COTE D'IVOIRE: ACOTA COORDINATOR VISIT SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000606

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV MASS IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: ACOTA COORDINATOR VISIT SUMMARY

Classified By: ECON OFFICER ERFANA DAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (U) Summary: ACOTA Program and Policy Coordinator, Chip
Beck (Coordinator),visited Abidjan 13-14 May 2006 for a
visit to, and an exchange of information with, the United
Nations peacekeeping mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
Headquarters Staff. He received a general briefing from the
Senior Officer in Charge of Staffing, Colonel Aziz
(Bangladesh) and Chief Operations Officer Colonel Wecker
(France) on the status of their operations in Cote d'Ivoire
and their assessment of the performance of ACOTA trained
troops under their command. Coordinator was assisted and
accompanied by Econoff, Deputy DATT, and the TDY Air Attache.
He was afforded a post-brief by the DCM after the UNOCI site
visit. The coordinator had an excellent opportunity to
obtain firsthand insights into the field performance of ACOTA
partners and assess potential needs for future peace support
operations (PSO) training. End summary.


2. (U) UNOCI Briefing: Bangladeshi Colonel Aziz provided a
standard Power Point briefing on the UNOCI operations, but
the most informative part of the meetings came in the
informal exchange of views during and following the official
briefing. Neither Colonel Aziz nor French Colonel Wecker was
familiar with ACOTA, so the Coordinator provided them with a
thumbnail overview of the US PSO training program and a
rundown of ACOTA partner countries. Surprisingly, Colonel
Wecker was not particularly familiar with the French RECAMP
program either, or the British BPST, so both force commanders
were interested to learn more about who is training African
forces, why, and how. The ACOTA partners with significant
troops present are Senegal, Nigeria, Benin, and Ghana, all of
whom are performing well in general, but with the below-noted
problems that occur during times of calm. With regard to
non-ACOTA countries serving the UNOCI, the UN commanders
noted that the forces from Niger are "good soldiers" and they
are happy with them. (ACOTA Coordinator Comment: Niger is
interested in joining ACOTA, and is under consideration as an
ACOTA partner in FY 2007. End Comment.)


3. (U) Recommendations: The ACOTA Coordinator believes that
ACOTA Program Office might consult with the UN DPKO offices
in New York to insure that future UN force commanders receive
at least a standard backgrounder on ACOTA, RECAMP, and BPST,
prior to deployment, along with specific details on which of
their African forces have received training in one or more of
the PSO training programs. The reason for this briefing
would be to open additional doors and communications channels
with the force commanders so that ACOTA might in the future
receive periodic and UN-sanctioned input from PSO commanders
on the performance levels and training needs as they perceive
them in the field.


4. (C) UN Observations From the Field: When questioned as
to the performance levels of the ACOTA and non-ACOTA African
units, the UN commanders initially attempted to be general in
their comments, rather than too specific, to avoid the
appearance of being critical toward any one country.
However, in the course of offering examples, they eventually
did get into specifics. Most of the examples were either
positive or correctable with training. One interesting sound
bite from Colonel Wecker was his assessment that "Africans
make the best peacekeepers in Africa" because of their
knowledge of the languages, cultural factors, and societal
nuances. More often than not, they also "infiltrate" the
communities they serve, in ways that, perhaps unintentionally
at times, assists in acquiring information and intelligence
that forewarn their unit commanders of impending trouble.
Colonel Aziz concurred with that assessment, noting that the
Pakistani and Bangladeshi troops were hampered not only by
their lack of knowledge of French and local languages, but as
with the Europeans, also by their ethnicity. Simply put, the
Africans fit in, whereas non-Africans stand out and are
isolated. It is an obvious observation, but one that
supports the policy goal of training more, and more
competent, African peace-keeping operations (PKO) forces for
the Regional Brigades and African Standby Force (ASF).
Colonel Wecker also commented that the African PKO forces
performed exceptionally well in times of crisis, not only due
to their foreknowledge of problems, but due to what he
described as their cultural acceptance of doing what needed
to be done in difficult situations. "A Senegalese is not
afraid to wade into the crowd and crack a few heads to
disperse them," he noted, "whereas a Pakistani may be unsure
of himself in a situation with foreigners." As an example,
the two commanders noted that in recent civil demonstrations
and rioting, the Senegalese quelled a disturbance, while
Bangladeshi elements were routed by the crowds.


5. (C) On a more critical note, Colonel Wecker noted that
while the Africans perform well under pressure and in times
of crisis, their military discipline tends to deteriorate

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significantly during periods of calm, during which times they
may turn to drinking, socializing, and carousing with the
locals, or just "slacking off." This has also caused some
unintended long-term problems, such as local pregnancies
fathered by African peacekeepers. (ACOTA Coordinator
Comment: This example of disciplinary problems was later
discussed with Burkina Faso Army trainers at the
Non-Commissioned Officers Training Academy in Ouagadougou,
where they noted they place a high premium on discipline and
force structure. As ACOTA seeks to assist the African Union
and Regional Brigades build the most solid PSO forces
possible, the issue of image, discipline, and role-modeling
needs to be continually stressed, perhaps even more than it
already is. End Comment.)


6. (C) Challenges Faced by the UN: Problems noted by the UN
Commanders were: the difficulty in maintaining vehicles;
difficulty in collecting short-term, time-critical
intelligence; insufficient number of PKO forces to blanket
all the areas they need to control, leading to deployment of
smaller elements that can be isolated or cut-off; and
effective communications discipline during crisis. In terms
of the limitations of the UNOCI, the commanders noted that
their force strength was generally insufficient to deal with
the thousands of hostile civilians that could be mobilized by
the Young Patriots or warring factions on short notice, and
who can descend very rapidly in large numbers on UNOCI units
that are then outnumbered and overwhelmed. Both Colonel Aziz
and Wecker maintained that creating general stability and
implementing the DDR processes are the general and preferred
answer to correcting this situation. It was noted that there
needs to be a change in the mandate for UNOCI to implement
DDRQand they estimate UNOCI needs at least three more
reinforced battalions over a period of six months to maintain
security during the DDR process. Both commanders indicated
that the general population is growing weary of the
disturbances and the interruption they cause to civilian
lives and jobs. They hope this frustration will eventually
(soon) act as a deterrent to continued large-scale
disturbances.


7. (U) Training recommendations: With regards to the type
of training that is needed by the PSO forces, the UN
commanders indicated that crowd control, reaction to
demonstrations, and riot training were high on their list.
Given the disturbances manifested by the Young Patriots as
well as looters, unemployed persons, students, and mobs in
general, the commanders indicated that not only did they need
more forces trained in crowd control and as Quick Reaction
Forces (QFR),but that those units also needed more
specialized gear, such as shields, riot helmets, batons, and
non-lethal weapons. (ACOTA Coordinator Comment: In the
past, ACOTA has provided both training and equipment in riot
control to military gendarmes. ACOTA will re-examine the
need for more such training, particularly if the field
missions PSO troops are entering can be identified as either
urban situations, or even involve large refugee centers where
demonstrations are not uncommon. As part of the "trainee
packages," ACOTA is able to provide limited quantities of
riot control equipment. End Comment.)


8. (C) ACOTA Coordinator Comment: The visit to the UNOCI
was the first such mission area site visit by ACOTA in the
past year. During the February 2006 African Union (AU)
Training and Evaluation conference in Luanda, the Deputy AU
Peace Support Operations Director (PSOD),Nigerian Major
General Ishaya Hassan urged program directors from ACOTA,
RECAMP, and BPST to conduct more such evaluations of
PSO-trained troops "on location" in the mission areas. ACOTA
plans to conduct additional mission area evaluations in the
near term, including Darfur. This particular visit to Cote
d'Ivoire was definitely useful for its tactical and
operational insights, and afforded discussion points that
were employed in the subsequent visit to Burkina Faso.
Hooks