Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUDHABI1797
2006-05-03 11:47:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILLEN'S VISIT

Tags:  PREL MCAP MARR MASS MNUC IR AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2197
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #1797/01 1231147
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031147Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4853
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 6085
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001797 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM -- A/S HILLEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016
TAGS: PREL MCAP MARR MASS MNUC IR AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILLEN'S VISIT
TO THE UAE

REF: A. ABU DHABI 1422

B. ABU DHABI 316

C. ABU DHABI 288

D. USDAO IIR 6 931 0090 05

ABU DHABI 00001797 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001797

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM -- A/S HILLEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016
TAGS: PREL MCAP MARR MASS MNUC IR AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILLEN'S VISIT
TO THE UAE

REF: A. ABU DHABI 1422

B. ABU DHABI 316

C. ABU DHABI 288

D. USDAO IIR 6 931 0090 05

ABU DHABI 00001797 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (S) Summary: Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming
you to the UAE on May 15-16. Your visit will be an
opportunity to build on recent Iran discussions between U.S.
and UAE officials, particularly Under Secretary for Arms
Control and International Security Joseph's April 8 meeting
with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed about
Iran's proliferation and a new security dialogue on defensive
measures. You will want to elaborate on deterrence and
dissuasion measures to deter Iran from acquiring or using
Weapons of Mass Destruction by creating a layered missile
defense system. Also, it would be helpful to engage your
hosts in a more comprehensive discussion about strategic air
defense systems, to include Patriot Missile and Air Defense,
Aegis cruiser, Airborne Laser, and Theater High Altitude Air
Defense. We have requested meetings for you with Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed
Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, and UAE Armed Forces Chief
of Staff Lt. Gen. Hamad Mohammed Thani al-Rumaithy. End
Summary.


2. (S/NF) When U/S Joseph visited Abu Dhabi, he emphasized
that the United States considers Iran a serious threat to
international peace and security, and that the USG will not
tolerate Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon (ref A).
Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) replied that
the UAE also considers Iran a threat, but he noted that the
UAE's close proximity to Iran put the country in a
"vulnerable" position. He also stated that the UAE aims to
maintain its robust trading relationship with Iran as a

measure to enhance UAE security. Highlighting the UAE,s
dilemma, AbZ requested that the USG approach the UAE on
interdiction requests "only as a last resort." U/S Joseph
conveyed to AbZ that he hoped to engage in a dialogue with
our key allies, including the UAE, to develop a broader
strategy for countering the threat. He outlined multilateral
diplomatic efforts, including targeted sanctions, which could
be taken against Iran in the event Iran is unresponsive to
the UNSC. In conjunction with these efforts, U/S Joseph
conveyed the USG's interest in beginning a security dialogue
on defensive measures with the UAE and other Gulf countries.


3. (S/NF) U/S Joseph told AbZ that security capabilities that
Gulf countries could consider to counter the Iranian threat
and enhance deterrence include counter proliferation planning
to prepare for the possible use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) by enhancing bilateral and multilateral
training and exercises (this could include consequence
management training and counter-ballistic missile exercises);
denial and interdiction of proliferation efforts, such as
cracking down on front companies and endorsing the
Proliferation Security Initiative,s Statement of
Interdiction Principles (UAE gave its private endorsement
April 15); and deterrence and dissuasion to deter Iran from
acquiring or using WMD by creating a layered missile defense
system. AbZ listened with interest but made no commitments.
(Note: AbZ will be attending the GCC-EU Foreign Ministers
meeting in Brussels during your visit. End Note.)

Missile Defense
--------------


4. (S/NF) In your meetings, we suggest that you have a more
comprehensive discussion with your hosts about the various
strategic systems, to include Patriot, Aegis, Airborne Laser,
and Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD). U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Abizaid and AbZ's older
brother, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
(MbZ),discussed the concept of a regional missile defense
shield March 27. MbZ was skeptical about getting other Gulf
Cooperation Council members on board in a campaign against
Iran.


5. (S/NF) U/S Joseph also pursued the missile defense system
theme in his discussion with AbZ April 8. AbZ appeared
skeptical about the Patriot system's effectiveness. U/S
Joseph mentioned encouraging results from recent
anti-ballistic missile tests and explained that the defensive
measures do not have to be 100 percent accurate; they just
need to be "credible enough" to deter Iran by convincing them
that the effectiveness of their offensive measures had been
eroded.

ABU DHABI 00001797 002.2 OF 004



Patriots vs. Russian S-300/S-400s
--------------


6. (S/NF) As a point of fact, Raytheon Company, Patriot Air
and Missile Defense System's manufacturer, has been trying
for 10 years to get the UAE to purchase the Patriot without
getting any traction. According to a Raytheon source, after
the fall of the Soviet Union, the UAEG loaned more than $1
billion to Russia to help with debt relief. Russia is
reportedly developing and attempting to field the S-300 air
defense system and its follow-on S-400 system to satisfy the
debt. This could explain why the UAE has been reluctant to
purchase another air defense system, such as the Patriot.
Moreover, the Emiratis are aware of U.S. interest in placing
our own Patriots on their soil to protect U.S. deployed
military troops and assets. Our reasons for urging the
Emiratis to consider acquiring Patriots are that they would
allow better interoperability (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have
purchased Patriots),which a Russian air defense system would
not. But, also, U.S. strategic Patriot systems may be
employed to other hot spots around the world and not
available for emirate protection.

Protection of U.S. Assets: Patriot Emplacement Survey
-------------- --------------

7. (S/NF) At CENTCOM's direction, and with Directorate for
Military Intelligence permission, U.S. Army missile defense
experts traveled to the UAE to conduct an air defense
assessment. Previous Patriot emplacement locations in the
UAE were focused against the Iraqi threat. The new surveys,
completed April 19, identified six new Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 emplacement locations to deter the Iranian
missile threat. They would protect U.S. military interests
at Al Dhafra Air Base, Al Bateen Air Base, Minhad Air Base,
Fujairah Airport, Jebel Ali Port, and Fujairah Port, and much
of the surrounding metropolitan areas of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.


Aegis Cruiser
--------------


8. (S/NF) U/S Joseph and AbZ also discussed the capability of
the Aegis cruiser-based missile interceptor and the Patriot
missile systems. AbZ seemed interested in the possibility of
deterring Iran with regionally-deployed Aegis combatants,
although he appeared concerned that an Aegis capability might
not be enough given the short distance between Iran and the
UAE. The UAE does not have Aegis ships, nor have they
expressed any interest in acquiring them (although the UAE
Navy may be very interested in learning more about their
capabilities). U/S Joseph and AbZ did not discuss THAAD or
Airborne Laser.

UAE Within Striking Distance
--------------


9. (S/NF) Iran conducted its "Noble Prophet" military
exercise in March/April 2006, the largest Iranian exercise to
date, involving surface ships, aircraft, submarines, and
UAVs. During the highly publicized exercise, the Iranians
demonstrated new weapons systems and techniques, apparently
to demonstrate to the U.S. and the Iranian public, as well as
their regional neighbors, their military capability and
proficiency. Last year, Iran reportedly test fired rockets
from Sirri Island, and rocket equipment was being deployed to
the disputed, Iranian-held islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs,
as well as Sirri. The rockets are capable of reaching most
UAE cities (ref D).

UAE Boosts Surveillance of Iranians, Extremists
-------------- --


10. (S/NF) We know that the Emiratis are ramping up their own
surveillance activities, especially targeting Iran and
Islamic extremists. Their Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI) had between 50 and 60 personnel conducting
"electronic surveillance" four years ago, a number that has
soared to more than 900 personnel today, with additional
personnel and co-location of other units capabilities. Many
of the surveillance functions from other agencies in the
different emirates were aggregated under DMI.

Critical Infrastructure Protection
--------------


11. (S/NF) The UAE has somewhat belatedly begun to recognize
the vulnerability of their offshore oil infrastructure. MbZ

ABU DHABI 00001797 003.2 OF 004


told Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, on 22 April that the
UAE was "absolutely" worried about its oil infrastructure.
He told Townsend that there are three international companies
currently conducting risk assessments of the UAE oil
infrastructure and maritime security for the UAEG. The UAE
Navy for thefirst time ever included a maritime oil platform
(OPLAT) defense scenario in an exercise with the US Fifth
Fleet in February 2006. The Fifth Fleet is also working with
the UAE Navy now to establish an OPLAT defense Standard
Operating Procedure, and has offered to take UAE Navy
representatives to Iraqi OPLATs to see how the coalition
handles command and control for OPLAT defense.

Robust Political-Military Relationship
--------------


12. (C) Iran-related security concerns are but a facet of the
U.S.-UAE bilateral political-military relationship. The UAE
has continued its excellent support in the war on terror and
it has cooperated with us in Afghanistan and in Iraq. This
cooperation is described in detail in the 2005/2006 Report to
Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (ref
C). The UAE provides basing and overflight for U.S.
reconnaissance and refueling assets, as well as naval
logistics support. The F-16 Block 60 program is a showcase
of cooperation between our nations. The UAE has taken
delivery of 59 F-16 aircraft (one was lost in a mishap on
January 9, 2006). There are U.S. pilots and training
professionals here that are core instructors for the program.
Another example of our expanding military cooperationis the
Air Warfare Center at Al Dhafra Air Base. Modeled on the
U.S. Air Force Air Warfare Centerat Nellis AFB, NV, and the
NATO Tactical Leadersip Program at Florennes, Belgium, this
regional acility is intended to enhance military
interopeability and cooperation between the U.S. and membes
of the GCC, Egypt, Jordan, and UK and France. In the future,
the U.S. plans to help the UAE develop a state-of-the-art
tactical range, incorporate USN and USMC assets as
participants, and use tankers (USAF and others) for
air-to-air refueling.

Weapons Acquisition
--------------


13. (S) The UAE has historically obtained its military
hardware from assorted partners, including the U.S., France,
the U.K., Russia, and China. We would prefer that they
mostly buy from us for interoperability reasons, and we
believe they, too, prefer to buy American quality. However,
it is not always clear to us that there is a strategic vision
behind their acquisitions. A case in point is the weaponry
situation within the UAE naval forces, which appears
disorganized. It would be useful to know more about their
naval capabilities, particularly in light of the Iranian
threat; therefore we recommend that you ask your military
interlocutor about this.


14. (S) Following are some of the most prominent cases the
United States Liaison Office is managing:

-- Four-year remanufacture of 30 Apache AH-64A attack
helicopters to a AH-64D "Longbow" configuration; $745 million
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case; the first six aircraft
have been shipped to Mesa, Arizona for refurbishment by
Boeing. (Note: UAE Apaches were deployed to Kosovo in 1999
under the Joint Command, and later deployed to Kuwait during
the Gulf War. End Note.)

-- Impending purchase of 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System (HIMARS) and 780 complementing Army Tactical Missile
System (ATACMS) rounds; $800 million FMS case; meeting in
Washington May 1-4 to discuss the scope of the sale with UAE
Land Forces Artillery Commander.

-- Stalled purchase of 1,000 Javelin anti-armor missiles;
$125 million FMS case; UAE did not sign the Letter of
Acceptance by the April 2006 deadline; Oman and Bahrain,
which were expecting economy of scale savings from the UAE
order, will face higher costs for Javelin, and the Javelin
production line will shut down in May. (Comment: The
Javelins are not as critical to the UAE arsenal as HIMARS or
the Apache remanufacture, which may help explain their
decision not to sign. End Comment.)

DCA: UAE Seeking Renegotiation
--------------


ABU DHABI 00001797 004.2 OF 004



15. (C) Despite their generally excellent cooperation and the
UAE's accommodation of our military presence on their soil,
we foresee a requirement for discussions on the Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA). One likely venue for those
discussions is the next U.S.-UAE Joint Military Commission
(JMC). The U.S. has proposed that the JMC be held in
Washington, June 21-22, but the UAE Armed Forces General
Headquarters has yet to respond. Meanwhile, we are still
waiting for the UAE to follow up on a February 14 diplomatic
note in which they advised us that they were interested in
negotiating changes to the DCA. The issue of legal
jurisdiction remains the sticking point (ref B). The
language of the existing DCA, which was never ratified by the
rulers of the seven emirates, provides that the U.S. retains
jurisdiction over all U.S. military and DOD civilian
personnel and their dependents whenever present in the UAE in
connection with their official duties. The UAE has
repeatedly insisted that they will assume criminal and civil
jurisdiction of U.S. DOD personnel. Periodic incidents
involving U.S. military personnel since the DCA was signed in
1994 have been resolved through ad hoc arrangements, but with
more ship visits than anywhere outside the U.S., and Dubai
the most popular R&R port for NAVCENT personnel, we are
concerned that these arrangements may not suffice if there is
a serious accident or crime involving or affecting UAE
citizens.
SISON