Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABUDHABI1233
2006-03-31 12:04:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

A/S WELCH MEETING WITH UAE STATE SECURITY DIRECTOR

Tags:  PREL KPAL IR IZ GZ WE AE 
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FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4253
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0774
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0133
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0633
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RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0129
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RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001233 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/06
TAGS: PREL KPAL IR IZ GZ WE AE
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH MEETING WITH UAE STATE SECURITY DIRECTOR

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001233

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NSC FOR E. ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/06
TAGS: PREL KPAL IR IZ GZ WE AE
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH MEETING WITH UAE STATE SECURITY DIRECTOR

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (S/NF) Summary: NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch
consulted with UAE State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin
Zayed al-Nahyan March 29 on regional developments, and
specifically on Iran, Iraq, and Hamas. A/S Welch was
accompanied by Ambassador and Rear Admiral Robert Moeller,
Director of Plans and Policy at U.S. CENTCOM. Welch
advised that the USG was looking to its friends in the
region to counter the rhetoric coming from IranQs
leadership and outlined growing USG concerns regarding
Iranian intent in the region. On Iraq, Welch noted the
USGQs growing concern regarding IranQs attempts to
influence the Iraqi situation and to undermine the
stability of the new government. Sheikh Hazza outlined
efforts that the UAEG had undertaken in order to weaken
pro-Iranian coalitions, and to provide support to moderate
Sunni parties in order to ensure Sunni participation in the
upcoming government. With regard to Hamas, Welch delivered
a straightforward message regarding the USGQs position on
support to the Hamas-led Palestinian government. End
Summary.

Shared Concerns about Iran
--------------


2. (S/NF) A/S Welch noted WashingtonQs growing problems
with Tehran. While public concerns were focused on the
nuclear issue, IranQs growing influence in Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and with extremist Palestinian groups and Hamas
was a growing concern to Washington. Welch further advised
Hazza that he wished to open a dialogue with our friends in
the region in order to determine the best way to counter
this rhetoric, noting that there needs to be both economic
and security elements to any plan. Welch informed Hazza
that he would be talking to key allies in the region and
would solicit advice on what the best approach for gaining
regional support to this initiative would be. He suggested
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) discussions or visits to the
U.S. in order to pursue a dialogue on countering IranQs
aggression. Welch noted that we fully intended to share our

plans and intentions vis-`-vis Iran with the UAE, but that
we requested the advice of the Emiratis as we go forward.


3. (S/NF) Hazza noted that it would take time for the UAEG
to respond to this request and it would require input from
his Qpolitical leadership.Q He further noted that the main
task of the security services was to ensure the safety and
security of the UAE, but quickly added that Qwe canQt stop
Iran.Q Hazza advised that he was concerned by the
consequences of the progression of IranQs nuclear program,
and had considered IranQs threats against Israel and other
neighbors in their evaluation of the situation. He also
noted the environmental impact of IranQs nuclear program.
(Note: After the GCC Summit in Abu Dhabi in December 2005,
the UAEG issued a statement expressing the GCCQs
Qlegitimate fearQ of IranQs nuclear program, focusing
mainly on environmental concerns. Rather that explicitly
condemn Iran, the GCC opted for a more generic approach.
End Note.) Hazza reminded Welch that the Ayatollah Ali
Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting the use of
nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this should not be
considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that Iran is also a
threat due to its ties to international terrorist
organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship
between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
also of concern, as was IranQs attempts to expand its
influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world.


4. (S/NF) Welch responded that it was the job of the USG to
make sure that the Iranians do not get a nuclear weapon,
and that POTUS favored a diplomatic solution to this
problem. On the issue of Syria, Welch noted that the
Syrians need a new understanding of the problems that their
relationship with Iran brings, pointing out that President
Bashir al-Asad is a card for Iran, whereas his father used
Iran as one of his cards.


ABU DHABI 00001233 002 OF 003


Countering Iranian Influence in Iraq
--------------


5. (S/NF) Welch said the U.S. was interested in a new level
of dialogue with the GCC about what needs to be done to
counter IranQs influence in Iraq. Hazza immediately
replied that his service was participating in a series of
consultative meetings with the intelligence services of six
regional countries in an effort to support a nationalist,
moderate Iraqi government. Hazza noted their goals as
bringing an end to the QIraqi civil warQ and supporting
Sunni involvement in the new Iraqi government. Hazza noted
that there had been 15 meetings to date, most recently on
March 28. The regional services support six moderate
groups in Iraq in an effort to solidify their positions in
the Iraqi parliament and the new government, he said, and
were looking to these groups to work as a cohesive unit,
including moderate ShiQa in a coalition. Hazza noted that
the Jordanians were in the best position to influence Iraq,
followed by Egypt and the UAE.

Influencing Moqtada al-Sadr
--------------


6. (S/NF) Hazza told Welch that the UAE had good relations
with the Sunni Iraqis. The UAE is also attempting to bring
the ShiQa and Sunnis together in a moderate coalition, and
working to influence Moqtada al-SadrQs group. Hazza noted
the UAEQs good connections with key elements in MoqtadaQs
party who influence his decisions. The Emiratis hope to
influence these Moqtada associates in order to have them
influence him, he said. The UAE wants to work with
MoqtadaQs associates in an effort to split the ShiQa.
Their aim is to QcontainQ Moqtada and prevent him from
becoming a good politician like Hizballah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah. The Emiratis would like to bring Moqtada
to a moderate coalition. Welch said he regarded Moqtada as
a Qdangerous fellow,Q and noted that he has some power in
the Iraq parliament by virtue of the fact that he won seats
in the election and can negatively influence the
composition of the new government.

Seeking Support for the U.S. Position on Hamas
-------------- -


7. (S/NF) Hazza discussed his belief that the Palestinian
elections had been a disaster and were largely a result of
corruption in the Palestinian Authority and the leadership
of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Hazza noted that
Hamas was surprised at the fact that they had won the
election. The State Security Directorate assessed that
there was both a positive and a negative aspect to the
Hamas win. On the negative side, he cited HamasQ position
with regard to Israel, and their violent (jihadist) agenda.
On the positive side, Hazza noted the fact the Hamas was
now in power and was accountable to the international
community. QWe think Hamas will be firing Fatah people
everywhere,Q Hazza opined. He spoke of the threat posed by
Muslim extremists, which Hazza and his al-Nahyan brothers
often refer to generically as the Muslim Brotherhood.


8. (S/NF) Welch questioned the amount of private financial
support going into HamasQ coffers. The U.S. does not want
to see any of its friends support the new Hamas government,
and requested the UAEQs help in that regard. However,
Welch said the U.S. will continue to provide support for
the Palestinian people. Hazza replied by asking who would
pay the government salaries if the UAE and other Arab
countries did not. QThat is not our problem, and it is not
yours,Q Welch told Hazza, underscoring the need for Hamas
to show accountability. QPlease donQt give one pennyQ to
support Hamas, Welch said. If the Palestinians resort to
violence, the Palestinian government will be responsible
for controlling it, he added.


9. (S/NF) Hazza wanted to know how the USG would react to
those countries that did support the Hamas government.
Would they run afoul of U.S. laws restricting support to
terrorist organizations? Welch said that could be a real
problem. QWe have no problem with providing support to Abu

ABU DHABI 00001233 003 OF 003


Mazen, but we do have a problem with providing support
through Abu Mazen. We donQt want to punish the Palestinian
people, but do want to punish the government.Q Welch
reiterated the U.S. position: QNo money to the government.Q
If Hamas Qchanges its tuneQ in the next six months and
renounces violence, and accepts Israel, we will accept
them. I bet that they wonQt, and therefore, we want to
exert pressure on them and make them fail.Q


10. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message.
SISON