COTE D'IVOIRE: UN HIGH REP FOR ELECTIONS DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001234

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: PREL IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: UN HIGH REP FOR ELECTIONS DISCUSSES
ROAD FORWARD AFTER 1721

REF: ABIDJAN 1173

Classified By: Poloff Laura Taylor-Kale, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Gerard Stoudmann, UN High Representative
for Elections, is cautiously optimistic that elections in
Cote d'Ivoire will happen in 2007, but that positive scenario
will require all the parties to exhibit substantially more
political will than they have shown heretofore. He cautioned
that the 2007 deadline will be built upon a very tight
schedule with little room for delay at any stage of the
process. Stoudmann also expressed regret that due to lack of
funding his own contract ends in two weeks. See action
request in paragraph 10. END SUMMARY

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Proposed Timeframe for Elections
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2. (C) In a November 2 luncheon at the Ambassador's
residence, UN High Representative for Elections in Cote
d'Ivoire Gerard Stoudmann outlined the steps the Government
of Cote d'Ivoire, UN bodies and the major Ivorian political
actors need to take now to meet the October 31, 2007,
deadline called for in UNSCR 1721. Stoudmann said that he
and his team favor kicking off an aggressive public relations
campaign on December 1 that would outline the ambitious 8-9
month identification/election list preparations the UN
elections team envisions. This timeframe contrasts with the
November 15 date privately proposed by PM Banny. Stoudmann
stated that putting the Ivorian National Statistical service
(INS) and other key institutions into shape technically would
take until December for a credible process to be ready. The
new sub-prefects participating in the audiences foraines will
have to be identified and trained, and the 133 new judgeships
created by Presidential decree (Abidjan 1173) will have to be
operationalized and the judges themselves given (perhaps by
the High Representative himself using the powers provided by
1721) the flexibility to function outside of their defined
jurisdiction. The High Representative noted that very few
Ivorians have valid identity cards, and that those cards
would have to be replaced anyway by the new process,
something poorly understood by most of the population.


3. (C) Stoudmann plans to implement a dual-track plan for
national identification and voter registration which will
overlap. In December the expanded audiences foraines would
be launched and run for 2-3 months, while the voter
registration process would start later and also run for 2-3
months. Both phases will end by mid-May. A provisional
voting list would be ready by the end of May and the process
of producing and distributing voting cards would commence
(Note: PM Banny's team has dithered in choosing among the six
companies bidding on the national ID project, potentially
adding yet additional delays and frustrating the UN elections
team. End Note). The voting cards would be distributed by
July 31, allowing three months for the preparations of
elections.


4. (C) Pressed by the Ambassador as to whether this
timeframe were realistic, Stoudmann readily acknowledged this
to be a highly optimistic scenario and commented that the
timeframe proposed leaves no room for the inevitable
blockages bound to disturb the process. More importantly,
the government and international groups managing the
elections need to set a limited timeframe for national
identification process and voter registration because it is
impossible to register all of the estimated two million
potential citizens (four million according to the New Forces
and 500,000 according to the FPI) by October 31, 2007 as
called for by UNSCR 1721. Stoudmann said that even using his
ambitious timeframe in a best-case scenario, only about one
million people would be identified. The international
community must work towards reaching a rough 50% threshold
for addressing the identity question for the elections. "The
country cannot wait," he said, "for every last possible voter
to be identified and enrolled." This compromise would have
to be made clear to everyone ahead of time, and the process
restarted after elections.


5. (C) Stoudmann expressed reservations as to the technical
capacity of the National Institute of Statistics (INS). He
said that the INS could participate in the process, but would
need to be folded into a larger structure. Its governance is
problematic as four of its top leaders are FPI activists,
which could prejudice the impartiality of elections.

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Searching for Political Will
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6. (C) The High Representative believes the Prime Minister
has the political will to move forward the tightly
coordinated steps outlined above. Stoudmann remarked that
simultaneous, or near-simultaneous disarmament would have to
take place in order to allow election planning to go forward.
Initial disarmament would be relatively simple, with
pre-groupment being completed in 1-2 weeks. This would allow
moving forward on identification for approximately 6 weeks to
act as a "down payment" encouraging the New Forces to go
forward with DDR.


7. (C) Hitting this trifecta will not be simple, but the
High Representative said there is some room for optimism.
"Time is against everyone," he remarked. "Gbagbo is having
trouble putting his people in the streets and Soro does not
control his people. Ouattara's RDR, particularly the young
members of the party, are not happy with him and his
old-school governance style." Stoudmann said Chirac's
Advisor on Africa Joubert told him that Bedie is living
luxuriously in Paris waiting for the French government to put
him back in power, leaving the Quay d'Orsay and the President
incensed. Stoudmann said Gbagbo feels threatened by Banny
most of all, and aims to exclude him from the process, making
Banny fearful for his own safety. Stoudmann agreed with
the Ambassador that Soro and the FN have made little to no
effort to transform themselves into something other than a
rebellion. Abroad since the end of September, Soro is
apparently concerned for his safety and is preoccupied with
how to handle his militia forces. Converging pressure on
Gbagbo and Soro may create the kind of dynamic needed to
drive main contending groups (the FPI and the NFs) into
accepting a deal on proceeding with elections coupled with
disarmament.

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There's A Chance(
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8. (C) Stoudmann laid out three possible scenarios for the
coming year. In the first, unlikely, scenario, the UN takes
over and administers Cote d'Ivoire. Secondly, parties find a
non-institutional solution where the UN is not involved, much
like in Haiti with Aristide. However, who is likely to
implement this scenario is unclear. The final and most
realistic scenario involves a more proactive UN. The UN, the
African Union, the US, and France would have to put more
pressure on all the actors. Stoudmann conceded that France
carries baggage on the Ivorian political scene, that
President Chirac will be unwilling to negotiate with Gbagbo
and that the impending elections season in France precludes
any French flexibility on Cote d'Ivoire policy. Compaore of
Burkina, in Stoudmann's estimation, is a key interlocutor,
able, with his control over NF territories trade and economy,
to "deliver" the NF and Soro in a way Mbeki could not.

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Frustration with Banny's Governance Style
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9. (C) Stoudmann remarked that Banny is "very much a one
man show," consulting with others sometimes but primarily
acting unilaterally. Citing Banny's unilateral decision to
move forward with the August 3 audience foraine (which
resulted in significant violence and the eventual halt of the
process),Stoudmann said this tendency causes frustration and
Banny ends up marginalizing himself. Egotistical and bored
with key details, Banny has made himself a principal FPI
target. Stoudmann mused that while Banny has faults, "he is
the best we have." The Ambassador agreed that the
international community must work together to encourage Banny
to consult more effectively.

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Funding Challenges for the Special Representative's Office
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10. Since the UNSC did not agree to continue funding for the
Office of the Special Representative for Elections,
Stoudmann's office is out of funding and his own contract
ends on November 16, requiring his departure. COMMENT: Were
Stoudmann to leave this month, his departure would be a
serious setback for the momentum of the Ivorian electoral
process. Stoudmann confirmed that he has been approached
about replacing Pierre Schori as the SRSG in Cote d'Ivoire,
and he is seriously considering it. If he accepts the offer,

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his current position as HRE would be rolled into the SRSG
job. ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Abidjan recommends that the
Department request USUN to urge the Secretary General to move
expeditiously on Stoudmann's contract, either as HRE or
HRE/SRSG, so that there is no loss of momentum. END COMMENT
Hooks