COTE D'IVOIRE - TENSE BUT CALM AND LIKELY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 001207

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PLEASE PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UNSC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE - TENSE BUT CALM AND LIKELY TO
REMAIN THAT WAY IN THE NEAR TERM

Classified By: DCM VICENTE VALLE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Cote d'Ivoire remains tense on the eve of the end of
the current one-year mandate of President Gbagbo and Prime
Minister Banny and a new UNSC resolution for the country.
While there is no doubt that both Gbagbo and Banny's terms
will be extended, doubts and fears linger over the relative
authority of the President and Prime Minister under the
renewed mandate and the status of the Ivoirian constitution.
Gbagbo's camp is insisting that the constitution and the
President's powers remain sacrosanct, while the opposition is
calling for the suspension of the constitution and the
rejection of Gbagbo or at least the paring back of his
authority. The New Forces have declared that they will no
longer recognize Gbagbo as president after October 31; they
made a similar statement in October 2005.


2. (C) Rumors are rife in Abidjan about possible unrest by
pro-Gbagbo militias (fed by threats and tough talk from some
militia leaders) or opposition youth (who showed a
willingness to take on the militias last July) and both the
Ivoirian military (FANCI) and New Forces rebels (FAFN) have
increased their state of alert. However, despite the
nervousness, there are few signs that conflict or violence is
imminent. It is highly unlikely that either military will
attempt to launch an offensive as Gbagbo did in November 2004
and no indication that they are preparing to do so. While
there is a greater possibility of violence by pro- or
anti-Gbagbo youth, this too seems unlikely at this time. The
heightened rhetoric is standard prior to a decision by the
international community and is not per se a precursor to
violence.


3. (C) The UNSC resolution is likely to be such that neither
side will be completely happy with it, but also one that is
unlikely to ignite violent protests. Interestingly, although
Gbagbo's camp came away from Addis very critical of the AU
Peace and Security Council's recommendations on October 17,
it has since adopted a softer tone and indicated a
willingness to accept a UNSC resolution along the lines of
the PSC's after the French began pushing a tougher resolution
in New York. We also believe that the opposition recognizes
that Gbagbo will remain in office and will eventually accept
this fact publicly.


4. (SBU) In addition, despite the threats by some hardliners,
others on both sides are arguing for a more conciliatory
approach. Young Patriots head Charles Ble Goude, for
example, has said he eschews armed confrontation and Imam
Idris Koudous, head of the National Islamic Council, called
on opposition leaders to renounce violence during his
televised sermon on Ramadan's Night of Destiny.


5. (C) We therefore anticipate no major unrest following
October 31 or a new UNSC resolution. The situation is in
fact reminiscent of the mood a year ago when Gbagbo's normal,
five-year term as president was about to expire. At that
time, too, there was much fear and nervousness, but nothing
much happened. Violence is always possible and even probable
at some time in the future, but there is little likelihood
that it will occur at this time.
Hooks