Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABIDJAN190
2006-02-22 14:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE: FOURTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNAUS IV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5256
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0190/01 0531445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221445Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0988
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1283
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/ECJ3/ECJ5//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000190 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNAUS IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FOURTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING GROUP

REF: A. ABIDJAN 180

B. 05 ABIDJAN 1333

C. 05 ABIDJAN 1177

Classified By: Pol/Econ Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000190

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNAUS IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FOURTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING GROUP

REF: A. ABIDJAN 180

B. 05 ABIDJAN 1333

C. 05 ABIDJAN 1177

Classified By: Pol/Econ Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Banny briefed the fourth
meeting of the International Working Group (IWG) on his plans
to adopt the IWG's road map as his government's work plan.
In light of the four days of street disturbances in reaction
to the previous IWG's stance on the National Assembly, it was
decided to echo the UN Secretary General's January 29
statement, expressing disappointment that President Gbagbo
extended the Assembly's mandate with full legislative powers,
and reiterating the importance of implementing both UNSCR
1633 and the decisions of the IWG. Members of the IWG
criticized UN High Representative for Elections (HRE)
Monteiro for taking so long to issue a ruling on whether the
disputed election for the internal officers of the
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) was valid, and then
not coming down squarely on one side of the question.
However, the IWG endorsed Monteiro's ruling and his call for
a political compromise on this issue to be reached urgently.
The Mediation Group, tasked with day-to-day mediation on
behalf of the IWG, was criticized for not doing enough actual
mediation, but defended itself by saying it had been rebuffed
by Prime Minister Banny. The French sought to insert into
the communique a call for the Security Council to increase UN
troop levels, but this was removed at U.S. request. It is a
welcome development that Prime Minister Banny is adopting the
IWG's road map as his government's work plan, but the group
risks losing its effectiveness unless the Mediation Group
becomes more active. Monthly meetings at the ministerial
level are not enough to have a significant impact on the
Ivoirian political process. End Summary.


2. (U) The IWG held its fourth meeting in Abidjan on
February 17. With the passing of the AU chairmanship last
month to Republic of the Congo President Dennis
Sassou-Nguesso, for the first time Congolese Foreign Minister
Rudolphe Adada co-chaired the IWG together with Special

Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Pierre Schori.
Also in attendance were French Minister Delegate for
Cooperation, Development and the French Speaking Countries
Brigitte Girardin; Ghanaian Foreign Minister Nana Akufo-Addo;
Guinean Foreign Minister Fatouma Sidibe Kaba; Nigeran Foreign
Minister Aichatou Mindaoudou; Nigerian Foreign Minister
Oluyemi Adeniji; South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana
Dlamini Zuma; ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohamed Ibn Chambas;
UN High Representative for Elections in Cote d'Ivoire (HRE)
Antonio Monteiro; and representatives from the United States,
Benin, the United Kingdom, the AU, the EU, the International
Organization of French Speaking Countries, and the World Bank.


3. (C) The meeting was once again preceded by a breakfast for
heads of delegation. French Minister Girardin felt the need
to emphasize to the other delegation heads that France has no
economic interests whatsoever in the three most important
sectors of Cote d'Ivoire's economy -- cocoa, coffee and
petroleum -- and therefore clearly does not have
imperialistic designs here. SRSG Schori noted the delicacy
of the National Assembly issue, after pro-Gbagbo militias
blocked streets and attacked UN installations for four days
after last month's meeting to protest the IWG's stance on
this issue. South African Foreign Ministe Zuma said she
could go along with making a statment on this issue in the
communique but it woul need to be carefully discussed.


4. (C) As at te previous two meetings, after the
introductory peeches Prime Minister Banny addressed the
group. Banny briefed in detail on the seminar he chaired
February 9-11 in Yamoussoukro to discuss with hi cabinet the
implementation of the IWG's road ma (ref A). Indeed, Banny
said the purpose of theseminar was for his government to
appropriate the road map as its own work plan for bringing
the country out of its political crisis. He was upbeat about
the results: all ministers attended except a few who were
traveling, and actively participated. Most notably New Forces
(FN) leader Guillaume Soro was there, for the first time
attending a cabinet meeting of the Banny government. Banny
promised he would soon hold a second seminar devoted to the
country's economic problems. He spoke at length about the
need to restore trust, reconciliation and compromise in the
country, but he branded the National Assembly as an obstacle
to peace and indicated he would seek to marginalize it.
Banny said he would personally take charge of the process of
issuing identity cards and registering voters. He insisted
that his "tandem" with President Gbagbo is working well --
Gbagbo likes what Banny is doing and supports him.


ABIDJAN 00000190 002 OF 003



5. (C) In the IWG itself there was extensive discussion of
how to treat the issue of the National Assembly in the
meeting's communique. Some delegations -- Ghana, Spain,
Niger -- were emphatic that the IWG must stick to its
principles, not let the pro-Ggbagbo street militias hold a
veto over everything the IWG does. Others, most notably
South Africa, argued for a more cautious approach. South
African Foreign Minister Zuma recalled that on January 18
Nigerian President Obasanjo, as then-AU chairman, appeared to
back away from the January 15 IWG's stance on this issue,
issuing a joint communique with President Gbagbo that said
the IWG had no authority to dissolve the National Assembly
and did not dissolve it. Several delegations responded that
of course the IWG didn't dissolve the National Assembly --
its mandate expired December 16. SRSG Schori elaborated that
at the January 18 meeting, which he attended, President
Obasanjo was very clear that the National Assembly should
remain as only a consultative body, without legislative
powers, and President Gbagbo seemed to accept this. This is
why on January 29 the Secretary General issued a statement
expressing his disappointment that Gbagbo had subsequently
used his decree authority to extend the Assembly with full
legislative powers. The statement also called on all parties
to refrain from unilateral action, and reiterated the
importance of implementing UNSCR 1633 as well as the
decisions of the IWG. In the end, consensus was reached that
the communique should not ignore the issue of the National
Assembly but should also not return to the question of the
expiration of its mandate. Accordingly, it was decided to
incorporate language from the Secretary General's January 29
statement.


6. (C) There was also considerable discussion about the
continued, five-month deadlock in the Independent Electoral
Commission (CEI). (President Gbagbo's Ivoirian Popular Front
(FPI) party, backed by a Supreme Court ruling, refuses to
accept as legitimate the October internal election of CEI
officers because consultative members were not allowed to
vote, and the opposition refuses to allow consultative
members to vote for internal officers or to cede another
senior position to Gbagbo's camp.) The previous day, HRE
Monteiro had issued a ruling that the election was fully
consistent with the Pretoria agreement, but was not
consistent with President Gbagbo's July decree enacting the
necessary legislation to set up the new CEI (ref C).
(Monteiro's ruling explicitly acknowledged that this means
Gbagbo's decree is not consistent with the Pretoria agreement
even though South African President Mbeki as mediator ruled
that it is (ref B).) Monteiro declined to rule on whether
the Pretoria agreement should take precedence over the Gbagbo
decree, but rather called for President Gbagbo and Prime
Minister Banny to find a political solution.


7. (C) At the IWG, Monteiro came under sharp criticism,
especially from Nigerian Foreign Minister Adeniji, for taking
so long to come out with a ruling -- he promised at both the
January and February IWG's that a ruling was imminent -- and
then not coming down clearly on one side of the question.
Monteiro defended his actions animatedly, saying he put a
compromise solution on the table (an additional senior
leadership position for FPI) and spent weeks trying to
persuade the Ivoirian political parties to accept it, but
they refused. He had done all he could do. Monteiro also
protested that it was unfair to single out the CEI issue when
all the other elements of the peace process also remain
stalled. Congolese co-chair Foreign Minister Adada noted
that he had met recently with FPI parliamentary leaders, and
they had indicated they might be willing to accept Monteiro's
compromise on a one-time basis, only for these upcoming
presidential and legislative elections. (Note: However, it
was clear from Monteiro's presentation that there are also
opposition parties that turned down his proposal.) In the
end it was decided that the communique should explicitly
endorse Monteiro's ruling that the CEI election was
consistent with the Pretoria Agreement, and should also
endorse his call for the Ivoirian parties to reach a
political compromise urgently (the communique says before the
beginning of March).


8. (C) There was also a heated discussion about the Mediation
Group's report. (The Mediation Group is chaired by South
African Mediation Special Envoy Sokupa, and the other members
are SRSG Schori, HRE Monteiro, and the local representatives
of ECOWAS and the AU. It is tasked with carrying out
day-to-day mediation on behalf of the IWG, to facilitate the
implementation of UNSCR 1633.) Members of the IWG noted that
while the Mediation Group's report was an excellent review of
the current situation and the various significant events that
had taken place since the last IWG meeting, there was nothing
in it to indicate that the Mediation Group had done any

ABIDJAN 00000190 003 OF 003


actual mediation. SRSG Schori (Sokupa was not present)
replied that immediately in the wake of the last IWG,
conditions were not conducive to mediation because of the
street disturbances. After that, the group tried to set up
regular weekly meetings with Prime Minister Banny, as they
had done with his predecessor, but he declined. Schori noted
that there were several recommendations at the end of the
report suggesting ways that the IWG could task the Mediation
Group with reinserting itself into the process. IWG members
then pointed out that there were six recommendations but only
one had anything to do with the Mediation Group. Schori
reiterated the group's frustration at having been rebuffed by
Prime Minister Banny. No mention of the Mediation Group was
included in the communique.


9. (C) France once again sought to insert a paragraph into
the communique calling on the Security Council to increase UN
troop levels in Cote d'Ivoire but this was deleted at U.S.
request.


10. (C) Comment. It is a welcome development that Prime
Minister Banny plans to adopt the IWG road map as his
government's work plan. Beyond that, the IWG was able to
work out reasonably good, strong but not overly inflammatory,
communique language on the National Assembly and the CEI, as
well as a number of other important but less potentially
explosive issues. However, the group risks losing its
effectiveness unless the Mediation Group becomes more active.
Communiques emanating from monthly IWG meetings at the
ministerial level are not enough to have a significant impact
on the Ivoirian political process. End Comment.
Hooks