TEXTBOOK CASE: DUBAI CUSTOMS; RE-DELIVERY AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000176

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, A/S ISN SRADEMAKER, ISN/ECC KCROUCH AND
CRUSSEL
COMMERCE FOR DOC/BIS MOBRIEN
DHS FOR IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
NSC FOR DHOOKS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2015
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: TEXTBOOK CASE: DUBAI CUSTOMS; RE-DELIVERY AND
DUAL-USE ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (SBU) Summary. On January 17, Dubai Customs allowed
Iranian vessel M/V Iran Baluchestan, suspected of
transporting dual-use items, to leave Port Rashid for Iran.
Despite requests from the Embassy and Consulate, Dubai did
not authorize the inspection of the container, claiming that
it had no legal authority for doing so. Dubai's refusal to
inspect this container is an example of the challenges we
face as we prepare to launch the Counterproliferation Task
Force (CTF) with the UAEG. The USG should use points from
this case at the February 11 CTF meeting as a way to advance
our nonproliferation priorities with the UAEG. End summary.


2. (S) On January 16, DHS/ICE attach received information
from DHS Headquarters indicating that a container onboard
Iranian-flagged vessel M/V Iran Baluchestan contained
aluminum sheeting that had potential dual use in nuclear and
missile programs. The information stated that the vessel
would be docking in Dubai on January 17, in transit to Iran.
The ship is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines. The aluminum sheeting is of U.S. origin, but there is
no information about the U.S company involved. According to
information developed by the ICE Attach, the suspect
container was loaded in Port Klang, Malaysia on December 19,
2005, and the manifest indicated the container was empty.
After stopping in Singapore on Jan 5 and Karachi on Jan 13,
the Iran Baluchestan arrived at Port Rashid in Dubai at 0845
am Jan 17.


3. (S/NF) ICE Attach contacted Dubai Customs and Dubai's
State Security Organization (SSO) to secure permission to
have the container inspected. SIMO Chief in Dubai also
contacted SSO to reiterate the importance of the request.
Neither Dubai Customs nor SSO would allow the search,
claiming that since the container was in transit and not
bound for the UAE, there were no grounds under UAE or
international law to allow the search. ICE attach pointed
out that since the container was in UAE territory,
international law would allow a search for contraband.
Furthermore, he noted that the UAE Counter Terror Law of 2004
(Law #1/2004) obligated the UAE to conduct the search.
Article 14 of the law states, "Whoever manufactures,
prepares, furnishes, imports, obtains, possesses, or gets
non-traditional weapons or parts used in their manufacturing,
preparing, furnishing or carrying, or attempts to carry them
through mail, any public or private means of transport or any
other means intending to be used committing of any terrorist
acts provided in this law, shall be punished with life or
provisional imprisonment." Ahmed Butti, Director General of
Dubai Customs told ICE Attach that allowing searches like
the one being proposed would be, "bad for business." (Note:
While he did not state is explicitly, it is likely that Butti
and other UAE officials do not view materials bound for the
Iranian Government as meeting the definition of "parts to be
used in the committing of terrorist acts." End note.)


4. (SBU) Later on January 17, at the request of ICE attach,
Consul General reached Chairman of Dubai Ports, Customs, and
Free Zones, Sultan Bin Sulayem (SBS),who was in Kuwait for
the funeral of the late Emir, and requested his intervention.
After consulting with Dubai Ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin
Rashed and Dubai SSO Chief Mohammed Al-Qamzi, SBS called back
to say that because the container in question was on board a
ship that had only stopped to load additional cargo, Dubai
Customs had no legal grounds for unloading the ship in search
of the offending container. "The minute a container touches
to dock, it is ours," Sultan claimed, "but not before that."
CG reiterated the importance to U.S. and UAE security of not
allowing the materials to reach the Iranians, but SBS held
firm, saying "If it is important material you can use your
ships in the Gulf to intercept it -- we will work closely
with you to ensure that you have the information you need for
the intercept." In the long term, he suggested, the U.S.
should "work with the UN to get a Security Council resolution
banning all such materials bound for Iran's programs. That
would give us, and every other port in the world, the
justification we need for pulling containers off of Iranian
ships in our ports." After five hours at Port Rashid, the
Iran Baluchestan departed for Bandar Abbas.


5. (C) Comment: In the past Dubai Customs has been willing to
work with us to stop shipments of internationally banned
components bound for Iran, even when doing so has required
extra-judicial measures. The sticking point in this case
appeared to be the "potential dual use" nature of the
U.S.-produced aluminum. Since the container was listed on
the manifest as "empty" there was nothing that the U.S. could
request be returned to the United States. Although Embassy
believes the UAE would have been clearly within its legal
right to inspect the container, if the UAE were a party to
the Proliferation Security Initiative, the UAE would have
been obligated to allow the inspection. Despite USG-provided
training on what constitutes dual-use technology, Dubai
Customs, SSO -- and even Dubai's senior leaders -- were
unwilling to allow the container to be inspected. (Note:
Although this case did not have a positive outcome, there
have been other instances where Dubai Customs was more
cooperative. In two cases, where the vessel came from the
U.S. directly to the UAE, Dubai Customs redelivered the
suspect cargo to U.S. custody.)


6. (C) Comment continued: This case is an example of the
challenges we have faced with the UAEG in trying to tighten
its export control efforts, and it is illustrative of the
type of case we should work to address during the upcoming
Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting. Embassy notes
that both SSO and Dubai Customs will participate in the
upcoming February 11 inaugural meeting of the CTF. Embassy
recommends drawing from the following points at the CTF:

-- It was disappointing that Dubai allowed the Iran
Baluchestan to depart Port Rashid without an inspection of
the suspect cargo container;

-- We had hoped that Dubai authorities would use this case to
take the opportunity to demonstrate their resolve in
preventing potential dual-use items from reaching Iran;

-- What can the we do to ensure a positive outcome next time?
SISON