 007


and how it is smuggled into the United States. U/S Levey
told al-Suweidi that the U.S. interagency had recently
published a paper on how money is laundered in the United
States. (Note: On May 8, Embassy provided a copy of this
paper to the UAE Central Bank. End note.)

Proliferation Finance
--------------

16. (S/NF) In a pre-meeting between U/S Levey, the Central
Bank Governor, and al-Awadi, and during the JTFCC meeting,
al-Awadi raised concerns about the Central Bank being
vulnerable to lawsuits by individuals whose accounts have
been frozen at the request of the USG. Al-Awadi again
requested indemnification, but U/S Levey said the USG would
not be able to indemnify the UAE Central Bank. (Comment:
This is the first time any Central Bank official has raised
the indemnification issue since Ambassador delivered U/S
Joseph's letter outlining the UAE's obligations under UNSCR
1540 in November (ref E). A separate U.S. delegation held
the Counterproliferation Task Force Working Group on
Proliferation Finance on May 1 with Central Bank officials,
and al-Awadi raised this issue in considerable detail - ref

F. End comment.) The Emiratis provided a document detailing
Dina Khan's frozen assets in the UAE. Al-Suweidi was adamant
that the UAEG does not have sufficient evidence to maintain
the freeze, and he said the Central Bank is continuing to
receive documentation (in the form of affidavits) from her
lawyers indicating that her funds did not come from her
father.

Action Items, Next Meeting
--------------

17. (C) At the conclusion of the JTFCC, the U.S. and UAE
delegations agreed to hold the third meeting either September
12 or 13, 2006 in Abu Dhabi.

-- Action Request for Treasury, State EB/TFS/ESC: please
discuss the possibility of coordinating a meeting between the
UAE, UK, and U.S. to discuss the issue of Somali hawaladars
(see para 4).

-- Action Request for Treasury: please prepare and seek
interagency approval on a "conduit versus financier" paper
for passage to the UAE at, or before, the next JTFCC meeting
(see para 7).

-------------- --------------
Dubai State Security Chief On Countering Extremism
-------------- --------------


18. (S) On May 1, U/S Levey and the delegation met with
Dubai's General Department of State Security (GDSS) Chief
Mohammed al-Qemzi. (Note: the GDSS was formerly called Dubai
State Security Organization (SSO). End note.) U/S Levey,
who met al-Qemzi in January and passed him a copy of the
paper on HAI (ref G),asked for an update on the
organization. Al-Qamzi reported that HAI's license for its
Dubai office will not be renewed, and he said that the GDSS
had alerted the federal SSD about the office's closure.
Al-Qemzi observed that he is worried about HAI's connections
to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB),adding that the MB is
committed to collecting money for Hamas, as directed by the
MB Supreme Guide Mohammed Akef. However, he noted that since
HAI is licensed in Ajman, the GDSS can not take any action
against the charity's headquarters. Al-Qemzi said that Dubai
has a policy that any MB-linked organization will be closed.
However, he said that since "the charity is not designated by
the UN, the judicial authorities cannot prosecute." He noted
that one of the biggest challenges in investigating charities
is that they tend to not send money directly to terrorists,
but rather they send money to other charities which then hand
the money to terrorists.


19. (S) Turning to a more general discussion of the Muslim
Brotherhood and countering extremism, al-Qemzi asked for the

ABU DHABI 00002081 006 OF 007


USG's view on MB. U/S Levey responded that the USG tries to
differentiate between its organizations that support violence
and organizations that do not. Matt Epstein added that the
USG has designated some specific MB entities in Kuwait and
Bosnia for their direct support to terrorism. Al-Qemzi said
that he views the MB as a unified movement that directs its
associated organizations. "If we don't act today using the
tools we have, then we won't have enough tools in the future
to stop them," he said. Al-Qemzi said that the GDSS's
approach to countering the MB's influence is to try to
isolate them; he said that a person's connection with the MB
was "enough" to disqualify him from holding a senior UAEG
position. Al-Qemzi said that the GDSS is aware that the MB
has tried to "hijack" charities and force them to contribute
to the MB's causes. He said that when Dubai restructured its
board responsible for monitoring charitable activities (DDIA)
in 2005, it "killed" the MB's effectiveness. When the DDIA
reviews the license application for any charity organization,
it reviews the organization's board of directors and vets
whether they have any ties to the MB or other extremist
organizations. Al-Qemzi said that Dubai's strategy is to
isolate the extremists by keeping them out of important
positions and preventing them from recruiting youth into
their movement. He reported that he has had good support for
this policy from the Ruler of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid
al-Maktoum, who "understands the MB's threat." Al-Qemzi also
complained about MB organizations operation in Europe that
served as conduits for MB funds. After the meeting, al-Qemzi
offered to provide a list of these organizations to U.S
Levey. Treasury also requested a copy of an MB presentation
al-Qemzi said he presented to Dubai Ruler Mohammed Bin Rashid
Al Maktoum.


20. (S) In response to U/S Levey's question about whether
there might be a way to de-legitimize them via a public
campaign, al-Qemzi said that it would be difficult because
the MB is strong and has already penetrated "many governments
and international bodies." He also said that he thought the
MB would find loopholes around any public approach. Al-Qemzi
said that Dubai tries to quietly offer an alternative --
particularly for the youth -- by providing government-funded
activities and clubs. "We strive to create competition with
the MB and other extremist organizations by giving children
other opportunities," said al-Qemzi.


21. (S/NF) Treasury representative Matt Epstein asked
al-Qemzi for his views on Muhammed bin Surur Zain al-Abideen
and his MB spin-off organization known as Sururiyya.
Al-Qemzi stated that GDSS considers Surur a terrorist and
Sururiyya a terrorist organization. Al-Qemzi offered that
the Sururis are extreme like Takfiri, but well organized like
the MB. He was not aware of a significant Sururi presence in
Dubai.


22. (S/NF) U/S Levey asked for an update on the status of
terrorist financier al-Shamsi. Al-Qemzi reported that
al-Shamsi is still being monitored by the GDSS, cannot travel
outside of the country, and cannot have any involvement with
any of his businesses. Al-Qemzi reported that al-Shamsi has
shared all of the information he has on the terrorist
networks with which he was associated. U/S Levey reiterated
that designating al-Shamsi would be a good way to hold
al-Shamsi accountable for his actions and provide a deterrent
to others.

-------------- --------------
Chair of Dubai Ports, Customs On Re-exporting to Iran
-------------- --------------


23. (C) In a May 1 meeting with Sultan bin Sulayem (SbS),
Executive Chairman of Dubai Ports, Customs, and Free Zone,
U/S Levey thanked SbS for his support in the joint cash
courier operation that would begin in early May. SbS agreed
that it was an excellent initiative. He said that Dubai has
noticed that certain nationalities -- like the Russians --

ABU DHABI 00002081 007 OF 007


are often "embarrassed" to declare their cash. He also said
that there have been problems with Russians and Pakistanis
bringing counterfeited currency into the UAE. SbS reported
that Dubai Customs is working to counter these problems, and
that things like the proposed U.S./UAE cash courier operation
will facilitate their efforts. SbS said that although there
are no x-rays along the land borders, they are in the process
of being installed. He reported that while Dubai customs
officials used to search for illegal pornography or liquor,
they now concentrate on finding "dangerous items" like drugs
and weapons. "The peace and safety in Dubai is earned.
Dubai Police, Customs, and GDSS all work hard to ensure that
it is maintained," he said.


24. (S) During a discussion about Iran's proliferation
efforts, SbS told U/S Levey that Dubai Customs has employed a
former GDSS officer to monitor companies in the free zones.
He said they have a list of materials of concern, and they
are "watching" to see who is importing those items. SbS told
U/S Levey that Dubai is willing to close Iranian front
companies, but he emphasized that Dubai needs more
information from the USG on companies of concern. He said
that Dubai tries to ensure that the companies do not
continually re-open under new names, but he acknowledged that
it is a difficult task. U/S Levey provided SbS with a copy
of Executive Order 13382, which identifies Iranian and North
Korean front companies associated with proliferation
activities.


25. (C) In a general discussion about Iran, SbS observed that
Ahmadinejad is very popular among the Iranian people.
Because of the smart diplomacy Ahmadinejad is conducting
among his own people, SbS opined that it will be more
difficult for the international community to act against him.
"You need to show the carrot and the stick," he observed.
SbS also observed that Iran is dependent on Dubai as a source
of food and other necessities, "People buy at the markets
here, put the items on the dhows, and take them to Iran.
Without Dubai, the Iranian people would have a more difficult
time getting the things they need."

--------------
Comment
--------------


26. (C) The Central Bank Governor expressed to officials in
Washington during his April visit that he would like for the
U.S. and the UAE to sign an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
to "formalize" the JTFCC (ref H). Embassy does not/not
recommend entering into an MOU with the Central Bank. If the
Governor continues to request an MOU, Embassy requests
Washington consider drafting a very general document that
only commits the two countries to meeting two to three times
per year in order to discuss issues of mutual concern
regarding terrorist financing. It should state that the UAE
side will be represented by federal and Dubai authorities,
and that the U.S. side will be comprised of representatives
from appropriate agencies. An MOU should not/not be an
attempt to delineate or "formalize" interactions in between
JTFCC meetings. It is essential that the day-to-day contacts
between various USG and UAEG agencies continue at the status
quo. End comment.


27. (C) U/S Levey's meeting with Foreign Minister Abdullah
bin Zayed al-Nahyan will be reported septel (ref I). U/S
Levey's discussions with Dubai General Department of State
Security Director al-Qemzi regarding Mayrow and its
associated Iranian front companies purchasing components for
improvised explosive devices were reported in ref J.


28. (U) U/S Levey cleared on this cable.
SISON