Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ABIDJAN1250
2006-11-09 14:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION PARTIES UNHAPPY WITH UNSCR 1721; PM

Tags:  PGOV PREL IV UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4659
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #1250/01 3131405
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091405Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2141
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 001250 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV UN
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES UNHAPPY WITH UNSCR 1721; PM
FINALLY REACTS PUBLICLY TO GBAGBO'S EFFORTS TO UNDERCUT HIM

REF: A. ABIDJAN 1228

B. ABIDJAN 1237

Classified By: DepPolEconChief EMassinga, Reasons 1.4 (b & d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 001250

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IV UN
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES UNHAPPY WITH UNSCR 1721; PM
FINALLY REACTS PUBLICLY TO GBAGBO'S EFFORTS TO UNDERCUT HIM

REF: A. ABIDJAN 1228

B. ABIDJAN 1237

Classified By: DepPolEconChief EMassinga, Reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) Summary. The Ivorian political class continues to
react to UNSCR 1721 and the President's ongoing efforts to
shape the political terrain to his liking. Both the Forces
Nouvelles (NF) and major unarmed opposition parties expressed
disappointment with 1721, specifically the decision to avoid
explicitly subordinating the Ivorian constitution. However,
they both indicated that they would accept the resolution and
asked the international community to react to the President's
apparent dismissal of 1721 elements he doesn't accept. Prime
Minister Banny has asked the Embassy to issue a statement
supportive of his position, and finally made a statement
himself indicating that he will restart the indentification
process, disarm the militias, reintegrate the military and
restore civil administration throughout the country. End
Summary.

New Forces
==========

2. (C) DCM and Econ Chief met with Forces Nouvelles Deputy
Secretary General and Minister of Solidarity and War Victims

SIPDIS
Louis Andre Dacoury Tabley on November 6 in his Abidjan
ministerial HQ. In an animated discussion, Dacoury expressed
the NF's plain displeasure with the President's immediate
efforts to define the adoption of UNSCR 1721 as a victory.
Recounting the history of the conflict since 2002, Dacoury
placed the blame for incessant blockages to the peace and
reconciliation process in the camp of the President and his
supporters. Dacoury then went on to discuss what the NF sees
as the key to genuine progress, the resumption of the
audiences foraines and identification process. Claiming that
more than half of the citizenry lacks national identification
cards (himself included),he claimed that Gbabgo's is the
latest in a line of Ivorian governments that have manipulated
the national identification question for electoral advantage.
Dacoury argued that the identification program launched in
the spring and summer should be renewed as it had been
structured, saying it went hand-in-hand with the successful

roll-out of the pre-regroupment process within the DDR
framework. Dacoury rejected modifying the audiences foraines
through the use of an expanded cadre of fixed judges, arguing
that without the audiences foraines, many average citizens
would not be registered because of the hardship involved in
having to travel long distances.


3. (C) Reacting to FPI talking points blaming the
"rebellion" for failing to disarm as the central factor
impeding the reunification of the country, Dacoury said the
FPI was using the disarmament question to hide its
unwillingness to allow a process leading to elections to go
forward. In response to standard FPI assertions that
conducting audiences foraines in NF-controlled territory
would subject them to unacceptable pressure from armed
partisans, Dacoury said international forces and all the
political parties would supervise the process. Responding to
a question, Dacoury said military-to-military discussions are
beside the point; "the central problem is not a military one,
but a political one. The militaries finished their work in
July, but it remains up to political leaders to implement
plans already agreed to." The Minister did concede that not
all NF troops have remained in pre-regroupment areas under
the process begun earlier this year because of the condition
of these sites. However, he added that the troops could
easily reconvene at these sites once the DDR process resumes.


4. (C) Dacoury said the NF support expanded powers for the
PM. Turning to the role of the international community, and
particularly the United States, Dacoury asked that Gbagbo be
censured for his outright refusal to cooperate with the
international will, as expressed in UNSCR 1721. In response
to a DCM observation that the international community cannot
impose peace, Dacoury said "you are here. Do something.
Require those who promise something to keep their word."
Noting that the Constitution was approved by a minority, the
Minister questioned the UNSC's (and U.S.'s) unwillingness to
explicitly subordinate it to 1721.

RHDP
====

5. (C) The Ambassador met with Rally of Houphouetists for
Democracy and Peace (RHDP, a coalition of the major unarmed
oppositions parties, the PDCI and the RDR) Chairman Alphonse
Djedje Mady at PDCI HQ on November 7. In a
well-choreographed meeting, the RHDP leadership was deployed
in force, and a sizable press gaggle had been assembled to
interview the Ambassador and Mady after the meeting, likely
in response to the large press attention to the Ambassador's
meeting with President Gbagbo a day earlier (reftel B),in

ABIDJAN 00001250 002 OF 002


which the pro-government press had slanted the Ambassador's
words to indicate U.S. support for the President.


6. (C) In a frank ninety-minute meeting, Mady expressed
deep reservations about President Gbagbo's real willingness
to allow the peace and electoral processes to move forward
towards elections in October 2007. After the nearly
obligatory review of the history of the crisis since 2002,
Mady began the meeting in earnest by presenting deep
dissatisfaction with the outcome of UNSCR 1721, and asked how
the U.S. could have supported it. Focusing on the question
of the interaction of the constitution and 1721, Mady said
that since the entire Marcoussis-inspired peace process is
outside the limits of the Ivorian constitution, excessive
fidelity to it by the international community does not serve
the Ivorian people or advance the peace process. Using
carefully prepared points, Mady said neither Gbagbo's
extended mandate, the mixed cabinet nor the powers given to
the PM to issue decrees were to be found in the Constitution,
but all these elements are enshrined in 1721. Going further
and referring directly to Gbagbo's aggressive public efforts
to undercut the PM and define 1721 as it suits him, Mady
asked how the international community and the United States
specifically could accept the President's open "rejection" of
the UNSC's stated will.


7. (C) The Ambassador responded with two points. The first
was that 1721 was the result of a compromise, and that its
treatment of the constitutional question was as far as UNSC
was willing to go and that the resolution and constitution
are not contradictory. Second, that the U.S. treats the
question of whether the United Nations can abridge national
sovereignty and a national constitution carefully, and that
creating such a precedent could not be undertaken lightly.
The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. position on 1721 "was
not a vote for Gbagbo or the FPI or anyone else, it was a
vote for the principle."


8. (C) Mady virtually ignored the Ambassador's first point
and focused his attentions exclusively on whether the
international will and the right to protect populations
supersedes sovereignty. Pointing to the Iraq situation, he
noted that the Saddam Hussein regime had a constitution, but
the U.S. led efforts to topple his unjust government. Mady
said his party couldn't understand why the U.S. would side
with Russia and China in the Security Council's
deliberations, countries, he said, which have questionable
democratic credentials. Mady said that the "FPI has
infiltrated all facets of the government and security
forces," and that as long as Gbagbo is the "prime mover" he
will act to block progress. Referring obliquely to the
recent events in Yopougon in which local residents forcibly
ejected pro-government militiamen (septel),Mady said "our
people are ready to go to the streets to support Banny."

Prime Minister Banny
====================

9. (C) The Prime Minister's Political Advisor Yaya Dembele
met with the Econ Chief on November 6th, and confided that
the Prime Minister's team was divided as to how to respond to
the President's post 1721 political offensive. Dembele asked
directly if the U.S. Embassy would issue a public statement
in support of the Prime Minister should the latter issue a
decree that would be contradicted by either the President or
senior leaders of the armed forces. (Note: the Ambassador
plans to meet with the PM to discuss this and other matters.
Results will be reported in septel). In the afternoon of
November 8, the Prime Minister delivered a long-expected
public speech, saying he would relaunch the identification
and DDR processes and proceed with the integration of the
military, dismantling of militias, and reestablishment of
state authority throughout the national territory. He
provided few details, and the speech was delivered abruptly
at 1336 GMT, an hour after his camp had announced it would be
postponed until the evening. Consequently, much of Abidjan
was unsure if the PM had actually spoken for much of the
afternoon of the 8th.



10. (C) Comment: Although the opposition is unhappy with
UNSCR 1721's lack of precision on the question of its
interaction with the Ivorian constitution, it is important to
recognize that they accept it. We anticipate they, as well
as the Prime Minister, will continue to look to the
international community to compel Gbagbo's compliance with
its provisions. End Comment
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