COTE D'IVOIRE: AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF THE SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 001303

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF THE SECURITY
FORCES

REF: ABIDJAN 820

Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. The armed forces are playing a very
ambiguous role in Cote d'Ivoire's political process. No one
trusts the security forces: not President Gbagbo, not Prime
Minister Banny, and not the public. FANCI (Armed Forces of
Cote d'Ivoire) Chief of Staff Mangou's loyalty to Gbagbo goes
well beyond the traditional role of a chief of staff, but he
also sometimes obeys orders from Banny and the Defense
Minister. Gbagbo's reliance on militias to work his
political will instead of the security forces undermines
their morale and public trust in them. UN Security Council
Resolution 1721 was meant to give Banny more control over the
security forces but Gbagbo has made clear he will not allow
this. There are signs of divisions with the security forces
with some still supporting Gbagbo and others shifting their
support to Banny. Some probably also still secretly support
the rebels. Clashes within the security forces cannot be
ruled out, but Gbagbo seems to have reduced prospects of a
coup. The ambiguous role of the security forces is
infecting the political process, but the political process is
also infecting the security forces, yet another illustration
of how deeply rooted Cote d'Ivoire's problems are. End
Summary.


2. (C) The government security forces are playing a very
ambiguous role in Cote d'Ivoire's current political crisis.


3. (C) No one trusts the security forces, including President
Gbagbo. Instead, Gbagbo continues to rely on the militias he
created, and the thuggish pro-Gbagbo FESCI (Federation of
University and High School Students of Cote d'Ivoire),to
intimidate the opposition and work his political will. To a
lesser extent Gbagbo also relies on mercenaries from Liberia
and elsewhere as a back-up military force. In one sense this
is not surprising, given the attempted coup against Gbagbo in
2002, and the memory of the successful coup against President
Bedie in 1999. However, it undermines the morale of the
security forces and public trust in them. Indeed, the
presence of security forces most visible to the public is at
road checkpoints where drivers are routinely shaken down for
bribes.


4. (C) Prime Minister Banny also does not trust the security
forces. Banny and the Defense Minister told the Ambassador
July 26 (reftel) that FANCI Chief of Staff General Philippe
Mangou is "evasive" in his responses to their requests for
support, does not always carry out orders from them, and
frequently receives instructions directly from Gbagbo's
entourage.


5. (C) Indeed, Mangou's loyalty to President Gbagbo goes well
beyond that of a traditional chief of staff. On several
occasions he has intervened in clashes between pro-Gbagbo
militias and security forces to shelter the militias,
ostensibly as mediator. And he goes out of his way to make
public statements pledging the loyalty of the armed forces to
Gbagbo. Notably in a speech November 3 i.e. after UNSCR
1721, he reaffirmed the support of the armed forces for
Gbagbo as commander-in-chief.


6. (C) However, there was nothing evasive in Mangou's
October 31 communique publicly rejecting Banny's proposal to
form a special unit from the armed forces to asist with
dismantling the militias. The Pretoria Agreement provided
for elements of the security forces to be made available to
the Prime Minister for this task, and Banny tried to set up
his own special unit, but Mangou issued a communique noting
that under the Pretoria Agreement it is the President who is
to designate these units, turning down Banny's proposal for a
newly-formed unit, and designating an existing unit for the
task. "Obviously there is a real problem of communication
between the Prime Minister's office and the top hierarchy of
the Defense and Security Forces," the communique went on to
say.


7. (C) The chain of command is also very unclear.
Presidential advisor and former Defense Minister Kadet Bertin
wields a great deal of influence, both over the armed forces
and over the militias. In early 2005 during parliamentary
hearings about the budget, the Finance Minister admitted that
in the previous year large amounts of money had been spent
off budget, i.e. not through the defense ministry but
presumably through Bertin, to buy weapons.


8. (C) UN Security Council Resolution 1721 was meant to give

ABIDJAN 00001303 002 OF 002


Banny more control over the security forces, in paragraph 9,
which states that the Prime Minister must have "the necessary
authority" over the military. However, President Gbagbo
noted pointedly in his November 2 address to the nation, that
the UNSC 1721 did not say explicitly that the Prime Minister
should have the power to appoint military officers, as had
been proposed in an earlier draft of the resolution, and he
stated flatly that the Prime Minister would have no such
power.


9. (C) The security forces have an ambiguous relationship
with the militias. For example, in January when militias
paralyzed Abidjan with street barricades for four days to
protest an IWG (International Working Group) communique
noting that the mandate of the National Assembly had expired,
security forces disappeared from sight. However, in
September, when FESCI tried to attack the police academy,
security forces fought back, beating and eventually firing
upon the protestors. (President Gbagbo later fired the
commander of the police academy and welcomed FESCI leaders at
his residence.)


10. (C) There are signs of divisions within the security
forces, with some continuing to support Gbagbo and others
supporting Banny. Indeed, there was a front page article
about this in the moderately pro-opposition but generally
accurate newspaper 24 Heures November 16, which quoted one
source within the security forces as saying, "We cannot
continue to follow blindly someone who has lost all legality
since the mandate expired which made him the supreme chief of
the army. Gbagbo was the supreme chief of the armies because
he was the President of the Republic. He lost that
prerogative as soon as his presidential mandate expired."
Indeed, the September incident when security forces fired on
FESCI protestors may well be a sign of increasing
exasperation at least in some quarters with the way the
militias defy them with impunity. It is also entirely
possible, though impossible to know for sure, that there is
lingering sympathy for the rebels, because most rebel
officers are ex-FANCI and there are certainly substantial
numbers of Northerners in the FANCI. The possibility of open
clashes within the security forces cannot be ruled out,
though Gbagbo appears to have peppered the ranks of the
security forces with enough loyal supporters at all levels to
diminish the possibility of a coup.


12. (C) Comment. The ambiguous role of the security forces
is infecting the political process here, but the political
process is also infecting the security forces. This is yet
another illustration of how deeply rooted Cote d' Ivoire's
problems are. End Comment.

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