Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABIDJAN483
2006-05-11 16:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

THE FPI AFTER SIX YEARS IN POWER

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV 
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R 111655Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1296
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
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RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/ECJ3/ECJ5//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000483 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV
SUBJECT: THE FPI AFTER SIX YEARS IN POWER


Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000483

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV
SUBJECT: THE FPI AFTER SIX YEARS IN POWER


Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d


1. (C) Summary. President Gbagbo,s ruling FPI party is
feeling defensive, with little to show after almost six years
in power. The party came into office in the flawed 2000
elections with a sweeping agenda of socialist reform. It has
achieved few of them while failing to address the fundamental
issues at the core of the Ivoirian crisis, including national
identity, land ownership, and corruption and economic reform.
Instead, it has focused on maintaining power through
intimidation and control of state institutions, promoting an
ethnocentric, xenophobic ideology. Party leaders have also
used dubious legal arguments and feigned differences with
President Gbagbo to allow the latter to plead innocence while
the former undermine peace agreements Gbagbo has signed. The
current political crisis serves as an all-purpose pretext for
poor governance and corruption. The FPI remains the leading
political force in Cote d'Ivoire by virtue of controlling the
Presidency and the legislature but the FPI leadership is well
aware that fair and free elections will change that
equation,. at least as far as the legislature is concerned.
End summary.


2. (C) After nearly six years in power, President Gbagbo,s
Ivoirian People,s Front (FPI) finds itself on the defensive
for primarily two reasons. First, despite coming to power on
an ambitious socialist agenda for reform, the FPI has
accomplished very little during its time at the helm. FPI
stalwarts often try to hide behind the 2002 failed coup and
subsequent division of the country as an excuse for their
inaction. In fact, however, Gbagbo and his party had almost
two full years in which to launch initiatives to begin to
address the thorniest issues fueling the current Ivoirian
crisis: voter registration, national identity, the concept
of Ivoirite, land ownership, and corruption and economic
reform. The regime did little on the first four. On the
fifth, it did change the structures governing the production
and sale of cocoa but this can hardly be termed as &reform8

as the changes did nothing to increase transparency or reduce
corruption or the exploitation of cocoa farmers by those in
power. The FPI has simply failed to follow any policy agenda
beyond seeking to remain in power and continuing to skim
money from state coffers. At the same time, it has promoted
an ethnocentric and xenophobic ideology.


3. (C) The second reason for the FPI,s defensiveness is its
own perceived lack of legitimacy as a result of the flawed
presidential and parliamentary elections of 2000. The former
disqualified Gbagbo,s two principal opposition rivals,
former president Henri Bedie of the PDCI party, and RDR
leader and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. As a
result, voter participation was only a low 37.4 pct. Gbagbo
won 59.4 pct of these votes, meaning he received the support
of only 22.2 pct of eligible voters, hardly a ringing
endorsement. After Ouattara was barred from running for
president, the RDR foolishly boycotted the parliamentary
elections, handing the FPI an effective majority in the
National Assembly. Since these unusual circumstances are
unlikely to be repeated, the FPI leadership is rightly
doubtful that it could defeat a united opposition in a free
and fair election, thus losing control of the National
Assembly.


4. (C) As a result of these concerns, the FPI is intent on
maintaining control of the electoral process so that it can
manipulate it to its advantage. The other lever that the FPI
relies on to maintain power is use of militias and street
thugs to intimidate the opposition. In fact, since the March
2004 violence against opposition supporters, the opposition
has withdrawn and Gbagbo,s thugs have been able to assert
control over the streets whenever they are called upon to do
so. Relying on militias rather than legitimate security
forces typifies the FPI,s continuing oppositionist mindset.
After all those years of opposing Houphouet and then Bedie
and Guei, Gbagbo and his cohorts have never made the
transition to thinking like a ruling party using the
legitimate tools of the state.


5. (C) The FPI also finds it useful to maintain a false
distinction between the party,s views and those of President
Gbagbo. Party leaders like to aver that they have been
excluded from peace negotiations and that they are not bound
by agreements which they did not sign or commit to. First
Lady and FPI leader Simone Gbagbo, in particular, is known
for her inflammatory statements. For instance she has stated
that the emergency decree allowing Ouattara to run for
president would have applied only if the election had been
held in 2005 and would no longer be valid in the future.
Madame Gbagbo was also quoted as saying last month that those
who insist on simultaneity of identification (a key rebel
demand) with disarmament (a sine qua non for the FPI, at

ABIDJAN 00000483 002 OF 002


least as far as the rebels are concerned) are dreaming.
Madame Gbagbo insists that disarmament happen first and she
has been critical of the International Working Group.


6. (C) This false dichotomy allows President Gbagbo the
excuse of insisting that he cannot compel his party to go
along with him. It is a tactic that fools no one,
particularly since he too has on occasion made similar
statements, e.g., when he insisted that disarmament begin
before identification. More recently, Gbagbo asserted in a
speech to a traditional king and his followers that, as with
chiefs and kings, ¬ just anyone can become president.8
Gbagbo added that Houphouet had named Ouattara prime minister
precisely because the latter could never become president
just as a chief does not name as his closest advisers those
who are eligible to succeed him.


7. (C) The FPI also likes to rely on narrow, and highly
dubious, legalistic interpretations to advance its positions
and attempt to preserve its control over the electoral
process and key institutions. In this it is helped by its
control over the Supreme Court. For example, the Court,
ruled in favor of the FPI in overturning the initial election
of the Board of the Independent Electoral Commission before
the Ivoirian parties finally reached a compromise decision on
the Board,s composition.


8. (C) Given its doubts about its capacity to win a free and
fair election, the FPI will continue to try to manipulate the
system to stay in power. However, this is becoming more
difficult with greater intervention by outside powers and a
stronger mandate for Prime Minister Banny. Failing this,
calling on the militias or finding ways to postpone the
electoral process while trying to assign the blame the rebels
or the unarmed opposition, will be the preferred tactics. In
a sense, the September 2004 coup attempt and ensuing division
of the country has served the FPI well, both in terms of
allowing it to exploit nationalist sentiment against the
French and as a justification for poor governance and
corruption. In fact, judging from its first two years in
office, the FPI would likely have governed just as badly and
with as little transparency had there been no coup and the
country remained united.
Hooks