SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001401

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, INR/NESA, AND S/CT - H. CRUMPTON
NSC FOR FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN ZARATE, MIKE TAYLOR, NICOLE
SHAMPAINE, NIK RAMCHAND, ELLIOTT ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016
TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC EPET MCAP KPAL AE IZ IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISOR TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO THE UAE

REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243

B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565

C. ABU DHABI 409

D. ABU DHABI 779

E. ABU DHABI 1228

F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL)

G. ABU DHABI 176

H. ABU DHABI 605

I. USDEL 00007

J. ABU DHABI 1123

K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming
you to the UAE on April 23. In the aftermath of the
controversy of the Dubai Ports World acquisition of P&O, your
assurances to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin
Zayed (MbZ),your host for the visit, that the USG values the
UAE as an ally and friend will be well received. While you
should commend the UAE for its assistance and cooperation,
you should take advantage of your luncheon with MbZ and his
brother, State Security Director Sheikh Hazza, to push the
UAE on several areas of interest to the USG:
counterterrorism, counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq,
and ideological extremism (each is covered in the
scenesetter). The UAE remains a committed partner in the
global war on terror, but it continues to take an ad hoc
approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the problem
for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held
the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating
Committee (JTFCC),but the discussions were not as detailed
or as robust as the U.S. delegation anticipated. Treasury
U/S Levey will return to the UAE to hold a second meeting
April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charities.


2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
serious threats to national security, UAE officials are
reluctant to take actions that could anger their neighbor and
compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the same
time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of the
UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate
between Iran and the international community, the UAE is
growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership--which has
told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization--plans
to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role
in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political
process and it continues to condemn the sectarian violence
that is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face
of growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE
leadership is politically determined not to allow Islamist
extremists to gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.

Counterterrorism Efforts
--------------


3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the
UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for
reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers
homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than
prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have
focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees,
and procuring equipment. The UAE has also aggressively tried
to prevent the radicalization of UAE nationals and Arab/South
Asian expatriates. UAE officials publicly and strongly
condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has
been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the
mosques, and the UAE ministry of Education has modernized the
Islamic studies curriculum in its schools.


4. (S) The UAEG government reacts quickly when presented with
evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not
approach the problem from a transnational manner. The UAE's
immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
the problem goes or whether there is an international network
involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
specific cases),Emiratis do not consistently share lead
information found in the possession of individuals in their
custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These
tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
address the nature and scope of the problem. The UAEG must
be willing to take action against Emirati nationals, it must
investigate fully, and it must share information with other
Gulf countries and with the USG.


5. (S) The only way to generate significant change in the UAE
on the issue of counterterrorism is to convince the senior
leadership that it needs to continue to display political
will and commitment in tackling the terror challenge with a
transnational approach. MbZ is the person most able to
elicit this type of change. Embassy recommends you have a
frank and forthright discussion during your meeting with MbZ
and his younger brother, Hazza, to encourage this type of
change. Although you should commend them for the UAE's CT
efforts and cooperation, you should also encourage them to be
personally involved in developing a more effective and fully
cooperative counterterrorism posture.

Counterterrorism Finance
--------------


6. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the
financial sector against money laundering and terrorist
financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal
framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement.
It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and
prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering,
cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date,
investigation and prosecution has been weak. In an effort to
increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing, the
first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on
January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives
from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one
participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an
effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs,
and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must
participate. Embassy is coordinating a second meeting April
30 that will focus on cash couriers and charity regulations.

Iran
--------------


7. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating
tensions between Iran and the international community. The
UAE feels vulnerable--as evidenced by the fact that its
leaders frequently note that Iran is "very near" the UAE.
Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner),and as a result
the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is
worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of
those instances have resulted in a successful interdiction.
In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State
Security Organization explained during the 11 February
U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the
decision to not inspect the containers had been a political
decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate
(ref H). In the two later instances (ref K),ships that had
been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar
Abbas.


8. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, MbZ has
expressed clear support for U.S. initiatives against Iran.
MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed
bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23 about the
need to counter Iran's growing influence in the region and
its nuclear ambitions, although they specified that any
sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership, not the
Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that he
did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before
proceeding with any plans against Iran (ref E). "Whoever is
interested in getting on board ship should be encouraged," he
said. "I don't think it's logical or smart to wait for
everyone to get involved so we can sail. ... If another GCC
member believes it's not right, that's his choice." In the
Arab region, MbZ specifically identified Bahrain and Jordan
as two countries that also view Iran as a threat and that are
"capable to work with us." He told A/S Welch that the UAE
would prepare a paper responding to USG concerns about Iran
and mechanisms for addressing the challenge posed by Iran.
In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid,
MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat with a greater sense of
urgency. He was strongly in favor of taking action against
Iran and its president sooner rather than later. "I believe
this guy is going to take us to war. ... It's a matter of
time," MbZ warned, adding that action against Iran and
President Ahmedinejad should be taken this year or next year.
MbZ said he was unwilling to wait much longer. "Personally,
I cannot risk it with a guy like Ahmedinejad. He is young
and aggressive."


9. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the
Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting
the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this
should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that
Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international
terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship
between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its
influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also
expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah
was supporting Hamas. During your meeting, you should
explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the
United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to
isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You
should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely
with the USG on interdiction requests. This meeting will be
a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ) on April
8, where Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for Iran
(septel). (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for
U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should
come to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
something without involving the UAE, please do so." End
Note.)

Palestinian Territories/Hamas
--------------


10. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a
terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas
unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after
Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on
March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs
Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed
that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial
assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J).
MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to
come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled
Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime
Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the
Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is
"going to the right people." UAE Vice President and Prime
Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of
optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas,
"with some pressure," would understand the need to respect
the will of the international community.


11. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant
financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically,
the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through
charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the
UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the
Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March
2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas
electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor
their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
(including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex
that was announced last year).


12. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD
Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a
negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative
side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and
their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the
fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the
international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat
posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch
how the USG would react to those countries that did support
the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of
U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations.
A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing
that no money should go to the government unless Hamas
renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told
Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other
Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas
government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show
accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from
"official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million
in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.

Iraq
--------------


13. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues
to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and
other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi
Freedom (and Operation Enduring Freedom). The UAE has also
been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political
process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious
figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has
consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions
about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has
publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence
in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the
al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid
expressed their concerns about Iran's interference in Iraq's
internal affairs to Secretary Rice during her visit to Abu
Dhabi February 23. MbZ further told General Abizaid that
discontent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'afari was
creating volunteers for al-Qaida. He pledged the UAE's
support to the fight against al-Qaida. In his meeting with
A/S Welch, MbZ advocated using the Arabic language media to
tell Iraqis the truth about how many of their own people are
dying at the hands of the insurgents. If Iraqis were to see
the figures, he opined, they would conclude that support of
the insurgency is "not worth it."

Ideological Extremism
--------------


14. (S) MbZ and his brothers continue to be outspoken on the
issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to the
region. MbZ underscored for A/S Welch the UAE's preferred
approach of denying extremists a foothold rather than
allowing them to play a role in the political process.
Although he warns of the dangers of free elections in
countries with a well-organized Muslim Brotherhood presence,
he tells USG guests that the UAE will go ahead with
elections. The Emirati leadership has told us that they will
not allow Islamists to participate in elections. (Note: The
UAE has announced that half of the members of the Federal
National Council would be elected while half would continue
to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates.
Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other
Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) MbZ
also sees extremist ideology threatening the educational
system, where he and his brothers are spending considerable
resources to modernize the curriculum and the teaching corps.
SISON