COTE D'IVOIRE: FORCES NOUVELLES COMMUNICATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 001150

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016
TAGS: PREL ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FORCES NOUVELLES COMMUNICATIONS
DIRECTOR DISCUSSES ABUJA SUMMIT OUTCOME


Classified By: EconCouns Ervin Massinga, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: FN Spokesman Lobognon expressed deep
disappointment at the outcome of the Abuja Summit on Cote
d'Ivoire, suggesting it would allow President Gbagbo to drag
his feet on the identification process for yet another year.
Lobognon added that Gbagbo acted to obstruct the consensus
adoption of recommendations aimed at reenergizing the peace
process. Expressing FN willingness to move forward on
disarmament once the identity blockage is cleared up,
Lobognon allowed that the notion of a new UNSCR strengthening
PM's hand is appealing, but reiterated that constitutional
ambiguities could undercut the overall intention. FN leader
Soro is looking forward to the upcoming UNSC meeting, which
he deems to be the decisive field of action. End Summary.


2. (C) Alain Lobognon, Forces Nouvelles (FN) Communications
Director and close advisor to FN leader Guillaume Soro, met
with Charge and Econ Chief at the Embassy on October 11 to
offer both the FN's assessment of the October 6 extraordinary
meeting of ECOWAS heads of state on the Ivorian political
situation and to preview the position the group will take for
the upcoming Cote d'Ivoire-related meetings at the African
Union and the UN Security Council. Lobognon had recently
returned from Abuja (the FN did not attend the ECOWAS summit
but met with participants on the margins of the meeting) as
well as the Francophonie Summit in Bucharest, at which PM
Banny represented Cote d'Ivoire.


3. (C) Lobognon began by offering the standard expression of
"deep disappointment" in the outcome of the Abuja Summit that
has been publicly expressed by the FN throughout the media in
the days since the meeting. While acknowledging that the
International Community (IC) cannot "impose" a solution, the
FN spokesman said that the situation in Cote d'Ivoire is
worsening, and that a renewal of the current arrangement
would simply produce another year of political blockages.
Referring to what are widely understood as the 'secret'
recommendations ECOWAS has forwarded to both the UNSC and the
AU Peace and Security Council (publicly discussed in major
newspapers since October 7th),Lobognon said that the
"ambiguities" of the plan would set the stage for a
"rupture." (Note: the nature of the rupture was never
addressed, and later he made clear he clearly does not
anticipate a strike by the FANCI across the demilitarized
zone. End Note).


4. (C) Focusing on the details of the ECOWAS plan, Lobognon
said the proposal is no great advance, merely UNSC 1633
redux. Acknowledging it would give greater power to the PM
and reinvigorate the identification and disarmament
processes, he said nevertheless that the use of the
Presidential decree mechanism to overcome current
constitutional hurdles to the plan's implementation would
enable President Gbagbo to simply hide behind the
Constitution for yet another year. Returning to the question
of specificity in the plan, Lobognon again conceded the
overall plan has attractive elements, but sharply questioned
how general objectives such as providing greater power to the
PM in the domains of identification and disarmament would
work without more precision.


5. (C) Charge asked Lobognon to address the question of
disarmament, a frequent target of President Gbagbo (who
broadly attacked the FN on this point at Abuja, according to
a copy of his speech in wide circulation) and FPI leaders
Affi N'Guessan and Mamadou Koulibaly as the central
impediment to peace. Lobognon said that the breakdown of
military-to-military contacts and further progress on
disarmament was the direct result of the President's failure
to honor agreements between the two militaries and to proceed
simultaneously as promised along the identification
(audiences foraines) and DDR paths. Lobognon concluded this
point by saying the FN expects the UNSC to render a decision
on how exactly to reintegrate the armed forces. Later in the
conversation, the FN representative said that FN soldiers who
had been placed in cantonment as part of the pre-regroupment
phase of DDR were still in those areas, despite the poor
conditions of the sites and rumors of a FANCI or militia-led
offensive, which he discounted.


6. (C) The FN spokesman then offered some atmospherics of
the Abuja meeting. Recalling that the debate was "hot," he
tacitly acknowledged the common understanding that Niger's
President Tandja often shielded President Gbagbo from what
would otherwise be a hostile consensus. Describing Gbagbo as
stubborn, Lobognon said the Ivorian President, right from the
beginning of the meeting, took full advantage of the desire

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to act by consensus through offering his outspoken objection
on key points. Host President Obasanjo apparently became so
exasperated by the proceedings that he left in the
mid-afternoon in the midst of discussions that lasted until
after 8pm.


7. (C) Turning to logistics for follow-on meetings, Lobognon
said the AU Peace and Security meeting will take place in
Addis, at the Head of State level on Tuesday, October 17. He
also said the FN's understanding was that the UNSC meeting on
Cote d'Ivoire would take place no earlier than Friday,
October 20, or perhaps a few days thereafter. Soro plans to
go to New York and to Addis although the NF have not received
an invitation to either meeting. (He added that the unarmed
Ivorian opposition, notably the PDCI and RDR, have also not
received invitations and may therefore not be present at
either venue.) According to Lobognon, ECOWAS has appointed
Presidents Yayi of Benin, Wade of Senegal, Compaore of
Burkina Faso and Tandja of Niger to "present" the group's
recommendations to the AU and UNSC.


8. (C) Lobognon said that ECOWAS's proposal to strengthen
Banny must be accepted by all including Gbagbo, but hedged
somewhat by noting that PM Banny himself is sometimes the
problem. He must be willing to grasp the power that the
international community provides, he said. Banny, however,
whom he called "France's selection," remains the FN's choice.
Returning to the question of identity/nationality, Lobognon
said the PM must recognize he is trapped in the current state
of affairs and that Gbagbo is insisting on naming the judges
that will adjudicate nationality (implicitly arguing a new
Constitutional arrangement is thus essential).


9. (C) Comment: While Lobognon's comments were expected, he
eventually softened the FN's public tone of disappointment in
the Summit's outcome. Clearly, the FN would prefer to see
Gbagbo replaced and the Constitution modified or set aside.
However, they have little leverage to insist on this point
and would likely accept an extension of Gbagbo's mandate
provided Banny receives a reinforced mandate, particularly
with regard to authority over the armed forces and the DDR
and identification/nationality processes.
Valle