Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABIDJAN1355
2006-12-08 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

ELEVENTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP

Tags:  PREL PGOV ASEC UNSC IV 
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PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #1355/01 3421420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081420Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2253
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0379
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1478
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABIDJAN 001355 

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KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC UNSC IV
SUBJECT: ELEVENTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP

REF: ABIDJAN 1317

Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABIDJAN 001355

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC UNSC IV
SUBJECT: ELEVENTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP

REF: ABIDJAN 1317

Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. At the eleventh meeting of the International
Working Group (IWG),Prime Minister Banny sought to persuade
the group that significant progress has been made to
implement UN Security Council Resolution 1721, especially on
re-launching identification, returning civil servants to the
North, and beginning to discuss military reform. He asked
for clarification on the intent of the Resolution with
respect to his control over the military and his decree
powers. Banny also appealed to international donors to
provide more financial assistance for the peace process. The
new Congolese lead in-country mediator for the AU has brought
new energy to the Mediation Group, a sub-group of the IWG
that works on a daily basis between the IWG's monthly
meetings. The commanders of ONUCI (the UN Operation in Cote
d'Ivoire) and the French Licorne peacekeeping force remain
extremely concerned about the security situation in the
country. The final communique from this meeting sidesteps
directly answering the question of how broad the Prime
Minister's control over the military and his decree powers
should be. It is more direct in criticizing President
Gbagbo's reinstatement of three of his cronies who were
implicated in the toxic waste disaster, and his seizing
control of state-owned media. For the first time the IWG
communique suggests tight deadlines for the implementation of
key steps in the peace process. It strongly protests the
blocking of access to the Prime Minister's office for ONUCI
bodyguards protecting him and opposition ministers.


2. (C) IWG members clearly were trying through the communique
to put as much IWG weight as possible behind the Prime
Minister in his confrontation with the President. However,
it does not appear that President Gbagbo found the communique
particularly threatening. He did immediately issue his own
communique condemning the IWG, but there were no street
protests and there has been little further outcry from the

Gbagbo camp. Perhaps they are getting used to IWG rhetoric
that in the end has little real impact on the situation. The
next IWG will be January 12. End Summary.


3. (U) The IWG held its eleventh meeting on December 1, 2006
in Abidjan, co-chaired as usual by Congolese Foreign Minister
Rodolphe Adada and UN Special Representative of the Secretary
General in Cote d'Ivoire (SRSG) Pierre Schori. In attendance
were French Cooperation Minister Brigitte Girardin; Ghana
Foreign Minister Nan Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo; AU Commissioner
for Peace and Security Said Djinnit; ECOWAS Executive
Secretary Mohamed Ibn Chambas; UN High Representative for

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Elections in Cote d'Ivoire (HRE) Gerard Stoudmann; Special
Representative of the AU Chairman Jean Marie Mokoko; and
representatives from Benin, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, the EU, the
World Bank, and the International Organization of French
Speaking Countries (Francophonie).


4. (C) Prime Minister Banny as usual addressed the group and
then answered questions. Banny looked shaken by his tense
ongoing confrontation with President Gbagbo. He had just
flown in from Yamoussoukro, where earlier in the week he told
the Ambassador he feels safer than in Abidjan (reftel).


5. (C) Banny sought to persuade the group that despite the
tense political situation, and despite the fact that
President Gbagbo has not yet given his promised proposals for
implementing the Resolution in the wake of his "consultations
with society" about it, significant progress has been made in
the weeks since it was adopted. On identification, the
guidelines are now revised, and 200 new tribunals have been
authorized for issuing certificates of nationality.
Logistical preparations for the tribunals are now being made:
organizing space, procuring furniture etc. Banny said he
hoped the list of proposed judges for the new tribunals would
be finalized by the end of the following week. He said he
hoped there would be little if any controversy over the list
this time, because he will send it to the President through
the Supreme Chamber of Judges, not through the Justice
Minister, and he will not include any of the judges whose
appointment Gbagbo has declared illegal. He was optimistic
that the mobile courts (audiences foraines) could be
re-launched the following week immediately after the list of
judges was finalized.


6. (C) Banny said he had finished plans for a working group
on identification/voter registration with all interested
Ivoirian parties and the UN High Representative for
Elections, as called for in para. 17 of UNSCR 1721, and he

ABIDJAN 00001355 002 OF 004


expected these plans to be approved at a Cabinet meeting he
would chair that same afternoon. Banny also said he would
announce the name of the company selected to be the technical
operator for the identification/voter registration process on
the Friday of the following week. (Note: The technical
operator is supposed to create and manage the database of
names for identification and voter registration.)


7. (C) Banny said he had also completed plans for a working
group on restructuring the military, with all interested
Ivoirian parties, ONUCI and the French Licorne peacekeeping
force, as called for in para. 15 of UNSCR 1721. He expected
this working group, which he himself would chair, also to be
approved by the Cabinet later that afternoon.


8. (C) The Prime Minister then reviewed progress on the
return of civilian administration to the North. He said this
was proceeding quickly, with all mayors already back, and
prefects and sub-prefects also returning. He had sent the
Minister of Local Government to the North, on a successful
mission to assure the rebel New Forces (FN) that the
returning prefects would not challenge the authority of the
FN military district commanders.


9. (C) The Prime Minister then made a strong appeal for more
international financial assistance, to pay for disarmament,
the return of civilian administration to the North,
identification, and elections. He estimated that the total
cost for all four operations would be CFA 125 billion (about
USD 250 million). The government has CFA 65 billion (about
USD 128 million) available, from budgetary resources and
foreign assistance already received, which leaves a funding
gap of CFA 61 billion (about USD 122 million). Banny urged
that a donors' conference be held as soon as possible. He
also acknowledged that Cote d'Ivoire's arrears to the World
Bank are a serious obstacle to receiving assistance from the
international financial institutions, but he said he was
confident he could cut this "Gordian knot" using his years of
experience as a central banker.


10. (C) Banny then asked the group to help clarify the
wording of UNSCR 1721 in two places: concerning his control
over the military, and his decree powers. He pointed to the
wording of para. 9 of the Resolution, which calls for him to
have "the necessary authority" over the Defense and Security
Forces." He asked for clarification of what this means, and
also asked what he should do if the military refuse to obey
his orders. Second, he pointed to the wording of para. 8 of
the Resolution, which calls for him to be "empowered to take
all necessary decisions, in all matters, within the Council
of Ministers or the Council of Government, by ordinances or
decree-laws." He asked what authority bestowed upon him the
power to issue decrees, a power which the constitution
reserves for the President, and more particularly, what
empowered him to sign decrees within the Council of
Ministers, which is chaired by the President (whereas the
Prime Minister chairs the Council of Government).


11. (C) Much of the question and answer session focused on
Banny's two questions about how to interpret UNSCR 1721.
Many members, led by France, Ghana and Congo, urged Banny to
assert complete control over the military, including the
power to hire and fire, and to assert full power to sign
decrees either in the Council of Government or in the Council
of Ministers, as he saw fit. If anyone disobeyed his orders,
he should fire them. South Africa, on the other hand,
insisted that para. 9 calls only for Banny to have sufficient
control over the security forces to implement his tasks under
the Resolution, and that the intent of para. 9 is for Banny
to have control over all security forces in Cote d'Ivoire,
including the rebel FN. South Africa also interpreted the
para. 8's wording on decree powers to leave all power to sign
decrees in the hands of the President. Members also asked
how Banny saw the way forward on state-owned media, now that
the President has taken over both state-owned TV and the
state-owned newspaper, and on the toxic waste disaster, now
that Gbagbo has reinstated his three cronies. France asked
explicitly whether Banny thought the Security Council should
cancel President Gbagbo's decrees. In both cases Banny said
these were issues that were still pending. On the
state-owned media, he said this was a matter that he needed
to thrash out with the President, and on the toxic waste
disaster, he said justice would continue to take its course,
implying that the three Gbagbo cronies could still face
prosecution.


12. (C) After the Prime Minister departed, Congolese General
Mokoko, newly installed as the AU's in-country mediator
replacing South African Samuel Silumko Sokupa, briefed on the

ABIDJAN 00001355 003 OF 004


work of the Mediation Group over the last month. (Note: The
Mediation Group, a sub-group of the IWG, is led by the AU
mediator and also includes the SRSG, the local ECOWAS
representative, the local Francophonie representative and,
now, the HRE. It works on a daily basis in between the
monthly meetings of the IWG, to advance the implementation
previously of UNSCR 1633 and now of UNSCR 1721.) It was
clear from Mokoko's briefing that the Mediation Group will be
much more dynamic under his leadership than it was in the
past. For example, one of his first actions was to invite
HRE Stoudmann to join the group. In addition, within his
first few weeks in the job, the Group met with the President,
the Prime Minister, rebel leader Guillaume Soro, the chairman
of the electoral commission, and the chairman of the
disarmament commission. (Note: the meeting with the
President was arranged with great difficulty. Gbagbo is no
longer willing to meet individually with SRSG Schori or HRE
Stoudmann.) They also traveled to the North to personally
inspect two of the pre-regroupment sites where rebel FN
soldiers are to begin the disarmament process. Mokoko said
he found one of the two sites completely uninhabitable.


13. (C) Later, General Fernand Amoussou, ONUCI Force
Commander, and General Antoine Lecerf, Commander of the
French Licorne peacekeeping force, gave another very bleak
assessment of the security situation. Amoussou called the
situation dangerous, unstable and deteriorating. He said
there were increasing signs of divisions within the military,
and of resentment within the military over the preferential
treatment being given to the militias over them. Lecerf said
there is increasing risk of social explosion, both in the
North and in the South. Those who created the militias no
longer control them. There are two many weapons and too much
money in circulation. The situation in the West is
especially critical.


14. (C) General Amoussou also informed the group that after
Prime Minister Banny had left the IWG, the President's
Republican Guard prevented the vehicles carrying his ONUCI
bodyguards from accompanying Banny past the gate of the
compound where both the Presidential palace and the Prime
Minister's office are located. The same thing happened to
two opposition ministers as they arrived for the Cabinet
meeting being held in the Prime Minister's office.
Eventually the IWG received word that from now on, no ONUCI
vehicles will be allowed past the gates of the compound.
SRSG Schori called this incident outrageous and unacceptable,
and he called for the meeting's communique to strongly
condemn it. Many IWG members echoed his reaction.


15. (C) The discussion of the communique was long and
contentious, especially over how to address key issues such
as the prime minister's control over the military, his decree
powers, the toxic waste/reinstatement issue, and the
RTI/Fraternite Matin issue. In the end, the communique
sidesteps directly answering the Prime Minister's two
questions about how to interpret UNSCR 1721 on his control of
the military and his decree powers. South Africa's creative
reading of para. 9 of UNSCR 1721 as calling for the Prime
Minister to control both government and rebel security forces
did make it into the communique. It explicitly mentions
President Gbagbo's reinstatement of his cronies, noting the
"deep dissatisfaction" this caused within the population.
The communique also "deplores" the dismissal of the directors
of RTI and Fraternite Matin, noting that these are both
violations of the Pretoria Agreement, and calls the
reinstatement of the dismissed officials "indispensable."
For the first time, the IWG communique suggests tight
deadlines for the completion of several key, near-term steps
in the peace process. Finally, the communique condemns the
Republican Guard's refusal to allow the Prime Minister's
ONUCI bodyguards to accompany him to his office, and it warns
that "those responsible" will be reported to the UN Security
Council's Sanctions Committee. On this point, the French
fought bitterly for the head of the Republican Guard to be
blamed by name for this incident, and were extremely
disappointed and angry when they did not prevail.


16. (U) The next IWG will be January 12.


17. (C) Comment. It seemed to us that the Prime Minister's
questions about how to interpret UNSCR 1721 were rhetorical,
meant to draw attention to responsibilities the Resolution
places upon him that may be desirable in theory but in
practice are impossible for him to carry out. It also
appeared to us that Banny was asking the IWG for some
latitude to try to work out the RTI and reinstatement issues
directly with the President. However, other IWG members
clearly did not see it that way, seeking through the

ABIDJAN 00001355 004 OF 004


communique to put as much IWG weight as possible behind the
Prime Minister in his confrontation with the president.
Judging by Gbagbo's reaction, he seems not to have found the
communique too threatening. He did immediately issue a
communique of his own condemning the IWG and this latest
communique, especially para. 3 which mentions the toxic waste
disaster and Gbagbo's reinstatement of his cronies, but there
were no street protests and little further public outcry from
the Gbagbo camp. Perhaps they are getting used to IWG
rhetoric that in the end has little real impact on the
situation. End Comment.

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