PRIME MINISTER: HELP KEEP PRESIDENT GBAGBO ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 000820

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2016
TAGS: IV PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER: HELP KEEP PRESIDENT GBAGBO ON
BOARD

REF: ABIDJAN 0770

Classified By: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 B.


1. (C) On July 25 Prime Minister Banny asked the Ambassador
to use his influence to help keep President Gbagbo in the
political process, especially on the issue of identification
of citizens. The PM asserted that he never takes a decision
without consulting with President Gbagbo and getting Gbagbo's
concurrence. However, once the PM begins to implement a
program in accordance with his discussions with the
President, the President frequently comes back to express
reservations and to request that action be delayed while the
PM consults further, generally with members of the
President's political camp. This was currently the case with
identification. It is like a good cop/bad cop routine, with
Gbagbo always playing the good cop while his FPI party
leaders play the bad cop.


2. (C) The PM said that violent public protests against the
identification process had him very worried. He was
determined to keep the process going, but the FPI was trying
to block the process by sending the Young Patriots out into
the streets, and if violence became widespread, the political
process would grind to a halt. He observed that the overall
political climate was still very fragile.


3. (C) The Ambassador told the PM that he shared the PM's
concerns about efforts to block the identification process
and he would indeed raise the issue with President Gbagbo, as
he frequently does. The Ambassador commented that the
opposition youth groups, who more or less abandoned the
streets to the Young Patriots following the killings that
resulted from the protest demonstration in March, 2004, are
now confronting the Young Patriots, resulting in several
deaths and a number of injured over the past week. Violent
confrontations will greatly increase the sense of insecurity
throughout Cote d'Ivoire.


4. (C) The PM, turning to the Minister of Defense who also
attended the meeting, said the position of the military
remains unknown. He and the Minister of Defense have met on
many occasions with Chief of Staff General Mangou, but Mangou
is evasive in his responses. Sometimes Mangou carries out
orders from the PM and the Minister of Defense and sometimes
he does not. The Minister of Defense commented that Mangou
frequently receives instructions directly from members of
President Gbagbo's entourage. If Mangou is ambivalent or
against the identification process, it will be hard to
maintain public order necessary for keeping the
identification process on track.


5. (C) COMMENT: The PM's appeal for the Ambassador's
assistance in persuading President Gbagbo to support the
political process suggests that the famous Gbagbo/Banny
tandem is under severe stress. The PM maintains that he is
determined to keep going as long as he can, but he knows that
he can only go as far as Gbagbo is willing to allow. The
identification process thus becomes a litmus test of
President Gbagbo's commitment to the political process.
Hooks