ECHOES OF ARETHA FRANKLIN: THE REBELS WANT RESPECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000179

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV
SUBJECT: ECHOES OF ARETHA FRANKLIN: THE REBELS WANT RESPECT


Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador made a three-day trip to
Bouake and Korhogo, in New Forces (FN) territory in the
North, to urge the ex-rebels to help move the political
process forward. We found a relatively relaxed security
environment and a population whose most pressing concerns
were not the FN, but the lack of water and the continued
postponement of school exams. The FN received the Ambassador
warmly and were receptive to his message. END SUMMARY


2. (C) The Ambassador made a three-day trip to Bouake and
Korhogo, in New Forces (FN) territory in the North, February
12-14. Since the 2002 coup attempt that divided the country,
no other ambassador accredited to Cote d'Ivoire has made the
trip to rebel territory by road, spending the night in both
Bouake and Korhogo. The Ambassador had discussed this trip
with both Prime Minister Banny and President Gbagbo, who
supported the visit as a chance to help move the political
process forward. The Ambassador's message to the FN was
clear: engage more fully in the peace process, disarm,
assist in the reunification of the country and help lead Cote
d'Ivoire out of the current crisis through free, fair, and
transparent elections. The Ambassador communicated these
points to Guillaume Soro, Secretary General of the FN; Hamed
Bakayoko, FN Army (FAFN) Chief of Staff; his deputy Commander
Issiaka "Wattao" Ouattarra; Bouake Zone Commander Cherif
Ousmane; Korhogo Zone Commander Martin Fofie (who was one of
the three Ivoirians recently sanctioned by the United
Nations); and other key leaders of the FN.


3. (C) The message resonated very well with all parties.
Soro promised to come to Abidjan to begin participating in
cabinet meetings within two weeks. Soro also urged that the
UN and the international community work with him to address
his security concerns. Indeed, the FN's message to the
Ambassador was that they want to be taken seriously as
partners in the process; i.e. they want respect. Soro noted
that UN SRSG Pierre Schori's recent comments, describing the
FN as warlords, were not helpful.


4. (C) The Ambassador also met with humanitarian workers,
municipal authorities, imams, the traditional chief of
Korhogo, and other community leaders. All parties agreed on
the need to move forward in the political process but pointed
out the importance of issuing identification cards to all
Ivoirians before elections can take place. When asked about
their relations with the FN, no community leaders expressed
any serious grievances. In Bouake, the FN capital, the
community leaders seemed to distance themselves somewhat from
the FN, willing to work with them but not necessarily
identifying with them. However, in the predominantly Muslim
northern city of Korhogo, community leaders seemed proud of
the FN and pleased that the rebels had taken up their cause.


5. (C) Though there had been isolated security incidents,
security was not a major concern for the community leaders.
The security environment in Korhogo and Bouake was more
favorable than that of Abidjan. The ambiance of both towns
was peaceful and the motorcades of armed FAFN soldiers were
regarded with passive stares and occasional waves by the
townspeople. We passed more road checkpoints in Abidjan
between the city limit and the embassy than we encountered
during our entire trip to the FN zone. We also did not see
the same long lines of truckers in the FN zone as in the
government zone, waiting for hours or even days to get their
goods through the omnipresent checkpoints.


6. (C) While physical security is not a pressing issue for
the communities, water security clearly is and was raised in
each meeting. The water pumps have not been maintained since
the outbreak of the rebellion and the government in Abidjan
has refused to send civil servants to repair the pumps that
are owned by the state. During the frequent water shortages,
the population has survived by using local wells.


7. (C) Education is also a major concern for the residents of
Bouake and Korhogo. The government has not held exams for
the children in the FN-controlled zone since 2003. After the
2002 coup attempt, the government recalled teachers from the
North, and has not called on them to return. Communities are
keeping schools open with the help of volunteer teachers, but
the numbers of students enrolled are diminishing. Though the
government cites security as the reason for not redeploying
the teachers, community leaders in the North are convinced
that the reasons are more political. The Minister of
Education, who is from President Gbagbo's Ivoirian Popular
Front (FPI) party, has rejected repeated attempts by
international humanitarian organizations and northern
community leaders to resolve the government's security
concerns.


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8. (C) Around town, we noticed that the FN have made an
effort to keep up a minimum of maintenance, noticeably more
so in Korhogo than in Bouake. The road from Bouake to
Korhogo was recently repaved and was better than the
government-controlled road north from Abidjan toward Bouake.
The streets were cleaner in both northern cities, and in
Korhogo there was significant new construction going on.
Fofie was proud to show us a cultural center that will soon
open, brightly covered with murals depicting Senufo culture.


9. (C) The hospitality we received in the FN-zone was
exemplary. We were met at the entrances to both towns and
escorted to the offices of the FN, then to our
accommodations. FN security was present but not oppressive.
During meetings that did not involve the FN, the soldiers
were not intrusive and left us to meet in private. Both
nights we were the honored guests at dinners where numerous
troupes of dancers from the surrounding areas performed.
Humanitarian workers were also invited to the dinners, giving
us a chance to continue our conversations with them in a
social setting. Indeed, the FN bent over backwards to make
sure every element of our visit was a success.


10. (U) The Ambassador's visit to the North received
prominent press coverage in the Ivoirian media and was picked
up by several international press agencies. The independent
and pro-opposition press hailed the length of the visit as a
strong, visible sign of U.S. engagement in the Ivoirian
crisis. The FPI-owned Notre Voie noted that while the U.S.
Ambassador was looking for solutions to the crisis, the
French Ambassador was showing his country's support for the
rebellion.


11. (C) COMMENT: The FN are now trying to persuade the
population in the North, as well as the other actors in the
political process, to take them seriously. While Soro
himself has not come to Abidjan to participate in the new
government, all of the other FN ministers have been visible
in their work and more fully engaged than in the previous
government. While the rebels have told PM Banny that they
will not run as the FN in the next parliamentary elections,
that does not preclude FN members from running on the tickets
of opposition political parties. Indeed, their eagerness for
respect and a chance to carve out a political future for
themselves could result in progress for the peace process.
END COMMENT
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