Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABIDJAN417
2006-04-24 15:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE: CONTROVERSY OVER IDENTIFICATION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ASEC IV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0417/01 1141559
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241559Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1232
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1343
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0304
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000417 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: CONTROVERSY OVER IDENTIFICATION


Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000417

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: CONTROVERSY OVER IDENTIFICATION


Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. A bitter dispute over how to identify who is
an Ivoirian lies at the heart of Cote d'Ivoire's current
political crisis. No new identifications have been
registered since 2003, and no identity cards have been issued
since 1999. Prime Minister Banny has made resuming the
identification process one of his top priorities, but
President Gbagbo's followers are insisting that the rebel New
Forces (FN) must first disarm. Going forward with both
identification and disarmament at the same time seems like a
reasonable compromise, but it is far from clear whether the
political will is there to accept it. There is no solution
to the Cote d'Ivoire crisis without a credible identification
process. Unless this process gets underway in April or early
May, which is highly unlikely, elections cannot take place in

2006. End Summary.


2. (C) A long, tangled, bitter dispute over how to identify
who is an Ivoirian lies at the heart of Cote d'Ivoire's
current political crisis. This dispute can be traced back to
1993 when Laurent Gbagbo's Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI)
party, then in opposition, accused Prime Minister Ouattara's
government of distributing forged identity cards to
foreigners in the North. (Ouattara is from the North and his
RDR (Rally for Republicans) party draws much of its support
from Northerners.) Ouattara's government instituted new
identity cards with tighter security controls. After Henri
Konan Bedie became president in 1994 and began propagating
the concept of "Ivoirianness" it became progressively more
difficult for Northerners to get the new cards. When Bedie
was overthrown by a coup in 1999 the government stopped
issuing them altogether.


3. (C) After Gbagbo was elected president in 2000, and the
FPI took control of parliament, they pushed through an
entirely new identification process requiring all Ivoirians
to register in their home village. This new law no longer
accepted as proof of citizenship the Certificate of

Nationality, which any Ivoirian can get by proving in court
that at least one parent is Ivoirian. Village-based
registration was highly unpopular among Northerners because
many of their families had long ago migrated to the South.
Others were naturalized citizens from neighboring countries
to the North who had no home village in Cote d'Ivoire. The
FPI's village-based identification was one of the principal
reasons for the 2002 coup attempt against Gbagbo. When the
rebel New Forces (FN) took control of the North they stopped
this identification process there and destroyed many of the
records that had been created. Village-based registration
continued in government-controlled areas, and in the end
about 60 percent of the population was identified through
this process, mostly in the South. No cards were issued --
the plan was to identify the entire population and then issue
the cards all at once.


4. (C) The 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement halted
village-based registration and called for a revised law on
identification, to return to a more inclusive identification
process under the oversight of a new National Commission for
the Supervision of Identification (CNSI),which would be
headed by a judge and include representatives of all the
political parties. The FPI-controlled National Assembly
pushed through a flawed bill in May 2004 that did create the
CNSI but also added two new pieces of information to be
recorded in the identification process: the height and
national origin of the person being registered. This meant
that the 60 percent of the population already identified
would have to register again. Under pressure from the
opposition and South African President Mbeki, President
Gbagbo issued a decree in July 2005 removing the national
origin requirement but leaving in height.


5. (C) The identification process thus remains paralyzed.
The CNSI was created and the concept of village-based
identification was scrapped in favor of a return to the
Certificate of Nationality. However, no new identifications
have been recorded since 2003 and no cards have been issued
since 1999. Certificates of Nationality continue to be
issued in government-controlled areas, but not in
FN-controlled areas where there are no courts. There is
another important legal procedure by which a person who has
no birth certificate can obtain one by bringing witnesses to
his identity before a traveling court. These courts are also
operating only in government-controlled areas.


6. (C) When Prime Minister Banny took office in January he
made the resumption of the identification process one of his
top priorities, to speed up preparations for elections.

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Indeed, at the February 28 "Yamoussoukro Five" meeting, he
persuaded President Gbagbo and the principal opposition
leaders to agree that identification and voter registration
would be carried out simultaneously. However, at a March 29
cabinet meeting, President Gbagbo rejected a proposal to
begin this process by sending magistrates to the North to
conduct traveling courts to help people obtain birth
certificates. Ever since then his supporters have been
conducting a strident campaign against resuming the
identification process until the rebels disarm. The rebels
have refused to disarm without identification. Congolese
President and AU Chairman Sassou came to Cote d'Ivoire April
8 to try to break this deadlock. After meeting with
President Gbagbo and the principal opposition leaders, Sassou
announced that agreement had been reached to go forward with
identification and disarmament simultaneously. Rebel and
opposition leaders embraced this agreement but Gbagbo's
followers emphatically rejected it.


7. (C) Comment. This dispute stands squarely in the way of
any progress toward elections. President Gbagbo has proposed
going forward with the elections using the voter registration
lists from the last presidential elections in 2000, but the
opposition claims many opposition voters were excluded or
removed from these lists. Given the deep mistrust on both
sides, going forward with identification and disarmament
simultaneously, perhaps one small step at a time, seems like
a reasonable compromise. However, at this point, it is far
from clear whether the political will is there to reach out
and take it. There is no solution to the Cote d'Ivoire
crisis without a credible identification process. Unless
this process gets underway in April or early May, which is
highly unlikely, elections cannot take place in 2006. End
Comment.

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