Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABIDJAN1331
2006-12-04 15:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT GBAGBO WILL NOT DISMISS PRIME MINISTER

Tags:  IV PGOV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5572
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #1331/01 3381538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041538Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2223
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0376
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1471
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001331 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: IV PGOV
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GBAGBO WILL NOT DISMISS PRIME MINISTER
BANNY, AT LEAST NOT NOW

Classified By: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001331

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: IV PGOV
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GBAGBO WILL NOT DISMISS PRIME MINISTER
BANNY, AT LEAST NOT NOW

Classified By: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the Ambassador on
November 30, President Gbagbo made the following points:

-- he will not fire Prime Minister Banny, although he did
not appreciate the PM's communiqu7 dealing with presidential
decrees; instead, he fired the Director of the radio and
television authority;

-- he will not ask the French to withdraw Licorne troops, at
least not for now;

-- he would like to see the buffer zone (Zone of Confidence)
eliminated since there is no longer a risk of war with the
rebels;

-- he has blessed the efforts of general officers of the
armed forces to encourage dialog between himself and the
Prime Minister.

-- he would like to see elections held in July 2007. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) President Gbagbo met with the Ambassador on
Thursday, November 30, in a two-hour session that ended at
midnight. After holding forth at length on the history of
independence movements in French-speaking Africa, the
President launched into the key points he had prepared for
the meeting. He began by stating that he would not fire PM
Banny, even though he did not appreciate the PM's communiqu7,
which the President labeled as seditious, that put in
question the President's decrees reinstating those allegedly
involved in the toxic waste scandal. Many people are urging
him to fire PM Banny, but that would be the wrong thing to do
now. The Ambassador strongly supported the President's
decision, and pointed out that firing Banny would put
President Gbagbo at odds with the international community and
the President would find himself challenging UN Resolution
1721, which would have serious consequences.


3. (C) President Gbagbo said he was surprised when ten
general officers, headed by Chief of Staff Mangou, showed up
at the Presidential Palace on Tuesday and told him that they
supported the Chief of State who had been duly elected, but
they urged him to resume a dialog with the PM, since that was
in the interests of the country. They wanted the President's
permission to go see the PM to urge the PM also to resume the
dialog with President Gbagbo. President Gbagbo said he was

touched, and told them that not only did they have his
authorization, but also his blessing. He said they came back
to see him on Thursday morning to report on their positive
meeting with the PM, and he had immediately called the PM.
The PM would be coming to see him as soon as the IWG meeting
was over the following day.


4. (C) The President stated that the Zone of Confidence
(ZOC) should be absorbed into the Government-controlled area.
The rebels no longer have any military capacity to attack
and he and his military have no intention of attacking the
rebels; hence there is no need to maintain a ZOC. The
Ambassador told the President that indeed the ZOC will
disappear when conditions are ripe, such as an identification
process and DDR well underway, and civil servants moving back
north. All of that assumes that the level of confidence is
far higher than it is now, especially in the tense
environment that currently prevails in Cote d'Ivoire. The
President also suggested that senior Government officials,
such as Fologo (Head of the Economic and Social Commission),
should start traveling in the North as a way of
reestablishing Government authority. The Ambassador endorsed
that idea, but pointed out that senior officials needed to
start pianissimo, focusing strictly on their official
functions, not with political campaigns. The Ambassador
noted that the purpose of his own trips to the North were to
emphasize the unity of the country, and reminded the
President that the President's policies, such as blocking
school exams in the North, had contributed to reinforcing the
dividing line, not erasing it. COMMENT: President Gbagbo is
naive if he thinks that the electric atmosphere he has just
created is the moment to suggest erasing the ZOC, but then,
this is his nature, to agitate the waters, then act as if
nothing has happened.


5. (C) President Gbagbo stated that he will not ask France to
withdraw Licorne troops, although that is what the population
wants. The time is not yet ripe. Eventually, all French
troops will have to leave so that Cote d'Ivoire will be an

ABIDJAN 00001331 002 OF 003


independent country. The Ambassador remarked that indeed now
was not the time to ask French troops to leave. The USG sees
Licorne troops as part of the security package, and if
Licorne left, UNOCI would be weakened and exposed, something
Washington would find troubling.


6. (C) Turning to his next point, President Gbagbo said that
the first round of presidential elections should take place
in July 2007. Should a second round be necessary, it could
be organized in August or September. The Ambassador remarked
that the sooner elections could take place, the better.
While technically elections could be held as early as July,
the political will necessary to move forward is still
lacking, and the war of decrees with the PM this past week
will complicate matters. The President stated confidently
that the political will to move forward will be there.


7. (C) The Ambassador then shifted the discussion to the
President's recent decrees. The Ambassador pointed out that
reinstating those implicated in the toxic waste disaster gave
the appearance of repudiating the PM. President Gbagbo said
he had already instructed two district attorneys to
investigate the involvement of Government officials in the
toxic waste scandal, so PM Banny's investigative commission
showed a lack of confidence in what the President had done.
The Ambassador noted that all elements of the Government were
slow to react to the toxic waste disaster, and the population
expected to see some action, something which they had not yet
seen from the district attorneys.


8. (C) The Ambassador focused considerable attention on the
decree firing the director of RTI, the radio and television
authority. President Gbagbo said that the Director of RTI
should have consulted the Presidency before broadcasting a
seditious statement. The Ambassador pointed out that the RTI
Director is responsible for broadcasting the news, which a
communiqu7 from the PM is, not in censuring the contents of
Government communiqu7s. The Ambassador observed that the
international community will see this decree as muzzling the
press, and it puts the President at odds with the Pretoria
Accords. The Ambassador added that the PM was responsible
for the contents of the communiqu7, not the Director of RTI.
President Gbagbo said he had fired the Director of RTI rather
than the PM just to avoid breaking a bigger pot.


9. (C) Surprisingly, President Gbagbo said the IWG
(International Working Group) had never invited him to come
to their meeting. The Ambassador asked whether the President
would come if invited. He said, why not? If I am invited, I
will go. He added that the IWG always saw him as the 'bad
boy' and the IWG communiqu7s were one-sided. When the
Ambassador asked the President again whether he was serious
about attending the IWG meeting, the President said yes.
COMMENT: The Ambassador raised this idea with the two
Co-Presidents of the IWG, SRSG Schori and MFA Adada, both of
whom approved of the idea and said they will try to meet with
Gbagbo to invite him to the next IWG meeting. Interestingly,
if Gbagbo accepts the invitation, it will show that he
somehow accepts the legitimacy of the IWG.


10. (C) Throughout the meeting, President Gbagbo did not
waste an opportunity to bash the French. He said that French
Ambassador Janier had requested that the President meet with
Minister of Cooperation Girardin (who heads the French
delegation to the IWG) and he said no, not until his anger
had passed. He commented that Minister Girardin had never
requested to see him and had stated in a radio interview that
she was prepared to meet with President Gbagbo if he invited
her, something he found insulting and unacceptable. COMMENT:
Mme. Girardin's first name is Brigitte, not "la conne"
(bitch) as President Gbagbo generally refers to her.


11. (C) These days few people make it into President
Gbagbo's good graces. When he mentioned Congolese Foreign
Minister Rodolphe Adada, he characterized Adada as arrogant
and full of himself, something which the President does not
like.

12 (C) COMMENT: President Gbagbo is often difficult to
read. He appears confident and self-assured, but he is
clearly keeping an ear focused on the reaction of the
international community. He has just rocked the political
boat with his series of decrees and reminded everyone that he
has to be reckoned with. Unfortunately, this is vintage
Gbagbo, in that he has stirred the waters, but he does not
know how to guide the boat to shore. And he has side-tracked
the political process, which puts seriously at risk the
objective of organizing elections by October 2007 as called

ABIDJAN 00001331 003 OF 003


for in UN Resolution 1721.
Hooks